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!e securitization of migration
!e 2006 United Nations report, #e State of the World’s 
Refugees, outlines many of the challenges of studying 
migration in the contemporary moment. !e first of 
these being the recognition that migration today is 
increasingly ‘mixed’ or blended. In contrast, the post-
World War II state-based migration regimes seem to offer 
governmental categories that, to paraphrase Friedrich 
Nietzsche, grasp at the smoke of an evaporating reality. 
!ese days, student migration is also widely recognized 
(even by governments) to be blended with labour 
migration. With increasing restrictions on labour 
migration, applications for asylum offer one of the few 
routes to a better life; and, with increasingly restrictive 
asylum systems, unknown numbers are falling into 
irregular routes. All of this must be situated against a 
background in which the numbers of migrants in the 
world continues to grow.1 Of course, many migrants 
are not asylum seekers, refugees or ‘illegal’ immigrants, 
but rather migrants working at different levels of the 
globalized world economy. !is special issue of the 
Irish Journal of Anthropology on Managing Migration 
looks at migration from different angles, from high-
tech workers to asylum seekers, and examines the 
migration regimes, management thinking and processes 
of securitization evident in today’s world.
 While we live in a complex world of mixed 
migration, it is nonetheless important to note that 
managing the frictions and flows of population 
mobility is a practical matter for governments, 
international organizations and policy makers. In 2006, 
for example, Elaine Dezenski of the US Department of 
Homeland Security discussed the North America and 
Mexico Security and Prosperity Partnership (SSP) at 
an EU conference and set out the aim of migration 
management in the following terms:
To streamline the secure and efficient movement of 
legitimate and low-risk traffic across our shared borders 
through a … traveller security strategy that includes 
standards on travel and nationality documents … 
facilitating travel, enforcing immigration laws, and 
identifying the bad guys … Best of all, we are able 
to achieve results like this without inconveniencing 
legitimate travellers …
 About 100 years ago, ‘Americanization,’ as the 
policy was called, sought to promote civic literacy, 
English language acquisition, and cultural assimilation 
… Today, we believe, that, despite differences in 
background, all Americans are bound together by 
a set of enduring civic principles as relevant today as 
they were the day our Constitution. … We welcome 
immigrants who want to make the U.S. their home and 
join us in honouring these principles. (2006: passim)
Dezenski establishes the benefits to be gained by 
facilitating low-risk travel while at the same time 
working to ameliorate the dangers inherent in mobility. 
!e technologies of identity management – travel 
documents and secure identity verification – are situated 
in the context of security. And security is situated 
alongside ‘integration’. It is the latter connection that 
many people may find surprising, but this connection 
is often made in the most explicit terms: in a recent 
interview with Irish Times migration correspondent 
Ruadhán MacCormaic one Irish government official 
argued, ‘Integration can’t happen without deportation!’ 
!is special issue begins with a recorded roundtable 
discussion on integration in which Clement Esebamen, 
former Senior Policy Advisor to the Irish Minister 
for State for Integration, Robin Hanan, CEO of the 
Irish Refugee Council, and Issah Huseini of the New 
Communities Partnership tease out many of these 
issues and connections.
 But what are the major policy shifts with 
respect to migration management, and how might 
we map the future directions and the human 
consequences? Again, many insights are available in the 
United Nations report, #e State of the World’s Refugees. 
It is worth noting, for example, that since 2000 the 
number of refugees (those who meet the definition of 
a person needing protection under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and 1967 Protocol) in the world has fallen, 
due in part to a decline in the number of inter-state 
conflicts. However, internal strife, oppression and civil 
war have persisted, and ‘refugees’ often do not cross 
borders today but remain encamped within their own 
or in neighbouring countries. !e number of asylum 
seekers has also fallen, but again this allows no space 
for celebration: today illicit channels seem increasingly 
followed as governments tighten asylum policy and 
deploy restrictive measures to manage the ‘problem’ of 
asylum. Perhaps the most disturbing trend, however, is 
management through ‘outsourcing’.
 In 2003, the UK government together with the 
Netherlands and Denmark put forward a ‘New Vision 
for Refugees,’ which envisaged transferring asylum 
applicants to third country Regional Protection Areas 
(RPAs). RPAs were to be supplemented with Transit 
Centres closer to the EU border area.  While this 
particular proposal met with considerable resistance 
from several Member States, NGOs and the UNHCR, 
the overall policy direction that undergirds it remains 
on the agenda. But this is no ‘Fortress Europe’ that 
can be studied via ‘border studies’ alone. As the US 
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Department of Homeland Security’s representative, 
Elaine Dezenski outlined to the EU conference in 2006, 
managing migration is not just about border control; 
rather, it is an assemblage of systems to filter mobility, 
separate the good from the bad; systems that make use 
of new technologies that promise secure identities, and 
systems that couple security and migration together 
with visions of integration.  What we are discussing 
is the securitization of migration. And what of the 
lives lived in this context – the stuff of ethnographic 
projects?
Human securitization
In January 2002, a group of two hundred asylum seekers 
went on hunger strike in the notorious Woomera 
Centre in Australia. !ey captured international media 
attention by stitching their lips together to protest against 
their muted and liminal status. Since the late 1990s, a 
deterrent system confronted those seeking asylum in 
Australia, involving the use of detention centres such as 
the remote ex-military base at Woomera and some off-
shore islands such as the tiny Pacific nation of Nauru. 
By late January 2002, however, there were signs of 
resistance: alongside the initial two hundred asylum 
seekers a further thirty-five went on hunger strike in 
Maribyrnong. Simultaneously, a large-scale riot broke 
out in Curtin Detention Centre. Michael Dudley of 
Suicide Prevention Australia and Sarah Mares, a child 
psychiatrist, inspected Woomera and slammed the 
conditions as, ‘akin to concentration camps’. !ey put 
the following question to the world’s media: ‘Does any 
other country lock children and families behind walls 
of razor wire in the desert?’  
 Australia’s asylum policy is at the vanguard of 
the securitization of migration, a trend characterized 
by new configurations of state, non-state agencies 
and private interests and marked by increasing use of 
detention and segregation. But one could also add the 
events in Europe in May 2009 under this heading: 
the Italian government, contrary to international 
legal principles, ordered its navy to force hundreds of 
migrants entering Italian waters towards Libya, where 
the EU’s ‘good neighbourhood’ policy aspires towards 
greater levels of security cooperation with North African 
governments. !erefore, to the question, ‘Does any 
other country lock children and families behind walls 
of razor wire in the desert?’ the answer is, to varying 
degrees, yes. 
In May 2006, thirty-three Afghan asylum 
seekers entered St Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin and 
began a hunger strike. By the following day their 
number had swelled to forty-one persons. ‘When you 
cannot have your rights in an office, a church is the 
best place to come,’ said the protesters’ spokesperson, 
nineteen year-old Samandar Khan. His choice was a 
poor one, however. Church authorities failed to mediate 
with government officials, while the UN’s Dublin 
representative, Manuel Jordão denounced the protest 
as ‘unacceptable’ in the light of Ireland’s ‘just and fair’ 
asylum system. !e neighbourhood surrounding the 
Cathedral quickly turned hostile.  By day six there were 
protesters outside, many scarcely more than ten year-
olds, carrying placards that read, ‘Let them die.’ 
In an interview with Mark Maguire for the 
Irish multicultural newspaper Metro Éireann, the 
protest spokesperson Samandar Khan explained: 
Our main purpose is not to commit suicide.  … We are 
victims and we are looking to have our rights.  We are 
not trying to die. We are trying to have our cases heard. 
(Maguire 2006: 3)  
Khan, who fled Afghanistan when his father was killed, 
pointed out that the group was composed of people 
who ‘have been here for three or four years and have 
been ignored’ (ibid.). !e hunger strike in Dublin 
ended peacefully after just one week.  !e protesters 
left the sanctuary of the Cathedral amid racist calls, to 
return to a ‘fair and transparent’ asylum system.
From Australia to the EU an image is 
emerging of increasingly similar asylum systems in 
which hundreds of thousands of people live their daily 
lives – as Michel Agier notes herein, it involves a long 
insomnia. In this special issue of the Irish Journal of 
Anthropology we ask: in what ways can social-scientific 
knowledge contribute to understanding migration 
systems, from IT workers on visas in the USA to 
asylum seekers in Europe and beyond its borders? But 
we also ask: what are the conditions for the possibility 
of efforts to ‘manage’? In this sense, this issue discusses 
themes that are broader than migration studies, from 
mapping and diversity in the Balkans to medico-legal 
reports for survivors of torture. Here we are interested 
in the politics of truth and life itself: the contemporary 
workings of biopower.
Recently the costs associated with the asylum 
system in Ireland received considerable attention. 
Estimates suggest that in 2008 direct provision centres/
sites cost the exchequer €91.5 million, with the asylum 
legal system and deportation costs bringing the overall 
bill to approximately €300 million per annum. If we 
follow Michel Foucault in seeing neo-liberal biopolitics 
as demanding the perpetual trial of everything in 
the court of the economy then we must understand 
that an ‘economic imperative’ to ‘tackle’ asylum is 
recognized by governments in many parts of the world. 
But Foucault was careful to note that neo-liberal 
economic rationalities are in fact embedded in broader 
strategies and tactics of government and are themselves 
instantiations of biopower: discourses about the 
vital nature of humans, their ‘truth’ and subjectivity; 
strategies and tactics for actual interventions on every 
level, from the individual to that of the population, the 
health, welfare or security of which might be threatened 
or curtailed and thus must be defended. 
Discussions of biopolitics, biopower or 
governmentality are not attempts to recast practical 
realities in the language of high theory; rather, such 
concepts provide useful tools with which to mine 
into contemporary political thought and useful ways 
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through which to recognize the interconnected nature 
of ostensibly disjoined and diverse tactics for migration 
management. Specific migration policies often clearly 
articulate the objectives, the overall approach and 
specific tactics to be deployed. Take for example Tony 
Blair’s preface to the UK’s policy statement Controlling 
our Borders: Making Migration Work for Great Britain 
(which bears more than a family resemblance to the 
speech by Homeland Security’s Elaine Dezenski to the 
EU):
We will finger print visitors who need visas … before 
they arrive. We will, where necessary, use our powers to 
demand financial bonds from migrants … to guarantee 
their return home … We will replace out-dated and 
confusing rules with a clear and modern points system 
so we only allow into Britain the people and skills our 
economy needs. (Home Office 2005: 6)
 
Here, labour migrants (‘visitors’) are perpetually tried 
in the court of the economy; those who are suspected 
of not being in a position to contribute are ‘suspects’ 
from whom truth is demanded on the level of life 
itself. And the contribution of those with the skills the 
economy needs is flexibly defined – as Payal Banerjee 
shows in this issue, Indian Immigrant IT Workers in 
the US, with skills the economy needs, must rely on 
informal networks of support in order to make a ‘high-
end’ contribution.
 Controlling our Borders is clearly a policy 
statement that brings together the different categories 
and scales of mobility and models the ways in which 
global migration can be harnessed and controlled 
for the good of the UK. Gone is the ill-defined 
multiculturalism of the past and in its stead a nation-
state conceptualized as a market-nexus in the global 
economy; gone is the vision of a nation-state as the 
pillar of international legal systems and agreements, 
replaced by a vision of borders that are spread out, filled 
in (Agier in this issue) and controlled with electronic 
fences. Reading statements such as Controlling our 
Borders through a lens of biopower allows one to see 
clearly the interconnected nature of ostensibly disjoined 
and diverse tactics and strategies of management. 
 
On truth
Efforts to manage migration at the level of truth and 
the body are often striking in their mobilization of 
‘scientific’ knowledge. For example, in 2009 the UK 
Border Agency (UKBA) established a pilot project to 
investigate the use of genetic tests for country of origin. 
Asylum seekers have been asked to volunteer mouth 
swabs or hair or nail samples where the credibility of 
their evidence of nationality is in doubt. In the light 
of a furious reactions from advocacy groups and from 
the scientific community—the latter pointing out 
that genes don’t respect nation-state borders—the 
UKBA argued that such tests are only to support other 
investigative methods, such as the broader credibility 
assessments by Immigration Judges, as discussed in the 
UK context by Anthony Good herein, and medico-
legal reports similar to those discussed by Monika 
Wesseinsteriner in the Irish case herein. While this 
proposal appears to be floundering it is the conditions 
for its possibility that demand attention. For several 
years the US has used DNA tests to query claims of 
relatedness in families claiming asylum and in cases of 
claims for family reunification. What is at stake here is 
not just the specific mechanisms of asylum systems but 
also broader uses of ‘science’ to uncover the ‘truth’ of 
migrants’ claims.
 Some ‘scientific’ tests of credibility clearly have 
more of a symbolic than evidentiary value and perhaps 
the best-known example of this is biometric tests of 
age for unaccompanied minors. In Germany, local 
Youth Welfare Offices and Foreigners’ Authorities have 
used biometric bone-density, radiological and dental 
tests to supplement a system in which a ‘notional’ age 
is ‘presumed’ through visual inspection. While visual 
inspections are carried out by culturally encoded eyes 
(in Germany they can the estimations of age can only 
be refuted by means of relevant documents or medical 
certificates) bone-density and radiological tests are also 
deeply cultural in that they are based on the dubious 
theory that ‘minors’ will have universal nutritional and 
physical stress variables in their environments.  
 Should we be surprised that ‘scientific’ tests 
of credibility themselves lack credibility? From the 
DNA and biometric tests mentioned above to the 
commissioning of private language testing companies 
to verify country of origin via interview transcripts, 
what we are witnessing is progressive and widespread 
efforts to problematize migration. In this sense, ‘truth’ 
is a security problem. But more needs to be said here. If 
Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopower can 
provide the conceptual tools to unpick the assemblage 
of migration management then we must take seriously 
not just the challenges of producing the anthropology 
of this contemporary problematization but also 
the history of the present.  As Jelena Tošić’s work herein 
shows, governmentality may be usefully deployed to 
think through how diversity is managed through older 
technologies for gathering knowledge of populations, 
such as maps and demographic data.
A brief history of the present
Such as travel carry with them a passport from the 
Prince, with both certifies the license that is granted for 
travelling, and limits the time of their return. … But 
if any man goes out of the city to which he belongs 
without leave, and is found rambling without a passport, 
he is severely treated, he is punished as a fugitive, and 
sent home disgracefully; and, if he falls again into the 
like fault, is condemned to slavery. … !us you see that 
there are no idle persons among them, nor pretences of 
excusing any from labour.
- Sir (Saint) !omas More, Utopia
In the above epigraph, as !omas More’s protagonist, 
Raphael Hythloday surveys Utopia (from the Latin, 
Nusquama, ‘Nowhere’ and the Greek, eutopia, the 
    Irish Journal of Anthropology Volume 12(3) 2009 9
good place) he notes that occupations are fixed and 
movement is restricted. Life in Utopia is orderly as a 
consequence of powerful incentives for the inhabitants 
to remain in their proper places. In Utopia, roles are 
expected to be fulfilled in specific locations, and while 
those roles are transposable to other, similar locations, 
movement denotes disorder and must be carefully 
managed.  
!e form of discipline and order in More’s 
Utopia is, as Hythloday informs us, predicated by 
a particular problem of population. Great numbers 
were once carried off by the plague – a disaster from 
which recovery was partial – and the health and wealth 
of cities is understood to depend upon forces at the 
level of population. !e plague therefore stands as 
the violent foundational moment of the law and as a 
constant image of all that is different and disorderly.
 In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault 
provides us with many examples of how more 
contemporary societies produce real and imagined 
visions of order and disorder, utopias and dystopias. 
His celebrated chapter on panopticism begins not with 
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon but with the plague 
measures for Vincennes at the end of the seventeenth 
century. !e measures proposed strict partitioning, 
surveillance, procedures to maintain food security, and 
definitions of ‘crows,’ or persons ‘of little substance’ 
who could be left to die. Everyday a syndic would stop 
before each house to survey the living and the dead, 
and inhabitants had to appear at their window and 
upon their ‘true’ names being called speak that truth 
under pain of death. According to Foucault:
!is enclosed, segmented space, observed at every 
point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed 
place, … in which all events are recorded, in which 
an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and 
periphery, in which power is exercised without division, 
… in which each individual is constantly located, 
examined and distributed among the living beings, the 
sick and the dead – all this constitutes a compact model 
of the disciplinary mechanism (1995 [1977]: 197).
!e disciplinary mechanisms that greeted 
the plague were exceptional and violent responses 
not just to the dangers of pestilence but also the 
potential for disorder. !e plague could bring with 
it a nightmare-like world wherein statutory identities 
gave way to mobile bodies and identities: a dystopia 
of alternative truths, idleness, crime, and the whole 
aspect of the carnival, wherein rules are suspended and 
indeed inverted.2 By countering this dystopian world, 
disciplinary management allowed for the realization in 
exceptional, limited and temporary circumstances of 
its own utopia, according to Foucault, ‘the utopia of 
the perfectly governed city’ (1995 [1977]: 198).
Foucault suggests that it was the very heaviness 
and quarantine-like nature of the plague town that 
made its form of government impossible to maintain. 
Societies and economies required circulation (see 
also Elden 2003). !us he turns to consider Jeremy 
Bentham’s panopticon. !e panoptic tower for viewing 
the lunatic, patient, school boy or factory worker, 
without the observer being seen (except by observers 
of a higher rank), is explained as not simply an 
architectural form or a specific technology. Bentham 
himself was quick to point this out: panopticism was 
‘a great and new instrument of government … its great 
excellence consists in the strength it is capable of giving 
to any institution’ (Foucault 1995 [1977]: 206). As 
Bentham hinted and Foucault understood, panopticism 
was a mode of generalized surveillance that could run 
the length of society and rest upon a whole series of 
connections between space, power and knowledge, 
from fixed names and occupations, to dedicated 
institutions, and from specific domains of knowledge 
to legal instruments. Instead of the exceptional dream-
like government through quarantine and discipline, 
panopticism allows for amplification without absolute 
violence; it is a more economic and efficient technique 
of management that exists not in the state but precisely 
through and beyond the state – panopticism is a way 
of governing that is deinstitutionalized as ‘flexible 
methods of control’ (ibid 211).
However, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and 
Michel Foucault’s discussion of panopticism do not 
stand as grand narratives of how western societies operate 
and cannot be simply transposed into the analysis of 
other cultures. As more and more Anthropologists turn 
their attention to issues of migration, integration and 
borders, the work of Foucault is being deployed to 
discuss new forms of security, databases such as Eurodac, 
encampment and identity politics. Yet, there remains a 
constant need to critically theorize the anthropology of 
migration and to use the material and problematizations 
in migration research to critically challenge ‘theory’. 
!is issue of the Irish Journal of Anthropology includes 
a debate on integration, articles on citizenship, labour 
migration, security and encampment, credibility in 
asylum courts, medico-legal reports, and governing 
diversity in the Balkans. !e common thread that 
connects these contributions is the sense that governing 
mobility, diversity, truth and life itself is a biopolitical 
problem that may be unpicked through anthropological 
approaches. Each in their own way, the contributions to 
this issue engage with discourses about the vital nature 
of humans on the level of life itself, their credibility, 
‘truth’ and subjectivity; strategies and tactics for actual 
interventions or management on every level, from the 
individual to that of the population, the health, welfare 
or security of which might be threatened or curtailed 
and thus must be defended. 
Notes
1 ‘Migrant’ here denotes a person residing in a country 
other than their place of birth for at least one year. 
Current data suggest that approximately three percent 
of the world’s population are migrants. !e figure 
has shown significant recent increase and grew from 
approximately 100 million in 1960 to 175 million 
in 2000. However, the most significant trend in the 
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migration from South to the North, especially from 
poorer countries to the ‘developed’ world: in 2000, 
63 percent of the world’s migrants were in developed 
countries.
2 An interesting historical illustration occurs in the 
summer of 1666, the English court decamped to Oxford 
and laid down ‘Rules and Orders’ for the movement of 
goods and bodies, conducted a survey of persons, and 
posted guards, all as if preparing for a siege. However, 
the measures could not provide full security; and one 
‘lewd fellow … having a plague sore upon him’ (Porter 
2000: 106) stole a scholar’s gown and roamed the court 
as if he belonged. !e Quarantine Act was passed in 
England in 1721 but was restricted in its powers amid 
concerns over attacks on liberties and its measures to 
control households were repealed in 1722.
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Introduction by Gavan Titley
 ‘What do we mean when we say integration?’ It is 
obvious that discussing integration in the way it has 
been dealt with in Irish political discourse over the last 
number of years, without recourse to a more general 
discussion about what a state of integrated-ness is in 
social, political or economic terms, has been somewhat 
absurd.  But the very fact that many of the cultural myths 
of the last decade are disintegrating around us makes 
this a particularly useful time to have a discussion of 
integration as it is seen in relation to migrants, but also 
in relation to more general and resurgent discussions 
about what makes a good society or what an integrated 
society might actually be.
 In Irish political discourse over the last 
number of years integration has come to be defined 
as a good thing.  However, it is not very often that 
we hear discussions about what constitutes a state 
of integration, that we hear discussions about what 
different modalities of social, economic, political 
and cultural life are deemed to be integrated or 
disintegrated, or indeed how people who migrate 
experience integrated-ness, and how as Ghassan Hage 
points out they might define it in ways that elude official 
discourse and official definition.  One of the problems 
that we could get into is that talking about integration 
in Ireland has been heavily influenced by a very stylized 
narrative consistent with post-multicultural politics in 
Western Europe, where integration has been seen as a 
state that has to be restored after a failed experiment in 
multiculturalism. It leads to fragmentation over social 
cohesion, which led to cultural relativism over national 
and liberal values (rarely defined but often stated). A 
range of discourses on citizenship ranging from civic to 
very culturalist manifestations are currently in vogue, 
and discussions of European and national identity tend 
to snake in and out of each other.  All of these discussions 
in various Western European countries currently cycle 
around measures of integration, or how integration can 
be recognized and how integration can be achieved. 
Some of these measures are very technocratic, some of 
them overtly racializing.  
!is is the point at which we enter into 
these discussions. And, it is a good time to take a step 
back and ask: ‘What is it that we mean when we say 
integration?’ 
Clement Esebamen
I think it’s really unfair to ask a profound question 
like, ‘What do we mean when we say integration?’ but 
I will try to answer personally and also talk about a 
social vision of where I think integration should lead. 
To start from that, I’m African, I’m originally from 
Nigeria, and I’ve been here for nearly ten years.  I’m an 
Irish and a Nigerian citizen.  So how do I become fully 
integrated in this society? My reference point is people 
who have migrated to Europe before me, the outcomes 
for them and their families, and the position they find 
themselves in society, whether it be remaining on the 
bottom of the heap of society in terms of where they 
live, or whether their children are achieving in different 
areas of endeavour. !ose are the kinds of pointers to 
me about where the possibilities are.  
In Africa we talk about the day being pregnant; 
pregnancy is one of the ways we visualize things in 
Africa, simply because we talked about all those kinds 
of things without the possibility of scanners and the 
modern technology where you can actually see what’s 
in the body now, before the child is actually born.  In 
Africa we think of pregnancy as the great unknown. 
What could come out of this?  It’s all a big mystery. 
!ese sayings of my people were handed down over 
generations, because poor people ascribe to the 
unknown.  But integration is not the unknown.  We’ve 
seen the outcome of migration to Europe since the 
end of the Second World War, whether in Germany 
or post-colonial France, or even Britain next door 
to ourselves.  And, generally, and I know this from 
immigrants themselves, they don’t like the state of 
affairs.  Everybody is looking around, fretting, about 
what they see.  I’m also worried about the outcome for 
children. 
!e first generation always has high hopes 
for themselves and if they have a family they think 
about progress from that perspective.  For a refugee 
or for an economic migrant you are coming here to 
find a better life.  !e idea of a better life is probably 
something that people might debate, but for many 
people the better life was glimpsed in their country 
of origin, popularized by globalized television and 
popular culture, where the good things in life – higher 
education, good jobs, prosperity basically – is what 
makes a lot of people migrate.  Of course danger is also 
a reason for migration, and danger and poverty tend to 
live side by side.
When I think about integration I think about 
possibilities.  I want my children to compete on par, 
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even to do better.  !e whole idea of ‘better’ is what 
propels migration, and I think that is the crux of the 
matter.  Integration is a question of what will you be 
integrated into.  Politically or technically?  !ey are just 
measures.  !e real issue is being able to stand shoulder 
to shoulder with my neighbour, whether they are Irish 
or Polish, without any feeling of inferiority, not being 
pitied and not being ignored by the state.
 One of the things I have seen across Europe 
is the lack of engagement by the state in the process 
of integration. !e lack of state engagement in 
the business, if you like, of immigrants becoming 
productive citizens of the countries in which they live. 
I think this is what needs to be talked about: how does 
the state engage more fully in this enterprise, changing 
its systems in ways that can guarantee a better future 
for the people within the state? What has come now 
is integration seen as an afterthought: what can we 
do now to remedy an already bad situation?  And in 
Ireland we have not gone to that threshold yet, but we 
are getting there.  In Ireland the whole situation with 
immigrants is beginning to feel as though we need to 
take urgent steps, strategic steps, to enable a systemic 
response to the issues that concern immigrants and also 
the barriers that prevent them from gaining a foothold 
and progressing.
I’ll stop there for now …
Robin Hanan
I think when we were asked this question we all knew 
it’s one of those questions that is very easy to answer 
and very difficult to understand.  
At the simplest level, integration can be 
defined as the ability to function in a society and the 
opportunities to participate, to take part, in that society. 
What that means, of course, is far more complex.  !e 
first question, which Clement briefly raised, is what 
are people being asked to integrate into?  !e very 
word integration implies people coming into a society, 
finding their way around a society, becoming part of 
a society, and the question is this: what exactly is it 
that we are asking people coming from other cultures 
to integrate into?  
!e Ireland that we are living in now – and 
this has become something of a cliché – is very, very 
different from the Ireland that I grew up in, and it is 
very different in a lot of different ways.  It’s different, 
for example, in the ways in which we define a national 
culture.  When I was growing up there was no question 
in people’s minds that being part of Ireland meant 
being part of a national culture which was shared at 
least within the twenty-six counties and probably by 
a large part of the thirty-two counties and was defined 
as being relatively self-contained and different from 
other societies. !e former TD Oliver J. Flannigan 
once remarked that there was no sex in Ireland before 
the TV in order to point out that we were living in 
a society in which influences from the outside world 
were relatively limited.  I think that the Ireland that I 
grew up in was narrower culturally than the world that 
James Joyce described a century ago in terms of contact 
with other parts of Europe or contact with influences 
from outside Europe.
 I think that people in Ireland now are 
connected to a whole range of different cultures and 
different ways of thinking, and not just sub-cultures 
within Ireland, rather many people in this country 
now work for multinationals and move from country 
to country; people study in different countries; colleges 
are far more mixed.  My own children grew up as 
honorary Californians as they watched television in 
Ireland.  !ese cultural influences have changed the 
very nature of the society in which we are having this 
discussion about integration, and yet the discussion at 
a political level goes on as if there can be some sort 
of imperative put on immigrants to integrate, to learn 
about Irish history, to know who Eamon de Valera 
was, or Michael Collins, to know a little of the Irish 
language, to know a little bit about who James Joyce 
was now that we don’t ban him any more, in other 
words it is as if we were talking about a static society.
 !e other great myth about integration is 
that we have to choose between assimilation and 
inter-culturalism.  !at an individual coming to this 
country has to choose either to remain totally within 
the culture they come from or to become totally Irish 
in a stereotypical way.  Again, we know from dealing 
with people in their everyday lives that most people 
have a whole range of identities.  We just can’t keep 
thinking that all the Yoruba, for example, come from 
the same place, have the same identity, think in the 
same ways and that they are now confronting a society 
called Ireland and that they need to adapt to it.
 For many immigrants to Ireland – I live in Bray 
for example, where there’s the Dell plant, Microsoft and 
a number of other multinational offices – a relatively 
cocooned life is possible, where French, Italian and 
Polish are spoken nearly as widely as English. !ose 
immigrants often depart quiet quickly.  Other people 
arrive in working class areas and immediately have 
to navigate shops, job hunting, schools, sometimes 
working with a more traditional Irish society.  !e 
debate in Ireland, particularly over the last year, but 
becoming louder since the recession started, works 
from the assumption that Ireland is facing into a crisis 
if we cannot promote this thing called integration. 
Integration at its best means the ability to participate 
in society, but we need to further define it at a whole 
lot of levels.  It is not just about understanding the 
Irish political system – which most people who grew 
up in this country still haven’t quiet got a grasp of – it 
is not just about learning about a particular historical 
context, it is about finding and contributing to the type 
of globalized and international society which most of 
us now live in.
My first thought is that the debate about 
integration, assimilation or interculturalism tends to 
deal very much in stereotypes. And when we move 
outside the universities, the NGOs and the government 
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departments the debate becomes even more simplistic. 
I constantly hear the term non-national. ‘!ere are 
non-nationals dealing drugs here’; ‘Some of the non-
nationals are quiet nice’; ‘Some non-nationals drink in 
our pub’.  So, not only are we asking people to fit into a 
single cultural stereotype of where they come from, but 
in popular discourse everyone from outside the country 
is treated as having something in common, something 
more in common with each other than they have with 
Irish society. It’s very common to have the kind of 
experience I had in my own town of Bray when setting 
up a small refugee support group to build contact 
between the local community and the new refugee 
communities. At a meeting, one of the participants put 
a female Nigerian speaker under enormous pressure 
to explain Roma culture – who were all these Roma 
coming here from Eastern Europe?  And I had to explain 
several times that the Roma were Europeans like myself 
and the person asking the question and not ‘foreigners’ 
from the outside that a person from Nigeria should be 
expected to understand and empathize with.
 I think that the first thing to bear in mind is 
that the debate itself is very artificial.  It’s based on the 
idea that people only have a single cultural identity, 
that someone from India only has two available cultural 
identities, Indian and Irish. We know that that person 
may have many identities and allegiances in terms of 
culture and interests and in terms of their work and so 
on.
 I also think that we need to guard against 
the very dangerous public debate that assumes that 
any sign of conflict that involves non-Europeans in a 
European city is a result of a lack of integration.  I find 
myself in a lot of conversations in which people say, 
‘We must learn from France. !ey’re had riots there. 
It’s all because they didn’t integrate.’  As I’m sure a 
lot of people will know France is a country that puts 
an enormous pressure on immigrants to assimilate 
into French culture, to think in French ways and to 
become French citizens.  !ey type of riots which we’ve 
seen in France in recent times are much more about 
disadvantage, much more about exclusion, and much 
more about discrimination. Consider two very obvious 
examples: during the !atcher years one of the iconic 
images of racial division in the UK were the Brixton 
riots, where largely African and Caribbean second and 
third generation citizens were fighting with the police; 
one of the iconic images of integration, within a year, was 
the poll tax riots where you had an enormous mixture 
of people from different races and disadvantaged places 
throwing things at the same police. Both of these events 
were described in very different ways in the media but 
both came from very similar contexts of exclusion.
 In opening up, I have said that the question 
is a dangerous one and one we have to think about 
very carefully.  In the area I work, with refugees, people 
are coming to this country traumatized, looking for 
protection and claiming the right to protection but will 
be put under pressure to prove that they’re integrated. 
One sees this especially in the new Immigration, 
Residency and Protection Bill where there are clauses 
that will put people under this kind of pressure.  !is is 
something Garibaldi didn’t have to prove when he lived 
in Britain in the nineteenth century; it’s something 
that the Fenians didn’t have to prove when they lived 
in other countries.  !e right to protection is absolute 
and should never be dependant on very artificial tests 
of integration.  !ere is also the danger that what are 
often put across as citizenship or integration tests – 
these have been on and off the public agenda here – 
will lead to greater divisions between people.
Issah Huseini
What do we mean by integration, or what is our 
understanding of integration?  As someone working on 
the ground, at the grassroots level, I don’t think there 
is any definition, so I just want to give some practical 
sense based on what I have seen over the past few years 
while I have been working for the New Communities 
Partnership.  I have been thinking about this for the 
past year since the economic downturn began and I 
have been asked what is happening within the migrant 
communities.  Well I always start by saying, ‘!at 
depends on the legal status of the migrant.’   !ere 
are some migrants who are entitled to state support 
and there are other migrants who don’t get anything, 
notwithstanding the number of years that they have 
lived in the country. !ere are some groups for whom 
the whole concept of integration looks like a luxury, 
because it is not a priority: it’s not what they are 
concerned about.  Again, it depends on the groups, 
but the first priority of many immigrants is to establish 
their legal status.  For most people, that’s the first step. 
It’s not about integration; it’s about how secure are 
they in their legal or residential status in the country. 
!is requires, we all know, an efficient and transparent 
immigration regime; it will require people in the 
country not being stigmatized because of how they 
came into the country.  
!e next step for many, based on my 
experiences, is that after they get their legal status 
people want to establish their own private space within 
the host community, often by linking with other people 
from their own home country, to provide support for 
each other for family events, to support each other to 
navigate the system, or in getting a job.  Because of all 
of this, there is a desire to link with people from their 
own country in order to get a space where they can get 
advice and this is why there are a lot of home culture 
associations spreading.  
I’ll just give you an example of what happened 
to me yesterday.  I live in Edwardstown and my car 
broke down and I had to go to Dublin. I was going by 
train, but I still needed the car to be fixed.  I come from 
Ghana and belong to the local Ghana Association, so 
I took the car to a friend from Ghana who will give 
me a good deal and fix it for me while I’m in Dublin. 
It’s things like this that help to build a common space 
where people can protect each other and support each 
other.  And it’s after this stage has been reached that 
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people look to connecting into the wider community, 
when they are more confident and want to engage 
as equals within the system, and be able to make a 
contribution as equals.
 But the biggest danger for me is how policy as 
a whole sees the integration process.  !ere are those 
who believe you have to play Gaelic games before you 
can say you are integrated.  I remember asking someone 
in Dublin once, ‘How do I integrate?’ and he said, ‘Go 
to the Pub!’
Gavan Titley
Clement talked about a vision of equality, of generational 
possibility and of people starting on the same level 
playing field.  Robin talked about the fact that while 
we may perceive a need for these debates integration 
is always seen through our culturalized lens, and part 
of that is the pressure on people to show themselves to 
be integrated, and perform being integrated in ways 
which are sometimes fantastical but are nevertheless 
quite powerful politically and socially.  Issah spoke 
about the idea that integration debates represent a 
luxury for many people when it comes to questions of 
security or one’s own life or one’s own network, which, 
though necessary, are also recognized as signs of dis-
integratedness – and we’re all familiar with debates 
about ghettoization, for example. But attention must 
also be given to other ways in which integration is 
recognized in political debate.
From the &oor …
I think all three speakers were uncomfortable with 
the question, ‘What do we mean when we say 
integration?’ On one level, everyone has said, ‘!is 
is more complicated’.  But there’s the other level at 
which integration is being talked about across Europe 
where it’s less about what integration means and how 
it can be modelled and more about how it’s becoming 
problematized, being made into a problem.  Perhaps I 
could hear comments on that.  
 I also have another question.  In a recent 
event organized by the Anthropology Department 
in Maynooth Gareth Fitzgerald echoed Michael 
McDowell when he said that really there hasn’t been 
any issues around integration. Michael McDowell 
writes about this in #e Soul of Ireland, that somehow 
the Irish example is different, that somehow we 
‘managed migration’.  Here everyone is saying that this 
is not quiet true. So I’d like to know more about the 
problematization of integration – where the flashpoints 
are going to be in debates going forward?
Clement Esebamen
What has happened in the last ten or twelve years in 
Ireland? Well it’s been pretty obvious that we have 
been riding on the back of a very famous animal, and 
now that Celtic Tiger is taking us in new directions. 
If there were any bumps on the road the economic 
prosperity basically smoothed the bumps and corners. 
I lived for several years in a poor area of Dublin and 
the changes in that area in that time were just short of 
miraculous.  People became very confident about who 
they were; people took two or three holidays a year – I 
don’t know how they managed it but they did – and 
the early apprehension abut the Somali family moving 
into the neighbourhood vanished into he air: it was no 
problem.
!e interesting thing I noticed about 
community cohesion was the Nigerian woman bringing 
her kids out to the bus stop to go to school about 
7.30am and the woman across the street shouting to 
her kids, ‘Look at the black people across the street, 
and you are still hear! Get out and go to school!’ It was 
amazing, in neighbourhoods that didn’t place a high 
value on school, attendance really shot up.  It wasn’t 
the only reason, but people said it to me: those black 
people are putting pressure on us, now we have to do it. 
!at was eight or nine years ago, and now there is a full 
cycle of children that have gone through school.
 But the flashpoints in other countries have been 
around a lack of cohesion.  If we say the communities 
are divided or that there are ghettos forming, like 
the banlieues of France or in Bradford, then we are 
talking about the division between the natives and 
the immigrants, where they are concentrated in large 
numbers.  In working class areas the differences in 
advancement or attainment might not be too different 
but he differences of race or ethnicity or nationality 
brings these divides to the fore.  !is is the crux of 
the issue: the fragmentation, the divisions and the 
differences are heightened when there is competition, 
be it housing or entitlements or social welfare.  Where 
there might not be jobs … that is where the challenges 
are going to come from.
 In some ways I agree with Dr Fitzgerald that 
we have had a society that has been receptive to large-
scale migration.  !e numbers of people who came into 
Ireland, whether they stayed or left, the footfall could 
be around one million people in the last few years.  !e 
issues around multiculturalism and integration have 
been challenging to some people, but that challenge 
has been masked by the high level of economic activity 
and the economic prosperity.
Gavan Titley
And it is in this same period of high prosperity that the 
state has on the one hand encouraged cultural diversity 
and on the other hand engaged in really flagrant crisis 
racism, for example with the Citizenship Referendum. 
So we also need to bring in state-level activity …
From the &oor …
Two things, really.  I’m a migrant from the USA in Ireland 
for the past 15 years, and the American experience is 
often held up, imagined as a migrant country, mosaic 
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and melting pot, whatever.  My research for the past 
ten years has been located in so-called disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods in West Dublin, so I see all of this in 
stereoscopic ways. 
I’m not sure if fetishizing the state is a 
particularly good idea, especially considering that the 
critique of the last while is that the state is the stand-in 
for the economy, generally considered relative ignorant 
of these problems. What’s troubling is the idea, the 
weird fetishization shared only by academics and other 
symbol workers – that if you get the phrasing right then 
the world follows suit, that we have to align integration 
with the state, as if the state is a rational entity that 
produces instructions and follows them. !at’s one 
problem.
 I’m willing to say that I think the Irish 
Government has behaved in ridiculous ways, but here 
I’m in agreement with them that the processes have 
been relatively unproblematic.  !ere hasn’t been a lack 
of people trying to capitalize on the issues. Áine Ní 
Chonaill (spokesperson for the Immigration Control 
Platform) in the late 1990s held a meeting in a school 
house in Cork and there were 15 people there, yet the 
national media carried it.  She did her best to make 
this an issue, but never really gained any traction.  So 
maybe the question should be turned around to ask 
not what is state policy on integration, but how is the 
problem of integration becoming a state problem? 
And that’s where you get the question, ‘Name the 
last four all-Ireland winners?’ in the citizenship tests. 
Ludicrous bits of signatures – not even evidence – of 
integration. So the question is how does the state see 
integration? And this is how it will play out against 
the less powerful.  And there’s going to be two parts 
to that, two opportunities for the less powerful: there’s 
ways that the less powerful can mark and cement it and 
ways that other less powerful people can become pissed 
off with their neighbour.  As opposed to being annoyed 
with the bank they will look side-ways or down.  !at 
is where I would worry about the flashpoints, in that 
arc you can draw from the North Inner City, that’s 
where you will find the foot soldiers …
!ere’s also the point that this whole problem 
of integration has in fact been central to the modern 
nation-state, the cultural nationalism in which has 
involved some notion of fictive blood.  One could 
take a lot of the contemporary discourse and take 
it back to the Dreyfus Affair in the late nineteenth 
century – recently arrived population, they don’t think 
like us, etc.  So we tend to de-historicize all of this by 
connecting it to the state and then naively thinking 
that if we somehow sorted out the state’s organs in the 
here and now then we can have a rational technocratic 
solution to the question of integration. !e question 
that’s really: why integration now?
Robin Hanan
I don’t think you have to go as far as the Dreyfus Affair. 
Take the debates in Britain over Catholic emancipation: 
they usually took the tone, ‘We’d like to involve them 
in our society, but they’re priest-ridden and closed, and 
they wear different clothes (not quiet hijabs), but when 
they grow up they’ll be different, more like us and 
maybe then they can vote.’ 
On the question of the state, I think it’s 
wrong to think of state policy as one policy in Ireland. 
Different arms of the state talk and act in different 
ways.  One thing that I find very frustrating as 
someone who works with asylum seekers is that on the 
one hand you have a lot of very broad, well meaning, 
well phrased discussion about social inclusion, an area 
that the state has relatively little influence on, areas 
where communities either solve or don’t solve things 
for themselves, areas where the economy is dominant, 
or areas like planning where Ireland is so bad at so 
many levels that the state shows little influence.  On 
the other hand, you also have very hard policy in areas 
like habitual residency permits, direct provision, things 
like the very harsh qualifications to become a refugee, 
all of the barriers that are put in the way for people who 
have come to work here to put down roots into the 
community, bringing their families in, claim benefits. 
All of this is hard policy, which tends to be negative.  
I tend to think of it along the lines of guests 
– there’s a new book out called New Guests of the Irish 
Nation – I think the attitude is that when people come 
into our house we tend to be friendly and welcoming, 
but we’re very careful who we let in.
 I think the real test for Ireland is not going to 
be just the competition for resources, which is going to 
be tough, but it’s also going to be about this sense of 
who really belongs in the country.  When you compare 
Ireland to other European countries, on the one hand 
you don’t have this hard , overt racism – Aine Ní Connell 
is not exactly Le Pen, she’s not a populist leader – but, 
then again, we’re a couple of generations behind.  What 
we do have, however, is a very strong sense of them 
and us.  !ere’s very little sense in popular culture that 
people who have come here recently have a right to 
be here.  !ere’s a very real sense in Irish society that 
the people who came here during the boom years will 
go somewhere else when things get hard, and maybe 
it’s the job of our government to encourage people to 
move on to somewhere else and to make it just that bit 
more difficult to come here.  In the area of asylum it’s 
very overt: the Department of Justice talk very openly 
about push and pull factors, with their understanding 
that their main objective is to try to make it as hard as 
possible to come to Ireland.  Even in the popular sense, 
there is a feeling that it was nice to have people here 
during the boom, but now things are getting harder 
and they should go somewhere else and let us get on 
with our lives.  !is is the real challenge: to change 
from a sense of guest to a sense of entitlement.  I don’t 
think we are anywhere near that in Ireland.  For all the 
criticisms we make of the ex-colonial powers that now 
have three to four generations of immigration, that 
sense of entitlement is much deeper in London, Paris or 
Rome. People sometimes say that we’re a country that 
should understand migration because we’re a country of 
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immigrants, another way of thinking about that is that 
we are a country of people who didn’t emigrate – the 
people who emigrated are in America or in Germany 
or the UK – and the sense that immigrants are not part 
of our culture runs much deeper that in many other 
European countries.
From the &oor …
Issah Huseini argued in his presentation that integration 
is probably not a good concept for the social sciences, 
and perhaps we can think about these relations at an 
individual level.  For example, you, the immigrant, 
must do better than everyone else.  In France, where 
I live, North African immigrants, young girls are told, 
‘You have to change!’  And, this is perhaps the symbolic 
violence in the society, to say ‘You have to change!’  
 In French intellectual life there are three 
examples we may think about.  First a film about the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu with a scene where he is in a 
social centre, and most of the people there are social 
workers or students of the second generation from 
North Africa, and he explains that he had to loose his 
accent of the south in order to be integrated into the 
academy.  !en he explained to them – all in inverted 
commas – ‘You have to loose your “bad” accent.’
 Second, Derrida, our great philosopher, 
explained that a regional accent is no good.  You cannot 
be a philosopher and have a regional accent.  And, he 
had a very strong accent from his people and his birth 
in Algeria.
 !ird, a well-known intellectual from the right 
made comments following the events of 2005 to the 
effect that you cannot pretend to democracy when you 
speak with the accent of the suburbs.  If you want to 
get inside politics you must have the ‘television accent’ 
– the ‘no accent’ of the television.
 !e point is that this is the way that society 
constructs itself violently.  And, in countries like France 
this is also becoming police violence.  We review what 
is ‘good’ integration by the accent spoken, by school 
results – and bad results mean exclusion.  !is is it 
exactly: integration is exclusion! In France integration 
is an instrument for a policy of exclusion.
Gavan Titley
I think that this intervention connects up the way in 
which the question has changed from ‘What do we 
mean when we say integration?’ to ‘Why are we talking 
about integration now?’  I think this is something we 
could profitably focus on, from the micro-biopolitics 
such as the right accent to the discussion opened by 
Rita Verdonk the former Minister for Integration in 
the Netherlands when she said they were the defenders 
of gay rights because they wanted to show photographs 
of gay couples kissing to prospective Muslim 
immigrants.  
 But how do we respond to the challenge set out 
by Arjun Appadurai when he says that under current 
conditions the modern nation-state is no longer capable 
of following through on the promise of integration and 
that, therefore, in many ways, while we might discuss 
questions of inequality, questions that are political and 
economic, the discourse of integration is cultural? As 
Appadurai argues, it’s ‘culture’ where sovereignty can be 
reclaimed and where grand statements about diversity 
can be made, where we can have control and where in 
other areas of political and economic life that kind of 
control is no longer possible.  Is that one of the reasons 
why the question has become, ‘Why integration now?’
From the &oor …
Partially, but without becoming distressed about the 
functionalist logic that some abstract entity called the 
state insists that it has control over this process while 
it throws up its hands over things that are massively 
impacting people.
 !e more this is performative in a weak sense 
the more opportunities there are for exposing the limits 
of the state, the more opportunities there are to think 
through the alternatives. 
 To take a more bottom up approach, we 
could also ask, ‘In what ways do people integrate?’ 
!e amusing thing about the Dutch Party waving the 
photograph of a gay couple kissing is that the partner 
to anti-Semitism in the history of the nation-state 
was the homosexual – that minority that was scarcely 
visible, constantly eroding from the inside the pillars 
of the state.  You couldn’t tell; there was no blood test; 
no colour.  So the despised minority from the decades 
past becomes a club to beat new immigrants?  And the 
micro politics are appalling!  We might start to consider 
this as a moment and not fetishize the elements of this 
moment.
Issah Huseini
We are in a situation at the moment were there is 
no real recognition of permanent immigrants in this 
culture.  People think they will just pack up and go 
after the Tiger is dead.  And over the last year we have 
the Minister for State for Integration saying he is not 
responsible for immigration, so you have immigration 
laws that are not consistent with integration aspirations. 
We cannot have one government department preaching 
one thing and another department or agency doing the 
opposite.  !e immigration system is making it so hard 
for people to even think that they belong to this nation 
that it’s preventing integration.
 
Clement Esebamen
I’m very tempted to dive into this, but more important 
for me is the question of why is integration problematic. 
Let’s take for example the reports of increased racist 
attacks on people in parts of Dublin.  Stabbings, 
beatings, gangs of youths, these are worrying things 
for people.  We’re talking about integration, but what 
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about them, what if there is no resolution for their 
own individual traumatic experiences? !is is where 
the state does come in: I’m asking how the police 
respond to a crime on the streets because the person 
looks different.  Initially this went into the bureaucratic 
maze as priority one hundred and twenty.  !ey have 
a drugs raid, they have a murder to solve – this is the 
pressure they’re under, that every policeman is under. 
How do we respond to this?  We respond to racist 
attacks in this country by counting them and listing 
the numbers.  What good does that do?  And it spreads. 
!at boy can’t go around without friends any more, 
so now there’s a group of black boys together.  It’s also 
about a perception that nothing is being done, and 
that’s why I think that the state and its organs should 
be well prepared to deal with this kind of thing.  My 
idea was to use new structures at local level -- the joint 
committees on policing for example -- to identify areas, 
deal with the issues and actually have results.
 !e problem is that we don’t think about 
what happens at the micro level if proper channels 
of engagement are not in place.  And, this can only 
happen if they are promoted by established systems of 
the state.  
I’ve spent nine months working with central 
government.  People ask whether your perspective 
changes and of course it does because you are exposed 
to a wide variety of information from different sources. 
But one perspective hasn’t changes one bit.  I think that 
we have a number of serious problems being stored 
up in this country if we don’t develop systems and 
responses to examples like I just gave.
We also have to look at the education system. 
And this is where I am in favour of the English 
language – no one is asking anyone to take up Irish 
dancing for example, but what is apparent, and what 
the Minister has been pushing is the whole area of 
language acquisition.  Even in the country I came from, 
in Nigeria, if you don’t have English you are consigned 
to a short, hard life.  !is is an area where we can make 
progress.
Robin Hanan
I would agree with Clement that integration should 
be about removing barriers and practical steps, and 
language I think is probably the most important of 
those to give people the tools to get out there and 
participate in society.  And while it is true that no one 
is forced to take up Irish dancing, there is a sense in this 
debate that people must partake of a particular vision 
of Irish national culture. 
But to go back to the state, the Department of 
Justice is one of the driving forces behind policy, and for 
most migrants coming into the country, your security, 
the documents you have your right to come into the 
country, to be here, settle, bring your family, to take 
up services and employment, these are fundamentally 
important. For immigrants, the Department of Justice 
functions as the state as gate-keeper; the people who 
work for the Department of Justice very clearly see 
their job as defending the country as far as possible 
from undesirable outsiders and perhaps letting in the 
kind of people that the rest of society finds useful. 
But it doesn’t see itself as a positive force.  !is comes 
across in a number of ways.  Even in terms of public 
opinion, we come across all the time when there is any 
suggestion of changes to asylum policy or in the asylum 
system, we find ourselves up against a very strong, very 
hostile machine. Whenever the security wing of the 
state feels threatened or undermined by a more liberal 
approach we find this reaction.  At the same time, other 
wings of the state are putting a lot of useful effort into 
issues like the education system.  
 For all its faults the primary education system 
has adapted relatively well as compared with other 
countries to all the challenges that come with increased 
immigration.  So you have this division between one 
wing of the state saying one thing and another wing of 
the state saying something else.  But what we saw in the 
Citizenship Referendum was a very strong statement 
by one wing of the state mobilizing the sense that while 
we have no problem with the Other coming to the 
country, the Other doesn’t belong here: the fact of your 
birth here doesn’t make you a citizen; there are a lot of 
other things that do make you a citizen. 
I can remember some of my children’s friends 
talking about how they welcomed immigration and the 
fact that the country was becoming more multicultural, 
but they didn’t feel that people should come here just 
to have babies and get citizenship.  My children would 
tell me, ‘Such-and-such’s parents don’t want black 
people coming to the country, so they would be voting 
yes.’  So we were talking one language on the surface 
with another one beneath.  As with so much social 
policy there is a soft wing talking about anti-racism and 
multiculturalism on the other hand there is a very hard 
wing of the state that has the legal basis to actually do 
something, which the other wing doesn’t tend to have, 
which is able to make it very difficult for people to get 
documentation, very difficult for people to gain status 
and which is trying to influence public opinion in a 
security conscious way.
Notes
1 !is is an edited version of a roundtable discussion 
recorded at the ‘Managing Migration’ conference held 
in NUI Maynooth on 5 May 2009. !e conference 
was supported through the financial assistance of the 
Research Office, NUI Maynooth.
In 2004, voters in the Republic of Ireland supported a 
constitutional amendment removing the automatic right 
to Irish citizenship by birth in favor of granting citizenship 
through a combination of ‘blood’ and residence rights. !e 
referendum attracted enormous public attention, especially 
to the perceived attempt to restrict citizenship claims arising 
from asylum seekers with Irish born children. Significant 
scholarly attention has also been paid to the role of the Irish 
state, and the relationship between the state and ‘race’. !is 
article critically reviews this literature and goes beyond it in 
several ways: first, we re-open discussion of Irish citizenship 
through a critical examination of its legal underpinnings; 
second, we trace over the public debates in finer detail; and, 
third, we show the ways in which Irish citizenship is being 
reconfigured by broader international forces.
Somewhere there are still peoples and herds, but not with 
us, my brethren: here there are states. A state? What is 
that? Well! Open now your ears unto me, for now will I 
say unto you my word concerning the death of peoples. 
A state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly 
lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: ‘I, the 
state, am the people.’  It is a lie! …
!e state, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the 
good and the bad: the state, where all lose themselves, 
the good and the bad: the state, where the slow suicide 
of all – is called ‘life.’                 
– Friedrich Nietzsche, #us Spake Zarathustra
Introduction
In 2004 an astonishing 79.2% of voters supported a 
constitutional amendment removing the automatic 
right to citizenship by birth in Ireland, jus soli, in favour 
of granting citizenship through a combination of blood 
and residence rights, jus sanguinis and jus domicile. !e 
citizenship referendum and subsequent constitutional 
amendment continues to attract extraordinary levels 
of media and scholarly attention.1 Broadly speaking, 
the amendment has been framed as an effort to restrict 
citizenship claims by asylum seekers with Irish born 
children, so-called IBCs. In a recent front-page New 
York Times article, Jason DeParle (2008: 1) cast the 
situation thus: 
Ireland not only offered citizenship to children born 
upon arrival; until 2003 it also allowed their illegal-
immigrant parents to stay, a shortcut many asylum 
seekers used to win residency. Word got out: with a visa 
to Britain, a pregnant woman could reach Northern 
Ireland, take a cab across the border, and gain residency 
by giving birth. 
Much of the media attention has been attracted by 
the striking ways in which ‘race’ and nationality have 
played out against the backdrop of dramatic changes to 
Ireland’s economy and migration patterns. Ireland, for 
so long portrayed as a poor emigrant nursery suffering 
from what Seán O’Faolain (1955: 106) termed ‘racial 
hemophilia,’ was recently recast as a wealthy destination 
for immigrants. And, with dramatic increases in asylum 
applications, the Irish were apparently becoming white, 
again (cf. Ignatiev 1996). Indeed, some commentators 
argue that a generation of ‘new Irish’ will grow up as 
strangers in their own country, forever seen as an alien 
contaminant within the true blood of the nation-state.
!e events of 2004 have also attracted 
significant scholarly attention, and it is clear that a 
certain consensus has emerged. In the main, discussions 
have centred on the role of the Irish state, conceptualized 
as a powerful discursive and institutional formation – 
an ‘unfettered Leviathan,’ to quote one commentator 
(Harrington 2005: 441).2 !ere is also widespread 
agreement that the amendment must be understood 
as a statement on ‘race’. !e move in favour of jus 
sanguinis has been read as the successful dismantling 
of an open and stable form of citizenship in favour 
of legalized notions of blood descent, a thin disguise 
for ‘new racism’.3 Female asylum seekers, according to 
Eithne Luibhéid, are specifically targeted because of 
the threat posed by their ‘sex organs and reproductive 
capacities’ (2004: 340). !us, for these authors, the 
state, Nietzsche’s ‘coldest of all cold monsters’ has 
returned and is now implicated in the government of 
biological life itself.
!e important work of Ronit Lentin and Robbie 
McVeigh deals explicitly with the 2004 amendment 
through the lens of contemporary social theory. 
Jumping off from David !eo Goldberg’s meditations 
on ‘state racism,’ they argue that we are witnessing the 
emergence of a biopolitical racial state. Biopolitics has 
become something of a leitmotif these days, especially 
following Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer and State of 
Exception. While biopolitics and biopower are notions 
that were originally developed in the seminal work 
The New Irish Question: Citizenship, 
Motherhood and the Politics of Life 
Itself 
Mark Maguire and Tanya Cassidy
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of Michel Foucault, it is the interpretations of recent 
interlocutors such as Agamben that inform much of 
this trend.4 However, the perspective that emerges is 
certainly a provocative one, as with Lentin’s discussion 
of the 2004 referendum: 
In the wake of the Citizenship Referendum there is no 
longer any doubt that the Republic of Ireland can be 
theorized as a racial state of exception. …
!e Citizenship Referendum represented an act of 
political brutality disguised as upholding the ‘common 
good’. … In doing this, the Referendum created a 
bizarre new category of people who remain ‘part of the 
Irish nation’, yet have their citizenship removed. … 
Ireland has thus created its own version of Agamben’s 
homo sacer – people reduced to ‘bare life’, stripped of all 
legal and civil rights. (Lentin 2007: 400-443 passim)
 In essence, there are several assumptions in 
scholarly discussions that deserve attention: (1) that 
a stable and open form of citizenship, jus soli, was 
amended to favour racialized principles of sanguinity; 
(2) that the state actively provoked racist sentiments 
and blood-nationalism and channelled them towards 
female asylum seekers; (3) that the state must therefore 
be accorded a central role in research; and, (4) that new 
racism, expressed as culture and partially disguised in 
legal instruments, is being exposed in this approach. 
Herein, we argue that assumptions (1) and (2) are far 
more problematic than they appear. !e history of Irish 
citizenship must, we propose, be understood beyond 
the crude frame that a state-based approach provides; 
citizenship needs to be complicated and thought 
about alongside processes such as securitization.5 But 
what of those ostensibly targeted by the constitutional 
amendment? We survey the debates surrounding the 
2004 referendum, showing how many important issues 
have been narrowly framed in public and scholarly 
discussions. !e overall thrust of this article, however, 
is to argue that the state is not the most appropriate 
frame for the analysis of new forms of racism and that 
a broader approach is both necessary and possible 
(assumptions 3 and 4).  
We are in broad agreement with Lentin and 
McVeigh’s call for research on the relationship between 
‘race’ and contemporary forms of biopower. However, 
here we argue that a closer reading of the original insights 
of Michel Foucault opens different research strategies 
and illuminates different readings of history. !is is not 
merely a theoretical re-articulation. Foucault’s position 
on the analytical valuation of the state is clear:
What if the state were nothing more than a way of 
governing? … !en we would have to say that the 
state is not that kind of cold monster in history that has 
continually grown and developed as a sort of threatening 
organism above civil society. What we would have to show 
would be how … a governmentalized society organized 
something both fragile and obsessive that is called the 
state. But the state is only an episode in government, 
and it is not government that is an instrument of the 
state. (Foucault 2007: 248 [our emphasis])
Complicating citizenship
Commentators have argued that the 2004 constitutional 
amendment may be read as a straightforward state-
driven reaction to immigration (Harrington 2005). 
Others have called for attention to unpicking the 
nexuses between national identity, citizenship and the 
state. As an example of the latter approach, Fanning and 
Mutwarasibo argue that the referendum ‘emerged from 
economic as well as cultural formulations of Irishness’ 
and that a ‘state-oriented approach is required’ (2007: 
440, 446).6 Here, however, we trace twentieth century 
articulations of Irish citizenship and emphasize both 
the domestic and international conditions for their 
possibility. Simply put, we suggest that Irish citizenship 
is far more complex and contested than it has so far 
been represented.  
!e first challenge is to understand citizenship 
as an emergent and context-specific legal code and as a 
set of practices. Citizenship is generally understood to 
denote the connection between the individual and the 
state composed of reciprocal rights and duties, which are 
generally confined to citizens. Here however, following 
Aihwa Ong (1999, 2003), we analyze contemporary 
citizenship as cultural processes of subjectification, 
involving self-making practices contingent on different 
power-laden and institutional settings, and as an always-
emergent legal structure through which ‘citizens’ are 
made and remade. We argue that a necessary condition 
for any understanding of citizenship is to see it as more 
of a complex process than a straightforward status.
By ‘complicating’ citizenship we do not wish 
to simply look to the margins of dominant legal 
codes; rather, we argue that a processual approach is 
required for understanding both the emergent zones 
of graduated citizenship and sovereignty found in 
today’s world (see Ong 2006, Agier 2008) and the legal 
reconfigurations (re)occurring in European and North 
American nation-states. Take for example the common 
legal pillars of citizenship, jus soli, the right of soil, and 
jus sanguinis, the right of blood, or variations thereof. 
Jus soli, which is rarely operated in an unmodified form, 
is an inherently territorial principle of citizenship, 
conferred by birth within a specified territory. It implies 
a civic form of identification with shared political and 
legal status, and it evokes a civic form of nationalism. 
Jus sanguinis citizenship, on the other hand, derives 
from birth to a citizen parent and is not constrained 
by territory, at least for the first generation in the 
case of foreign births. It implies a shared heritage and 
culture; it evokes the ‘blood’ nation. !us, while there 
is no necessary connection between nationality and 
citizenship, it is often the case that laws (take the Irish 
case) make explicit connections between citizenship, 
nationality and belonging (see Neveu 2005: 199). 
Furthermore, while there are no necessary connections 
between ‘race,’ nationality and citizenship, it is often 
the case that laws, policies and public discourses make 
such connections – and it is the conditions under which 
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‘race,’ nationality and citizenship are brought together 
in Ireland that concerns us here.
To bring nations and nationalism into a 
discussion of citizenship is not to leave behind the 
smooth surface of legal codes and government for 
the rough ground of history, myth and sentiment. 
!e last three decades of scholarship on nations and 
nationalism shows that while nations are thoroughly 
modern ‘imagined communities’ that successfully draw 
from history and pre-existing ethnicities, nations are 
also rooted in concrete institutional and governmental 
practices (see Anderson 1991: 163–185). Nations thus 
require a certain type of governmental and spatial activity 
in order to exist, and where the existence of a nation 
is most in question nationalism tends to emphasize 
the cultural production of roots – characterized by, to 
paraphrase Nikolai Berdyaev, aggressive parochialism 
in space. And, it is precisely these concrete dimensions 
of imagined communities that are important when 
considering how contemporary nations and states work 
to mutually constitute each other. !e nation requires 
a mixture of governmental concreteness and mytho-
history; the state requires a similar combination of the 
hard-to-grasp and the all too real. But beyond both 
one may analyze the conditions for the possibility of 
certain types of exercises of power, such as those with 
citizenship as their target.
A considerable body of scholarship focuses on 
typologies of ‘citizenship regimes’. Such regimes are 
often assumed to arise from national ‘philosophies’ (see 
Brubaker 1998). For example, the civic republicanism 
that ostensibly undergirds the ‘French model’ of jus 
soli-based citizenship is often contrasted with German 
ethnic citizenship, understood as jus sanguinis-based. 
However, there is little empirical basis for such handy 
configurations and considerable potential for national 
clichés to be reproduced (cf. Koopmans et al 2005). 
In fact, for much of the nineteenth century France’s 
nationality legislation was overtly jus sanguinis based, 
while over the past decade Germany has moved 
incrementally towards de-ethnicizing its nationality 
laws to accommodate multi-generational ‘immigrant’ 
populations. 
If national philosophies fail to explain trends 
of convergence and divergence then what does? While 
there is a growing cognizance of how populations are 
imagined and governed – domestic, emigrant and 
immigrant – the emphasis on the nation-state has 
remained. For example, Stephen Castles and Alistair 
Davidson (2000) argue that the European nation-state 
remains the primary reference point for granting and 
defining citizenship. While this position is certainly 
more realistic than the view that globalization is 
sweeping nation-states away, herein we wish to expose 
the configurations of space, power and knowledge that 
run through and beyond the nation-state and manifest 
themselves in citizenship. In this regard, Ireland 
provides a very interesting case study.
Versions of Irish citizenship 
Much may be said about Irish citizenship by first 
looking to the period after independence. !e Irish 
Free State, Saorstát na hÉireann, was born of the 1922 
Anglo-Irish Treaty. !e Treaty allowed Northern 
Ireland to opt out of the Saorstát, which it did, and 
partition and Civil War soon followed.7 !e post-
Civil War situation was characterized by fragile nation 
building, however the ‘constructive statesmanship’ of 
the 1920s was not the only register in which nation 
building found a voice (see Maguire 1998: 109–120). 
Take for example the short-lived and controversial 
journal To-morrow. Its first issue included an erotic 
poem by WB Yeats featuring two male swans, a short 
story about interracial sex, and Lennox Robinson’s ‘!e 
Madonna of Slieve Dun,’ the story of a girl who finds 
out she is pregnant after a sexual assault and imagines 
she is the Madonna – Robinson’s expectant protagonist 
falls due on Christmas day and is gradually believed 
by villagers until, that is, she gives birth to a girl. !is 
striking and controversial journal released its first and 
last issues in a context in which identity politics was far 
more nebulous than subsequent historical treatments 
suggest (see Harrington 2005; cf. Graham 2001); in 
a nation without a nationality act, in which British 
subject status obtained, and in which ‘citizenship’ was 
the idiom of much debate and conflict. 
If one briefly moves from the ‘public sphere’ 
of To-morrow to the Paris-based Irish Race Conference 
of 1922, citizenship appears at a very different scale. 
!e conference aimed to forge a ‘… Greater Ireland, 
the Magna Hibernia across the seas’ (#e Republic 12 
March 1921). !is attempt to think in diasporic and 
racial terms collapsed under the weight of political 
maneuverings and failed to reconcile Irishness with so-
called assimilation overseas.8 While the collapse of the 
conference signaled the temporary closing off a particular 
configuration of Irishness, the 1922 Constitution 
nonetheless reflects an emigrant consciousness. Article 
3 refers to ‘the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State;’ 
Article 17 refers to both ‘the common citizenship of 
Ireland’ (the diasporic ‘race’) and allegiance to the 
British Crown. !us, in the 1920s Irish citizenship was 
in practice local, in reality a British subject status and, 
in the imagination of some, the potential basis for a 
Magna Hibernia. 
In the 1920s, ‘orange skin’ theory hypothesized 
that dominions could have graduated degrees of 
citizenship under the outer cover of British subject 
status.9 Nationality was no less complicated. It took 
until the British Nationality Act, 1948 for the first formal 
recognition of Ireland’s distinct nationality, wherein 
overseas Irish could simultaneously be Irish nationals, 
British subjects and Commonwealth citizens. !is was 
overtaken by the declaration of the Republic of Ireland 
in late 1948, whereupon rapid legislative moves gave 
Irish citizens and British and colonial subjects with 
reciprocal rights in both territories. 
By the time of the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act, 1956, Irish citizenship had grown 
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to encompass every person born in Ireland and was 
therefore a unique case in the history of modern Europe: 
it was an irredentist effort to regulate citizenship by 
the extension of jus soli to another jurisdiction (see 
Ó Caoindealbháin 2006). Little wonder then that it 
provoked the ire of Northern Minister, Terence O’Neill, 
who refused the ‘attempt by a small pastoral republic to 
create a vast empire of citizens’ (quoted in Daly 2001: 
403). Moreover, public representatives worried about the 
consequent legal ‘loopholes’. One Senator commented 
on the dangerous possibility of children of parents of 
‘Nigerian or Korean citizenship’ who happened to be 
in Ireland ‘automatically acquiring Irish nationality’ 
(Seanad Éireann 1956: 96–97). !e 1956 Act remained 
in effect until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, 
which through subsequent constitutional change 
removed the claim on Northern Ireland and enshrined 
citizenship as a birthright of every person born in the 
island. !e result was the unsettling of citizenship, and 
the progressive dismantling of the Irish border.  Brian 
Ó Caoindealbháin has argued that the Agreement has 
resulted in the ‘unbundling’ of citizenship in the face 
of ‘post-modern’ reconfigurations of the border and the 
state (2006: 14).
!us, what is one to make of the assumption 
that in 2004 a stable and open form of Irish citizenship, 
jus soli, was amended to favour racialized principles 
of sanguinity? Even a brief survey of Irish citizenship 
in the twentieth century shows no straightforward 
relationship between stable analytical categories of 
‘citizenship’ and ‘the state,’ indeed both ‘citizenship’ 
and ‘the state’ are better understood as complicated 
processes rather than finished artifacts.
Security and citizenship
!us far, we have outlined the ways in which 
Irish citizenship may be seen as unfolding as a 
consequence of different processes at different scales, 
from the nation-state-based and post-colonial to the 
diasporic and racial. In order to draw attention to 
the workings of contemporary governmentality and 
biopolitics and their ramifications for citizenship, it 
is necessary to retell the story of the 2004 citizenship 
referendum in Ireland from perspective of migration 
and security. !is narrative must include discussions 
of the Common Travel Area, British and Irish anti-
immigration legislation, and the increasing role of EU 
policy connected with the reconfiguration of Europe as 
an area of ‘freedom, security and justice’. And, again, 
here we are arguing that approaches to citizenship, 
migration policy and even (national) security must take 
greater account of forces that run through and beyond 
the nation-state.
While ‘orange skin’ denotes an early twentieth-
century theory of British subject status it could equally 
refer to security policy. !e Saorstát’s immigration 
control systems were transposed from British policy. As 
Bernard Ryan (2001) has shown, the Common Travel 
Area (CTA) was composed of rules and agreement that 
came without saying and largely went without saying. 
From the British perspective there was a need to ensure 
that labour migration continued while administrative 
overheads remained low; from the Irish perspective the 
needs of a ‘transnational’ community were foremost; 
and, from both perspectives, the simple fact was that 
the border was impossible to police. 
Aside from the period of World War II, the 
CTA remained intact throughout the twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries and encompassed not just 
travel but also migration management. From the 1920s 
onwards the British Government provided the Saorstát 
and later the Republic with copies of the UK’s suspect-
codex of persona non grata – the so-called ‘Book of 
Aliens’. By mid-century a single index of entry and exit 
for ‘aliens’ operated. While the CTA was predicated 
by state sovereignty with respect to asylum, in practice 
immigration was a British phenomenon, and a deeply 
racialized one.
 Scholars have justifiably read the debates 
surrounding the British Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 
1962 as reflective of a powerful, racialized worldview in 
which reactionary voices across the political spectrum 
imagined ‘floods’ of immigrants draining the vitality 
of Britain, whereas moderates confined themselves to 
simply being patronizing. Ireland was included in the 
Act in theory to counter claims that the legislation 
targeted non-whites. However, entry to the UK from 
Ireland was not covered, and British citizens could 
freely enter Ireland, unlike Commonwealth subjects 
after the Irish Aliens (Amendment) Order, 1962. Despite 
Irish government claims to the contrary, the changes 
followed a Home Office request to ensure against 
‘backdoor’ migration—but Ireland went further than 
the UK’s Immigrants Act by effectively excluding non-
white holders of British passports (see Ryan 2001: 
865).
With the exception of issues arising from the 
transposition of European directives and programme 
refugee resettlement, the next major changes to Irish 
migration laws accompanied the rapid increase in 
immigration from 1994 onwards. A steady stream of 
legislation flowed, such as the Refugee Act, 1996 and 
the Illegal Immigrants (Tra%cking) Act, 2000, both 
of which are illustrative of a steady move towards a 
‘tightening’ of policy on asylum applications. In the 
period of the heaviest immigration to Ireland, Irish 
legislation was marked by efforts to harmonize with EU 
policy more than simply bearing the fingerprints of the 
state. And, while important differences will continue to 
exist between Member States, moving into the future 
the EU and not individual Member States will be the 
main driver of immigration and asylum policy.
!e period from 1995 to 2004 saw just under 
half a million persons migrate to the Republic and, 
with a sharp decline in emigration; this resulted in a net 
immigration of 222,500 persons. In that same period, 
approximately seventy-five percent of immigrants were 
returned Irish citizens or migrants from EU Member 
States, especially the UK. Prior to 2004, all labour 
migrants who were not EU citizens required either a 
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Working Visa/Work Authorization, which was aimed 
at high skilled workers, or a Work Permit, aimed at 
non-European Economic Area (EEA) low skilled 
workers—a system which has since been extended and 
will continue to be reconfigured. From the late 1990s 
onwards, the numbers of applicants for Work Permits 
rose rapidly to 47,551 in 2003. In 2004, Ireland, along 
with Britain and Sweden, did not impose restrictions 
on labour movements from the new EU states but did 
restrict access to a full citizenship, and access to benefits 
and welfare payments. Work Permits for non-EEA low 
skilled workers were simultaneously tightened. Again 
in step with the UK, Ireland did not open to labour 
migration from Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
!e available data on asylum from the same 
period paints an equally dramatic picture: in 1994 the 
number of applications to Ireland for asylum stood 
at 362; while in 2004 there were 4,800 applications, 
but this was a dramatic decrease from the high-water 
mark of 2000-2003 when there were approximately 
1,000 applications per month. Asylum applications 
have fallen of worldwide as a consequence of several 
factors, including the ‘securitization of migration’ (UN 
2006). One direct outcome of the ‘securitization of 
migration’ (ibid.) is that in most EU Member States the 
overwhelming majority of applications for asylum are 
rejected, even on appeal, and Ireland is no exception.
Unlike many EU countries, however, Ireland 
has no time restrictions on the length of the asylum 
determination phase, and individual asylum seekers 
may be in the system for several years. Moreover, 
asylum seekers in Ireland do not have the right to 
enter into paid employment or into most third-level 
education programmes. In March 2000 a system 
of dispersed direct provision accommodation was 
initiated in step, yet again, with policy shifts in the 
UK in order to prevent Ireland being perceived to 
be a handy ‘backdoor’ (the system also reacted to an 
acute housing crisis in ‘Celtic Tiger’ Dublin).10 !e end 
result of domestic and international pressures is the 
network of ‘hidden villages,’ dotted about the country, 
a situation rendered all the more acute because asylum 
seekers are regarded as being outside of integration 
policy until they have been granted refugee status or 
other subsidiary protection.  
To date the dominant scholarly position has been 
that, following the increases in migration to Ireland 
over the past decades, latent racist undercurrents in Irish 
nationalism and in the Irish historical experience have 
been exploited by the state. What, however, if we take 
cognizance of other forces, such as the securitization of 
migration, that move through and beyond individual 
nation-states? Rather that seeing ‘race’ and racism as 
the hidden motivation behind transformations of Irish 
legal codes, is it possible to argue that contemporary 
processes of racialization are not just disinterred relics 
of the past, but, also, a part of new configurations of 
biopolitics and security? Here, at the very least, we 
have argued that by surveying the relationship between 
security and migration in Ireland one is forced to 
question the assumption that the Irish state is the sole 
author of policy changes.
Rethinking the citizenship referendum
One of the most provocative and frequently cited 
discussions of contemporary forms of racism in Ireland 
is Eithne Luibhéid’s essay, ‘Childbearing against the 
State?’ wherein she argues that a state-driven (re)
nationalization has targeted and excluded asylum 
seekers in Ireland.11 Her elegant description of the 
problematization of citizenship stresses both systemic 
exclusion and the biopolitics of reproduction:
With the growth of the Direct Provision system in 
Ireland, there remained just one ‘get out of jail’ card 
that could be played. !is was to give birth to a baby. 
By birthing a baby, one could leave Direct Provision and 
instead move into private rented accommodation and 
receive regular welfare … [and] become a legal resident 
of Ireland based on parentage of the child. It was as if 
a reversal happened: the child gave birth to the parents 
… (2004: 338)12
 It is certainly the case, as Luibhéid notes, 
that in 2004 many issues related to asylum in Ireland 
turned on the image of the childbearing asylum 
seeker. So much so, in fact, that in June 2004 an EU-
wide advertising campaign to encourage voting in 
the European elections was banned in the UK and 
Ireland. !e clever advertisement featured a woman 
breastfeeding under the caption, ‘You’ve been voting 
since you were born.’ It was banned in the UK because 
of its ‘sexual’ imagery and in Ireland because of fears 
that it could be construed as referring to immigration. 
While such controversies do serve to illustrate the 
bio-politicization of motherhood, how much has 
been explained by the hypothesis that ‘asylum seeker 
women [were] reduced to their childbearing bodies, 
their vaginas’? (Luibhéid 2004: 343) !e underlying 
equation set out by Luibhéid appears, at first glance, 
to balance: by birthing and Irish-born child asylum 
seeking women could ‘get out of jail’ and gain residency 
rights; by closing this ‘loophole’ the state could protect 
its sovereignty and gain national symbolic currency 
by playing to racist sentiments rooted in sanguinity. 
However, this equation provides a restricted view that 
takes the world as it finds it: nationalism and the state 
are always already there and are uncritically assumed to 
provide a reservoir of exclusionary sentiment and the 
driving force for new racism. And what of critical social 
theory? Its role appears diminished to the point of being 
unable to offer more than symbolically ‘unmasking’ 
migration policy as state racism.  
If one revisits the media debates and public 
statements that surrounded the 2004 referendum one 
undoubtedly sees an attempt on the part of certain 
government spokespersons to vilify asylum seeking 
women as exploiters of Irish citizenship law – it would 
be disingenuous to describe this as anything other 
than deliberate racialization (for numerous examples 
see Deveraux, Haynes and Breen 2006; Brandi 2007; 
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Lentin and McVeigh 2006a, 2006b). However, as Bryan 
Fanning has recently pointed out, the ‘state’ cannot 
be attributed sole authorship, and state-driven racism 
cannot account for the astonishing 79.2% of voters who 
supported the constitutional amendment. Fanning calls 
for attention to ‘culture’ (though he generally discusses 
state policy), but in a way that analytically separates 
a triad of forces: ‘state,’ ‘culture’ and ‘policy’ (Fanning 
2009: 129–137 passim). Here our argument is that by 
re-engaging with Foucault’s work on biopolitics and 
governmentality it becomes possible to see such forces 
as in fact sharing a common grammar. 
Moreover, the media and public statements 
during the referendum do not simply contain a 
hysterical reaction to the fecundity of asylum seeking 
women.13 Take for example an illustrative statement 
by Michael McDowell, former Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, published in the Irish 
Times on 24 April 2004 and titled, ‘We Must be Able 
to Manage Migration in a Sensible Fashion’. !e 
statement suggests that late-term pregnant women 
were deliberately travelling – ‘legally and illegally’ – to 
Ireland to give birth in order to secure the entitlement 
of Irish citizenship. !e phrase ‘legally and illegally’ 
points to the fact that asylum-seeking women were not 
the only concern; rather, Irish migration policy aimed 
to manage the potential citizenship entitlements of a 
substantial population of non-EEA immigrant work 
permit holders (see also Mancini and Finlay 2008: 
582). !is arose from the fact that by 2004 Ireland was 
in the position of being the only EU Member State 
to recognize unrestricted jus soli, which following the 
Good Friday Agreement meant that residence rights in 
the UK as well as other Member States was, potentially 
at least, up for grabs. One does not need to cite every 
public statement that openly points to this issue, but 
it was hardly hidden from view (see, for an illustrative 
sample, McDowell 2004: 16; Mansergh 2004: 16; 
Lenihan 2004: 18; O’Halloran 2004: 6).14 Moreover, 
the need to close off the so-called ‘loophole’ of jus 
soli was flagged in a International Organization for 
Migration report on migration legislation and practice 
in 2002 and was the substance of two of the most 
important legal cases for Irish migration policy, the 
‘Chen case’ and the ‘Lobe case’, both of which pointed 
to the diverse claims to residency based on Irish-born 
children arising from non-EEA nationals and the 
fact that more people achieved residency in this way 
that did so via the asylum determinations process.15 
Speaking of the Chen case to Seanad Éireann in the 
run up to the Referendum then Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, TD, 
characteristically argued that the nub of the issue was 
the perceived advantages to be gained from birthing a 
child in Ireland:
!ose advantages do not simply flow from an 
immigration-free status in the State. !ey flow from 
an immigration-free status for Irish citizens in the 
United Kingdom because of the common travel area. 
In addition, they flow from the extensive right of Irish 
citizens to move freely throughout the European Union 
and the full extent of the implications are illustrated by 
the Chen case … (Seanad Éireann 2004: 1612–1614 
passim)
It is important to take statements such as this seriously. 
While the focus on ‘race’ and the Irish state in 
contemporary scholarship does provide insights into 
the racialisation of asylum seekers it has done so at the 
expense of in-depth analysis of the conditions which 
subsist behind international migration management 
strategies, the lock-step policies of the UK and Ireland, 
and the growing importance of EU-wide systems and 
processes.
It is also possible to add to discussions of the 
2004 citizenship referendum by briefly considering an 
example of forthcoming legislative moves. At the time 
of writing the Immigration, Residence and Protection 
Bill, 2008 remains to be transposed into law, and has 
been subject to a great many amendments. Nonetheless, 
the Bill provides a clear window onto governmental 
thinking on migration management. In essence, it 
provides for the restatement, modification and shoring 
up of the government’s capacity to regulate the presence, 
movement and deportation of foreign nationals (again, 
not just asylum seekers). One of the impetuses for the 
legislation is the forthcoming (though stalled) end of 
the Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland, 
originally scheduled for 2010. !e UK government is 
moving in the direction of e-borders, as set out in the 
UK Border, Citizenship and Immigration Bill, 2009, and 
will be dispensing with older travel agreements that 
rely on the security of national identity in favour of the 
securitization of identity itself.  Biometric technologies 
are the central pillar of the UK’s approach to migration 
management, from proposals to reduce friction 
for high-end travellers to increasing individualized 
security for persons perceived to be a risk. According 
to the position paper Controlling our Borders: Making 
Migration work for Britain, the border of the future 
will be ‘smart,’ spread out through advanced passenger 
information systems, and, according to David Lyon 
(2009), driven by social sorting through categorical 
suspicion. 
!e Irish Immigration, Residence and Protection 
Bill and British migration management policy, not for 
the first time, appear to be isomorphic. !e proposed 
Irish legislation empowers the Minister for Justice to 
prescribe the form in which visa applications are made 
and biometric data harvested. !e Bill makes a clear 
distinction between authorizations for the retention, 
storage and/or comparison of bio-data for Irish citizens 
and similar processes for foreign nationals. In the case of 
asylum seekers, biometric data will be entered into the 
Eurodac database and shared with agencies throughout 
the EU and with other jurisdictions. What will this 
world of securitized and spread out borders look like, 
and what are the human consequences? Susan Bibler 
Coutin’s important work on ‘illegal’ migration to the 
USA shows how clandestine routes are being followed 
with tragic consequences. Because their presence 
24 Irish Journal of Anthropology  Volume 12(3) 2009
is prohibited, according to Coutin, ‘unauthorized 
migrants do not fully arrive even when they reach their 
destinations’ (2005: 165). Because they use the body as 
a passport to spaces and privileges biometrics hold out 
not just the promise of enhanced security, but also the 
possibility of letting certain things happen, of allowing 
for the mobility necessary for participation in the 
global economy while managing that same mobility. 
In his 1978 lectures in the College de France, recently 
published as Security, Territory, Population, Foucault 
argues that the challenge for security is to allow
 
… circulations to take place [but] controlling them, 
sifting the good from the bad, ensuring that things 
are always in movement, constantly moving around, 
continually going from one point to another, but in 
such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation 
are cancelled out.  No longer the safety (Sûreté) of the 
Prince and his territory, but the security (sécurité) of the 
population and, consequently, of those who govern it. 
(2007: 65)
Foucault’s prescient work on security, which still 
resonates so strongly, moved from considerations of the 
state to an attempt to map out a grid of spatial, power 
and knowledge-based relations of which the state is an 
outcome. !e challenge of researching governmentality, 
he argues, is to understand the political mentalities 
implicated, such as those that construct the immigrant 
or asylum seeker and the truth of their being; to 
understand problematizations such as citizenship 
or integration, to understand actual interventions 
such as the 2004 amendment, and to understand the 
technologies deployed – those Jonathan Xavier Inda 
(2006) has termed anti-citizen technologies; those 
Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild consider, following 
Foucault, as central to the Ban-opticon (2002). Our 
argument herein has been that, instead of investigations 
along these lines, contemporary scholarship on 
migration in Ireland is transfixed by the state – why, 
one might ask? Why the problematic assumption that 
the state must be accorded a central role in research?
Conclusions: Notes on the di#culty of 
statism
Back in 1977, the sociologist Philip Abrams, in his 
famous ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,’ 
remarked: ‘!e state is not the reality which stands 
behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the 
mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it 
is’ (1988: 54). Indeed, such a problematization of ‘the 
state’ may be detected in the foundational scholarship 
of political science, especially so in Hobbes. A similar 
problematization may also be located in modern 
anthropology with Radcliffe-Brown’s exasperated 
demand that we abandon discussions of the state in 
favour of the more analytically useful ‘government’ 
(1940: xxii). !is makes the less nuanced vision of 
political power in ‘race’ and state theories all the more 
curious, especially so considering that it is accompanied 
by a focus on biopolitics. In this concluding section 
we suggest that the ‘state’ provides a simple mask that 
prevents a full engagement with biopolitics today.  
 Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is something 
of an unfinished project. In essence, he uses it to draw 
attention to the anatamo-politics of the human body, 
on the one side, and the biopolitics of the population, 
on the other. Discourses that deploy the vital-ness of 
the human thus become discursively important, such 
as ‘race’ (see Foucault 2003: 239-265). But Foucault 
was careful to think in terms of how governmentality 
worked on the individual and on the conduct of 
conduct in ways that did not involve the state – take for 
example that which exists alongside the nation-state: 
the social, where a whole series of sub- and non-state 
institutions and discourses, from insurance to welfare 
and from medicine to notions of ‘race’ operate. A good 
example of the need to broaden analysis beyond the 
state is offered by the challenge of dealing with the 
contemporary use of biometric technologies to regulate 
migration (as above). Biometric security emerged 
in the nineteenth century in places as far away from 
each other as Argentina, India and France, linked with 
eugenics and generally operating in civil applications 
(Maguire 2009). In thinking about that example, 
the question becomes less about new forms of state 
surveillance of others and more about how fairly old 
technology couples the anatamo-politics of the human 
body (your prints), on the one side, and the biopolitics 
of the population (who’s suspicious), on the other in 
ways that require and instantiate ‘race’ discursively.  
 Foucault also discusses the emergence of the 
biopolitics of population in ways that would have been 
‘absolutely foreign’ (2007: 42) in earlier centuries, and 
suggests that modern biopolitics is accompanied by a 
new way of thinking about security. Today as nation-
states around the world are attempting to manage the 
tension between promoting the mobility necessary 
for participation in the global economy while, at the 
same time, controlling that same mobility, the question 
revolves less around the power of the state and more 
around the ways in which biopolitics is connected to 
new articulations of ‘state’ power, racialization and 
citizenship. Such articulations often depend upon the 
figuration of motherhood to determine the legitimation 
of ‘state’ power and identity as well as threats to the 
same. Ireland, like many other nation-states, has 
enlisted matriarchal images to support its own sense of 
imagined community, and now enlists proximate and 
overlapping images to illustrate how that community 
may be unimagined, or to dramatize the unimaginable 
afflicting the community. !e notion that motherhood 
can offer positive and negative political messages at 
one and the same time is no paradox or coincidence. 
Rather it offers something approximating the Freudian 
concept of unheimlich applied to the level of statist 
legitimation: the greatest supposed threat to a nation’s 
identity and security must be immanent with that most 
profound physical symbol of unconditional love and 
intimacy. Biometric technologies that seek to facilitate 
the movement of bodies through states in ways that 
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streamline economic and political interests will not solve 
the ‘problem’ of how native and foreign bodies remain 
or become knowable, but rather shift its terms and 
terrain. As Georg Simmel has argued, the category of 
‘stranger’ exists, not to be resolved or erased, but rather 
to be ‘managed’ in ways that continually reinforces and 
reinvents a network of institutional categories.
 What, then, of the assumption that by 
according a central role to the state in research on 
migration in Ireland new racism, especially directed 
towards asylum-seeking mothers is being exposed? In 
this article we have not denied that overt racism was 
directed towards asylum-seeking mothers, but we do 
argue that social-scientific research that pits ‘the state’ 
against particular and vulnerable mother-victims erases 
too much and highlights too little. If anything, the 
state is a mother that is constantly giving birth to itself; 
a mother whose role and status shifts according to the 
needs not of her children but the needs of forces that 
deploy ‘mother-child’ dyads with powerful political 
charges. !e ur-text of Irish statehood, the 1916 
Independence Proclamation famously describes the 
aim of ‘cherishing all the children of the nation equally’. 
Yet sustaining the unstable fiction of ‘the nation’ has 
proved largely a matter of unequal cherishing.
Notes
1 !e 2004 Amendment was accompanied by the Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act, 2004, which restricted 
access to citizenship to those children whose parents 
had resided legally in the state for three of the four 
years previous to the birth. For reviews of the enormous 
media coverage of the referendum and amendment see 
Deveraux, Haynes and Breen 2006; Conway 2006; 
Brandi 2007).
2 An illustrative sample of the literature ranges from 
political geography (e.g. MacÉinrí 2007; Crowley, 
Gilmartin and Kitchin 2006), and from political 
science and political sociology (e.g. Mancini and Finlay 
2008; Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007; Garner 2007) 
to legal scholarship (e.g. Bacik et al 2004; IOM 2006). 
However, there has also been considerable comment 
from anthropology (see Lele 2008; Shandy 2008 and 
forthcoming; Tormey 2007), applied social studies (e.g. 
Christie 2006) and feminist thought (e.g. Luibhéid 
2004). However, the most widely cited contributions 
are from Lentin and McVeigh (e.g. Lentin and McVeigh 
2006a, 2006b; Lentin 2007).   
3 Scholars tracking ‘new racism’ have identified the 
following notable features: (1) ‘new racism’ seems less 
directed by or towards specific groups than in the past; 
(2) it tends to be expressed through notions of cultural 
and social incompatibility; (3) perceived ability to 
assimilate and to perform in the economy – associated 
with language use – is as much a marker as skin colour; 
finally (4) institutional avoidance, ineptitude and poor 
policy.
4 Biopolitics may be taken to denote discourses about 
the vital nature of humans, their ‘truth’ and subjectivity; 
strategies and tactics for actual interventions on every 
level, from the individual to that of the population, the 
health, welfare or security of which might be threatened 
or curtailed and thus must be defended.
5 Herein ‘securitization’ refers to the trend towards on 
the one hand, fortifying borders against poor, ‘illegal’ 
immigrants while, on the other hand, making use of 
security technologies to simultaneously speed up the 
flows of ‘high-value’ migrants.  !is trend is documented 
in the 2006 United Nations report on #e State of the 
World’s Refugees. However, we also take ‘securitization’ 
to be a useful term that denotes exercises of power that 
are neither recent nor confined to frontiers. Michel 
Foucault (2007), Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild 
(2002), and Mark Neocleous (2008) have all argued 
for security to be considered as a discursive formation 
that links together a whole variety of social domains 
and is located at a variety of scales.
6 In arguing that a ‘state-oriented’ approach is required, 
Fanning and Mutwarasibo are following a line of 
thinking put forward earlier by Patrick Weil.  In Weil’s 
analysis, individual states’ adaptation of immigration 
policies arising from, inter alia, UN Conventions, post-
colonial restrictions/obligations, or EU harmonization 
cannot be understood without knowledge of individual 
states’ priorities. While this argument has the virtue of 
refuting the fetishization of what Fredrick Jameson 
termed ‘NATO high culture,’ it simply fetishizes the 
state in instead.
7 !e Saorstát Éireann Constitution Act was passed on 5 
December 1922 and took effect from the 6 December 
onwards. Northern Ireland opted out of the Saorstát 
on 7 December. However, the so-called ‘twenty-
four-hour gap’ meant that every ordinarily resident 
person in Northern Ireland on 6 December 1922 was 
automatically an Irish citizen.
8 Indeed, Eamonn de Valera had to reassure Dáil 
Éireann that no attempt would be made ‘to dictate to 
those of the race who are citizens of other lands’ (Irish 
Independent 28 January 1922).
9 Irish independence was modelled on the Canadian 
‘example’ of graduated (local) citizenship. However, 
Canada was not the only imperial laboratory: the 
British Nationality Act, 1914 acknowledged the rights 
of dominions to impose ‘local citizenship,’ which 
manifested itself in restrictions on immigration and 
political participation of colonial subjects. !is, in 
effect, meant restrictions on migrants from colonies 
such as India in dominions such as South Africa.  
10 Indeed, by the late 1990s this crisis was considered 
so acute that a policy of housing asylum seekers in 
floating hotels—so-called ‘flotels’—in Dublin Bay was 
given serious consideration.
11 Eithne Luibhéid’s essay ‘Childbearing against the 
State?’ is frequently cited in discussions of the 2004 
referendum (see for example Lentin 2006, 2007; Garner 
2007, Tormey 2007). Her work follows an important 
strand of feminist scholarship that argues that women 
occupy distinct roles in ethnic and national communities 
as the reproducers of the collectives’ members, as 
reproducers of boundaries through procreative choices 
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and as reproducers of culture through childrearing (see 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989). Such work takes the 
position that ‘there are no necessary ‘natural’ social 
effects of sexual differences or biological reproduction 
(see Yuval-Davis 2000: 9); however, rather that see 
gender and sexuality as free-floating and socially 
constructed they call attention to power structures 
that ‘play a central role’ in providing the conditions 
for the possibility of particular configurations of sex, 
gender and community – structures like the nation and 
the state. !is feminist perspective is book-ended by 
problematic issues. Firstly, the proposition that women 
are reproducers of the collective’s members is based on a 
narrow-gauge biological reading of culturally mediated 
phenomena (take for example the ethnographic 
discussions of reproduction in the Amazon by Mader 
(1999)). Secondly, the unusual a priori presence of 
the state in, for example, Yuval-Davis’s discussion of 
power structures is justified through a zero sum game 
in which one either focuses on the state or ‘dispenses’ 
with it (a position crudely ascribed to Foucault), with 
no alternative perspective presented.
12 It is worth noting that data suggests that women in 
direct provision were presenting in maternity hospitals 
cognizant of the legal ramifications of giving birth in 
Ireland, as were much smaller numbers who migrated 
while pregnant (see Shandy 2008: 811-813). However, 
the available data indicates that the numbers were 
much lower than government statements suggested. 
Moreover, one must be mindful of the long periods 
in direct provision, and higher fertility rates in prior 
countries of residency: much of what was imagined 
to be ‘citizenship tourism’ instead evidenced women 
presenting at Dublin maternity hospitals having 
travelled from dispersed direct provision centres. 
Indeed, one must also ask serious questions about 
policies that present few opportunities for people in the 
majority world to migrate to wealthy countries, except 
through claiming refugee status, and then the same 
countries that canalize migration engage in efforts to 
‘unmask’ claims for asylum. Finally, an in a related way, 
there is the important issue of representation: why, we 
might ask, is discovering active agency so jarring to 
representations of the ‘genuine’ refugee?  
13 It is also worth pointing out that a semiotic reading of 
public statements on the citizenship referendum does 
not reveal fears over African fecundity or sexuality; 
rather, the overwhelming impression one gets from 
public statements that vilify asylum seekers is that those 
statements are castigating African women for strategic 
motherhood – a racialized accusation that surely cuts 
deep, because it imagines an Other that values the lives 
of children only to the extent of their instrumental 
value.
14 Speaking in the run-up to the Referendum, Taoiseach 
Bertie Ahern claimed that it didn’t matter if the issue 
was ‘a few, a few hundred or a few thousand’, and 
that he ‘… did not visualize in 1998 that Russians, 
Moldovans and Ukrainians would be coming to this 
country for two or three weeks simply for the benefit 
of Irish citizenship’ (See O’Halloran 2004: 6; see also 
Dáil Éireann 2004: 1482 passim; for a rebuttal see also 
Rafferty 2004: 16).
15 In the first instance, ECJ, case C-200/02, Chen & or. v. 
United Kingdom pitted Man Lavette Chen and Kunqian 
Catherine Zhu against the Secretary of State for the UK 
Home Department. Chen, a married overseas Chinese 
national, had been refused long-term residence in the 
UK. She became pregnant with her second child and 
could not return to China because of the one child rule. 
On legal advice, she gave birth in Belfast and thereby 
(following the ECJ overturning the British Supreme 
Court’s decision to deport her) gaining UK residence 
rights. (All) Ireland’s citizenship laws were used, it was 
argued, to gain access to the UK and to the EU.  In the 
latter case, in January 2003, a majority of the Supreme 
Court ruled, in Lobe v. Minister for Justice that being 
the parent of an Irish-born child was no longer entitled 
automatic residency.  Like Man Lavette Chen, David 
Lobe, a Czech Roma, did not conform to the image 
of the female African asylum seeker so thoroughly 
captured in media and public discourse.
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.
Literature on immigration emphasizes social networks 
in immigrants’ economic and social survival in the US, 
however insufficiently attention is being paid to how social 
relationships subsidize the state and corporate sectors. Based 
on in-depth interviews with Indian immigrant IT workers 
on specialty work-visas, this article examines the significance 
of social relationships and demonstrates how these relations 
are relied upon as critical substitutes. !is article, thus, 
examines how the larger institutional apparatus of the state 
and the corporate sector has ‘privatized’ and downsized its 
accountability for ensuring access to essential services by 
relegating this task to the private domain of immigrants’ 
individual personal networks. 
Introduction
Immigration scholars use the concept of social networks 
to explain many immigration-related processes, from 
‘chain-migration,’ employment, ethnic enclaves and 
entrepreneurship to housing and settlement patterns, 
and assimilation, to name a few (see Massey et. al 
1993; Arango 2000). From this perspective, immigrant 
networks are typically seen as facilitating initial 
migration and shaping the subsequent aspects of the 
immigrant experience. !is approach, however, does 
not necessarily question how the state and capital – 
two vital and imbricated contexts impacting migration 
– intersect with and rely upon immigrants’ immediate 
social collective in ways that allow the state and capital 
to accrue certain benefits. Based on qualitative data 
from on a multi-year study on Indian immigrant IT 
professionals in the US with visas such as H-1B, this 
paper develops an analysis of how corporate clients 
in the US are able to relinquish their accountabilities 
towards labour by shifting the tasks of responding to 
workers’ embodied needs to individual immigrants 
and their social networks/relationships. In sync with 
the core of neoliberal labour policies, this privatization 
and individualization of a range of tasks, from bearing 
the costs associated with relocating immigrant workers 
to ensuring their overall well being, have enabled the 
abrogation of corporate responsibility. 
 !is article is based on research that included: 
(1) in-depth semi-structured interviews with Indian 
immigrants in the IT field in the US, as well as 
managers and Human Resources personnel at labour 
intermediary firms responsible for coordinating the 
recruitment of IT workers from India for clients in 
the US; (2) field visits and interviews with project 
managers and IT professionals at one of India’s largest 
IT services consulting company’s regional office in the 
eastern city of Kolkata; (3) analysis of US immigration 
and visa policies, and review of Congressional debates 
on visas for specialty occupations; and (4) examination 
of India’s IT and technology-based development 
strategies and practices over the decades following 
independence in 1947. Situated within this wider 
research context, insights presented in this article draws 
upon approximately forty in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews conducted with immigrant IT professionals 
in the US between 2002 and 2005 at various locations 
across several states on the east coast. !ese interviews, 
based on a snowball sample and typically between one to 
three hours in duration, were conducted at venues most 
convenient for participants, e.g. cafes, public libraries, 
meeting rooms in offices, and participants’ homes. 
!ese professionals’ career trajectories and reflections 
on their personal experiences as immigrant IT workers 
in the US on work-visas constituted the central theme 
of these interviews. Each interview was tape-recorded 
with written permission following informed consent 
requirements and transcribed verbatim for coding. !e 
majority among the participants were males in their 20s 
and 30s. Despite significant efforts, no more than three 
women could be included in this research – a result 
of the fact that men tend to compose the majority of 
this immigrant workforce. Interview narratives serve as 
the basis for understanding the demands made by both 
capital and by the state on immigrants’ labour and the 
ways in which immigrants must rely on their social and 
personal resources to address this demand. 
Neoliberal globalization, labour, and the 
question of &exibility
A growing body of critical literature continues to reveal 
the impact of neoliberal globalization on workers 
and the terms and conditions of exploitative work 
Subsidizing Flexible Accumulation: 
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Networks 
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encountered by people due to economic restructuring, 
development strategies, such as the establishment 
of export-processing zones; foreign investments, 
privatization, and their consequent displacement and 
migration. During the 1970s, corporations in the 
global North, specifically the US, faced a profit-impasse 
resulting from stagnating growth rates, saturated 
markets, over-production, increasing unemployment, 
high cost of oil, and an overall crisis in the welfare state 
model, among other factors. !is crisis necessitated a 
massive re-organization of both the logic and methods 
of global trade and a search for new open markets 
for capital investment, resources, production, sales, 
and labour (see Ong 1991; Sassen 1998). Neoliberal 
economic mandates, institutionalized through the 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the IMF and 
the World Bank on numerous developing countries, re-
invigorated the expansion and integration of the global 
market beyond national borders. Previous Fordist-era 
strategies of large-scale production and employment, 
which no longer delivered desired rates of profit, got 
abandoned in favour of corporate practices that started 
to be labelled as the ‘just-in-time’ business model.1 
Fragmentation of production processes, facilitated 
by the SAP-enabled creation of innumerable export-
processing manufacturing zones across the world, 
combined with contract-based short-term employment 
arrangements both in the global North and South, 
ushered in a new phase in the relationship between 
capital and labour. 
 A review of the vast literature on this relationship 
between labour and capital in neoliberal globalization, 
especially in the so-called non-professional and 
unskilled sectors, suggests that neoliberal economic 
policies have been accompanied by increasing labour 
flexibilization and casualization.  Scholars like Aihwa 
Ong (1991), Guy Standing (1989) and Saskia Sassen-
Koob (1984), among others, offered some of the earliest 
analyses of flexible employment patterns’ impact on 
labour. !eir assessment – of the terms and conditions 
of work in export-oriented factories and other spaces 
incorporated within the folds of global capitalism 
in Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America – reveal 
various forms of exploitation and disembodiment 
of labour in general, and that of women workers in 
particular (see also Sassen 1998; Marchand and Runyan 
2000; Oxfam 2004). !ese conditions have included 
varying degrees of low wages, long hours, unpaid or 
underpaid overtime, lack of access to healthcare or life- 
and family-supporting services, erosion of bargaining 
capacity for better work conditions, acute surveillance 
and monitoring of workers’ activities, dehumanization 
(e.g. expressed in terms of limited bathroom breaks, 
lack of sensitivity toward heath and safety), as well as 
rampant sexualization and sexual exploitation (Sassen-
Koob 1984; Ong 1991; Fernandez-Kelly, Patricia and 
Sassen 1995; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000).
!is pattern of disembodiment of labour 
suggests significant intersections between flexibilization 
of production and employment, where inequalities 
within global social hierarchies, such as those defined 
by gender, race, class, and third world status are deeply 
implicated. Marchand and Runyan (2000: 16-17) 
have conceptualized labour flexibilization in global 
restructuring as being linked with feminization of 
labour in the following terms:  
… [W]hat feminists call the ‘feminization of labour’ 
in the context of global restructuring refers not only 
to the unprecedented increase in the numbers of 
women workers in the formal (and informal) labour 
force to service the global economy, but also to the 
‘flexibilization’ and ‘casualization’ of (especially women’s) 
labour to keep labour costs down and productivity up 
in the name of free trade, global competitiveness, and 
economic efficiency. 
Feminization of labour thus refers not only to the 
rapid increase in the number of women in global 
capitalism but also to the deteriorating terms of 
employment, which include labour flexibility and the 
steady degradation of work conditions for third world 
and immigrant labour, such that their labour remains 
inexpensive, disciplined, and low status (Chang and 
Ling 2000). Immigrants, particularly women, tend 
to be placed into the restructured and increasingly 
volatile low-wage sectors in first world countries 
(Fernandez-Kelly, Patricia and Sassen 1995; Sassen, 
1998, 2002; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Chang 
2000; Parrenas 2001; Zentgraf 2001; Carty 2003). In 
the majority of the cases, labour migrants are subjected 
to exploitative work contracts and conditions that deny 
access to citizenship, family unification, or fair labour 
laws. Unfortunately, despite extensive resistance and 
organized efforts to combat these conditions, women 
workers continue to be exploited given the increasing 
demands for flexible and inexpensive labour in the 
global economy in both manufacturing and service 
sectors.  Oxfam’s (2004) report on women workers 
from farms and factories across the world brings into 
view, with chilling clarity, scores of examples of precisely 
how the logic of flexible production and subcontracting 
translate into immense economic and social costs, 
whose burden is shifted by brand-owners, retailers, 
and mid-chain suppliers down the supply chain to be 
borne primarily by workers and small scale producers. 
!e demand for high profits and rates of return on 
investors’ contributions, quick product cycles, and 
the quest for cheapest labour intensify cost-squeeze, 
creating acute competition among producers and 
subcontractors at the lowest level of the global supply 
chain. To remain competitive and to ensure a steady 
flow of consecutive job orders from mid-chain suppliers, 
subcontractors and producers experience immense 
pressure to economize on wages, labour conditions, 
overtime pay, worker benefits, and other overheads. To 
cope with these demands, employers put their workers 
through some of the most stringent labour strategies. 
Subcontracting not only allows multinational retailers 
and global brand-owners to keep themselves distant 
and insulated from these processes, it also enables these 
companies to subsidize or entirely eliminate a vast 
range of costs/risks of their own making. !e volatility 
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and hidden costs of flexibility, on the other hand, get 
displaced down the global supply chain such that they 
are increasingly borne by women, people in the third 
world, immigrants and minorities of colour, and the 
economically disadvantaged in both advanced and 
developing economies (see also Mitter 1994; Sassen 
1998; Chang and Ling 2000). 
 !is literature raises a set of critical questions: 
how do workers bear the social, economic, and psychic 
costs associated with the vagaries of production and 
labour flexibility in this economy? What personal, social, 
and institutional resources are they made to rely upon, 
and what relationships of dependence or co-adaptation 
are thus created? In other words, what sorts of social 
relations does the contemporary global economy 
benefit from as workers subsidize the social and human 
costs associated with labour flexibility? In the analysis 
presented below, I engage with these questions on the 
basis of my research on Indian IT workers in the US 
and discuss how high-skilled immigrants, positioned 
as temporary contract workers in a neoliberal labour 
regime, deal with flexibility and disembodiment. 
Many observers are likely to perceive this 
educated and skilled immigrant workforce as part of 
a relatively privileged group in a globalized economy, 
with access to white-collar salaries, overseas travel, 
workplace benefits, career paths, ability to navigate on 
their own terms high-status positions in a field that 
is considered to be at the top-end of the skilled and 
high-paid services sector. Indeed, this workforce does 
enjoy certain privileges: they have university degrees, 
skills that are valued in the global economy, and their 
salaries are, at least in part, reflective of high-skilled 
white-collar employment. 
In the recent past, given the importance 
of information technology in the global economy, 
companies from across the corporate spectrum in the 
US (and several European countries as well) reached 
out to India to access IT professionals. Although the 
debates about the existence of skilled worker shortages 
in these economies are yet to be resolved, there is no 
doubt that access to Indian IT workers as immigrant 
labour did offer extensive benefits to the end-user 
clients across industries (Banerjee 2008). Starting in the 
late-1990s, the US government legislated and amended 
the country’s employment-based skilled worker visa 
policies, such as the H-1B program, in response to 
corporate demands for this immigrant workforce. !e 
proportion of Indian IT workers on the H-1B visa 
relative to the entire workforce in IT occupations alters 
from year to year based on several factors (number of 
visas capped per year and general employment figures). 
Overall trends, however, continue to be as follows: 
Indian nationals represent an overwhelming majority 
among those who are in the US on the H-1B to work 
in the IT field (Lowell 2000). In 1999, sixty percent of 
all H-1B visas went to immigrants hired for the IT field 
of which about seventy-five percent of all immigrant 
IT workers on H-1B visas were from India (US GAO 
2000, 2003). Roughly half of all H-1B workers were 
from India in 2001 (US DHS 2003). !ese overall 
trends have remained stable over several years. As a 
result, Indian immigrants have figured as a dominant 
majority among foreign workers in IT occupations in 
the US. 
!e immense drive to recruit Indian IT 
professionals, that too as documented workers with 
some measure of labour protections (entitlement 
to fair market wages, etc.), however, does not reflect 
certain characteristics that one is likely to expect from 
high-skilled professional employment in the global 
economy. !e experiences of this immigrant workforce 
constitute high inequality related to, on the one hand, 
the hierarchical politics of race and immigration 
status and, on the other, this group’s employment as 
temporary contract workers in IT jobs (Banerjee 2006; 
2008).2 As a result of the corporate sector’s increasing 
preference for flexible hiring, the majority of Indian 
IT workers in the US have been hired by labour 
vendors or subcontractors and not by the ‘clients,’ i.e. 
companies that require the services of these workers. 
Typically one or more intermediaries operate between 
individual immigrants and their clients. Each one of the 
intermediaries, including the consulting firm managing 
the project on the clients’ behalf and the immigrants’ 
direct employer, deduct portions of the IT workers’ 
hourly wages (billing rate) as commission. Although 
immigrants on the H-1B visa are supposed to be paid 
on the basis of ‘prevailing market wages,’ the fiscal logic 
of levying commissions embedded in subcontracting 
render the subject of ensuring prevailing wage elusive. 
Moreover, the rate of commissions taken out of these 
immigrants’ salaries as well as their billing rate from 
clients frequently vary from one project to the next, 
which can cause fluctuations in their take-home pay 
(Banerjee 2008). Data from the U.S. Department of 
Labour also indicate that IT workers on this visa earn 
about $13,000 less per year on average than their US 
counterparts in similar occupational categories and 
geographical areas.
Moreover, the terms of the H-1B further 
complicate this immigrant group’s status and bargaining 
power in the context of flexible employment. By 
definition, the H-1B is an employment and employer-
based visa. It predicates immigrants’ legal status and 
employability in the country on being employed with 
the company authorized with their visa. !e prospects 
of uninterrupted long-term work in a labour market 
dominated by short-term contract-based projects are, at 
best, vague and often untenable. !ese immigrants often 
find themselves in vulnerable positions: legal status, 
work authorization, and livelihood simultaneously 
overlap and depend on being employed, which means 
that not having a project threatens immigration status 
if one is fired by one’s labour vendor employers. 
!e workers interviewed in this research described 
their ‘bench’ periods – recurrent phases of de facto 
unemployment in the absence of client projects – as 
one of the most demoralizing and anxiety-ridden 
aspects of their experience. Many concluded that the 
terms of the H-1B ‘tied’ or ‘bound’ them to their visa-
holding companies, i.e., placed them in a relationship 
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of dependence and subordination to their employers 
and denied them the eligibility to enter the labour 
market as autonomous workers. Despite their skilled 
and documented status in one of the high-end service 
sectors, Indian immigrant IT workers are thus subject to 
a range of marginalization and exploitative practices. 
Labour-ready: the transnational 
coordination of &exible work in IT 
Companies in the US use specific strategies to carry out 
projects requiring an IT component in a way that would 
maximize flexibility and minimize or entirely eliminate 
their responsibilities of, say, recruiting, keeping a large 
workforce on their payroll, monitoring the work of IT 
professionals, managing the details of the project, etc. 
Moving away from erstwhile Fordist business models, 
these companies have followed a flexible project-based 
and short-term approach in meeting their IT needs 
by delegating all or portions of the work to external 
consulting companies. !rough a bidding process, a 
handful of preferred consulting firms are invited to 
provide competitive blue-prints illustrating how the 
project might be executed with complete details of 
costs, composition of the IT team, its management and 
planning structure, as well as the resumes of individual 
IT professionals to be placed on the project. In theory, 
the most efficient and viable proposal wins the project.3 
During the course of fieldwork, I interviewed Nabil, an 
Indian immigrant IT professional and a senior manager 
at one of the largest consulting firms in the US. Having 
acted as a supervisor for projects and project-managers 
for many clients, Nabil had intimate knowledge about 
the bidding process and was able to provide details that 
help analyze the character of flexibility and its impact 
on labour subcontractors’ recruitment approaches and 
immigrant workers’ experiences. Nabil explained:
We are a large consulting company and we are into 
managing all kinds of IT projects for our clients. And 
we have to compete with other consulting companies 
and bid for the clients’ projects. We have to show a plan 
and we need resumes of our guys [IT professionals] we 
will place on the project when we bid. Now, of course, 
these IT guys are not our employees and we are not 
looking into hiring them either. So to prepare a bid 
what I will do is I will call up my preferred vendors and 
tell them that I am going to bid on this project. And if 
we win, I am going to look for resources [IT workers to 
be place d on temporary contracts] from you. I will ask 
them: ‘Do you have resources in these skill areas? If you 
have resources, give me their resumes. And, if we win 
and these are guys are accepted, we will put them on our 
project.’ !ese vendors, of course, want to work with 
us. Sometimes they approach us and say: ‘Can you put 
the resumes of our candidates in your proposal, so that 
if you win, you can hire our guys.’ But if we don’t win 
the bid, then we will not hire the vendors’ guys.4 !en 
everything is over. If we win, our vendors get excited. 
And they will do everything for the IT guys to come 
from India or if they are in the US already, then to get 
them together to be there on time for the project. If we 
lose the bid, then we tell them, we lost the proposal. 
So they say, okay, no problem, next one. So we do get 
the resumes for the bid, but we don’t hire any one of 
them if we don’t win the bid. And the vendors do the 
same thing to their vendors! Now, it is possible that our 
vendors actually access the IT professionals through 
another layer of labour-vendors, that is another layer of 
companies that they contract from. Our vendors will 
approach their vendors and ask for IT professionals they 
may have on their roster that reflect the needs of the 
project we are bidding for. Our vendors might say to 
them: ‘Hey, do you have any resumes? We are going 
to be bidding with one of our big companies over here 
and if they win the project then they will be looking for 
resources from us. So if you have resources you give it to 
me.’ So you see, before or during the bidding, nobody 
has done the actual hiring. And this guy [IT worker] 
may not even get placed, have this job! But his resume 
is up on the tender with us. Right? !is guy could be 
sitting in India somewhere! Let us say, BizTech in India 
interviewed an IT professional and gave the resume to 
Atlas in the US. Atlas is our vendor and Atlas gives the 
resume to us. And we put it up on our tender to our 
client. But nobody has hired the guy yet. Again, it is 
possible that some Bodyshop or vendor already hired 
him, thinking that some project will come along from 
one of the preferred vendors. But the guy [Indian IT 
worker] is in Timbuktu, sitting! In actuality, he doesn’t 
have a project even though his name is being floated 
around. So you see, this is the arrangement. 
!is corporate ‘arrangement’ has relied upon the creation 
and viability of one of the most complex systems of 
transnational subcontracting and immigrant labour 
deployment in the name of flexible accumulation. 
!is integrated system – brought to life by the end-
user clients on one end of the spectrum, followed 
by consulting companies serving clients’ project 
needs, followed by numerous labour vendors and 
subcontractors, and ultimately the Indian IT workers 
– operate within a field of social relations where the 
costs and burdens of flexibility are shared inequitably. 
!e mandate of flexibility motivates both clients and 
large consulting companies to keep their respective 
(directly employed) workforce lean, which makes it 
incumbent upon competing consulting companies to 
look towards their labour-vendors for the actual IT 
labour pool. !ey also tide through the demands of the 
bidding process, which requires consulting companies 
to identify appropriate workers and furnish competitive 
price tags to lure projects from clients, by supplying the 
skill-profiles of ‘resources’ or IT professionals they wish 
to acquire through vendors. As in the case of export-
processing factories within the global supply chain 
for manufactured goods, labour cost competitiveness 
and flexibility are critical for winning projects (Oxfam 
2004). 
Given that the outcome of the bid is always 
uncertain, consulting companies and the layers of 
labour vendors involved in coordinating access to IT 
workers must be prepared for two possible scenarios. If 
the bid is successful, they have to place the IT workers 
on time and in the manner promised to the client. If 
the bid is unsuccessful, decidedly there is no contract 
or need for workers. !e strategy of appointing labour 
    Irish Journal of Anthropology Volume 12(3) 2009 33
vendors provides a buffer against loss and costs. It also 
allows consulting firms to withstand either possibility 
to their best advantage while remaining competitive. 
By minimizing direct in-house recruitment and not 
finalizing contracts with labour vendors until they 
win a project, these companies insulate themselves 
from the negative consequences of losing a bid. On 
the other hand, they rely on their labour vendors to 
quickly assemble the ‘resources’ or IT professionals if 
they bag a project. In either case, consulting companies 
relieve themselves of the burdens associated with the 
uncertainties of this process by passing them on to the 
subsequent layers of labour subcontractors.
!e price competitiveness and labour flexibility 
enjoyed by clients and consulting firms are based on 
the ready availability of immigrant and overseas labour 
managed by IT services consulting firms in India as 
well as the numerous labour vendors of varying sizes 
in the US. Indian immigrant entrepreneurs run the 
majority of these companies. Whether a project is 
won or lost by consulting firms, labour vendors must 
remain on the stand-by with immediate access to 
workers even in the absence of any confirmed projects 
for their employees. Subcontractors have to position 
themselves as labour vendors or Bodyshops with a 
roster of workers, without any guarantees that their 
employees will actually be picked up by consulting 
companies for client placements. !ese labour vendors 
have also been relegated tasks that large companies in 
the US have abdicated systematically. For example, 
labour vendors organize job interviews with candidates 
in India, process their visa applications, and coordinate 
a range of human resources-related tasks to ensure that 
these workers are readily accessible and prepared to 
join a project quickly. Furthermore, these vendors also 
bear, to some extent, the responsibility of providing for 
the embodied needs of new immigrants, such as initial 
housing, as they are brought to the US to respond to 
clients’ demands for instantaneous access to temporary 
contract workers. !ese costs, however, are ultimately 
shifted on to individual immigrants. 
Nabil’s explanation of the process of bidding 
for projects reveals how the process of deploying labour 
for IT work in the U.S. is not just about what we 
identify as flexible hiring, but that the process also has 
embedded within it an element of speculation which 
has direct consequences for immigrant IT workers. 
His choice of the idiom, ‘sitting in Timbuktu,’ in 
reference to the state in which newly-recruited IT 
professionals find themselves, reflects the absence of 
immediate job prospects and the overall uncertainties 
deflected towards workers who might get hired by 
labour vendors and brought to the US in anticipation 
of the project, but who cannot be immediately placed. 
Under the circumstances, what social relations and 
institutions must be created so that this flexible system 
can be sustained along with its attendant constellation 
of uncertain terms, volatility, speculations, and 
disappointments concentrated for the immigrant-run 
labour vendors and their immigrant employees? !e 
following sections elaborate on the establishment of 
certain institutions, infrastructure, and social relations 
that have enabled this transnational subcontracting 
system to function. 
Supporting cast: the role of guesthouses, 
employers, friends, and colleagues in 
subsidizing &exible accumulation
Let us take a closer look at the lived experiences and 
embodied aspects of a flexible employment regime that 
insists on having access to a ready labour pool but refuses 
to account for the human/social costs associated with 
having this privilege. Indranil and his five colleagues 
were recruited from India and brought to the US by a 
labour vendor, Roy Consulting, which operated out of 
a suburb on the east coast. When Indranil arrived, Roy 
Consulting had no confirmed projects for this group. 
It was still in the midst of a bid involving other vendors 
and a consulting firm. Indranil, like several other 
interviewees, indicated that upon arrival he was put 
on ‘the bench’ – a period of time when these workers 
are without projects – and stayed at the company-run 
accommodation until there was a project for him. 
Recounting his experience of waiting on the bench, 
Indranil said: 
No! No, no, no, no. We did not have any projects 
when we arrived. !ey were looking for projects. I 
wish they had, so that we could jump on to projects 
immediately … !ey had a guesthouse where we stayed. 
!e guesthouse was good, there were a lot of people and 
very spacious. !ey also gave a car to be used by those 
of us who could drive, they had a guesthouse car. So we 
could use that car if we knew how to drive. 
Sourya, an IT professional in his mid-thirties who 
was recruited from India by a labour vendor and had 
many years of experience in the field, also described his 
housing arrangement during bench as follows:   
A few other engineers and I were living in this 
guesthouse. !ey used to deduct guesthouse charges, 
you know, from our salary. When I first came it was $20 
per night, and when I came back again to the bench 
after the Atlanta project got over it was $25 a night. So 
you can do a monthly calculation from that. So it was 
$750 for a month to share a room in that guesthouse. 
Uncertainties embedded within the bidding process, 
including the demand for a readily accessible workforce 
by clients and consulting firms, create the need for 
vendors to have Indian IT professionals present in the 
US before their placements are finalized. !e need for 
housing these immigrants temporarily is fulfilled by 
the efforts of labour vendors and is ultimately paid for, 
as we shall see from interview data, by the immigrants. 
!e establishment of the so-called ‘guesthouses’ thus 
represents one of those subsidizing practices, which 
allows labour flexibility to materialize. Set up with the 
explicit purpose of temporarily housing immigrants 
placed on the bench before their deployment to clients’ 
sites, these guesthouses stand for the certainty of 
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uncertainties written into the terms of transnational 
labour subcontracting in IT between India and the 
US. Clients and consulting companies are virtually 
absolved from sharing this cost or responsibility arising 
out of the embodied needs of labour they eventually 
access.
Interviewees’ descriptions of company-
run accommodations suggest that guesthouses vary 
greatly in terms of their cost, comfort-level, size, and 
convenience. A far cry from what the term ‘guesthouse’ 
conjures; these living arrangements typically represent 
an assortment of sparsely furnished rental units in 
apartment buildings or houses with several bedrooms. 
!ese guesthouses are meant to provide immigrants 
short-term accommodation with the assumption 
that they would be placed on projects shortly after 
reaching the US. Immigrants are required to vacate the 
guesthouses or to start paying rent if they cannot be 
placed on projects within a few weeks of their arrival 
and if their bench period stretches over several weeks 
or months. Some interviewees reported sub-standard 
living conditions. When Vinay, an IT professional in 
his mid-twenties, reached the US as an employee of a 
labour vendor, he had no immediate client placement 
and was sent to his company’s guesthouse. His employer 
was already dealing with a large number of employees 
waiting to be placed on projects. !e guesthouse 
had become over-crowded as a consequence. Vinay 
described his initial experience upon reaching the 
guesthouse as follows: 
!ey give an address to you, a bungalow type of house or 
something. !ey had a guesthouse with some 17 guys in 
the house. It was not a big house even. In a small room 
like this, there would be six guys. !ey used to share 
that room. And even in some of the other guesthouses I 
have seen, there were families sharing space. Like three 
families sharing a small space with two other bachelors.
Uttam, also an employee of a labour vendor in the US, 
had a similar housing experience to share: 
And just in the first floor was a group of people, they 
were with a consulting firm, and there were five or six 
H-1B guys who were living there. And they had like 
a family and then six bachelors all staying together, 
you know. Like a Mess,5 all living in the company 
guesthouse, all in the same place. I think that there were 
two married people with their wives and kids, and the 
rest were all bachelors. It is hard; it is not easy to live like 
that. So that’s what happens. 
While some interviewees found their accommodations 
to be uncomfortable, others reported unfair housing 
policies, e.g. arbitrary rates or deductions from paychecks 
without the immigrants’ prior knowledge or consent. 
Of course, not all vendors provide accommodation, in 
which case immigrants are expected to make their own 
arrangements. A few interviewees, who had no friends 
or family in the US to seek help from, stayed at local 
YMCA hostels or hotels until suitable alternatives were 
found. 
Arun, who came to the US as an employee of 
a labour vendor in the mid-1990s, recollected his time 
in company housing as one of the ‘benchers’ without a 
project with a blend of sarcasm and dark humour:
And what would occupy my time in the guesthouse 
during that time? Yes, every morning we used to come 
to NIC Consulting, our company. !ey provided us 
lunch. !e office was medium-sized, not very many 
people there. We kind of comprised the whole crowd 
of the company, because we were the benchers. !e 
number of benchers varied, seven, eight, nine.
!ere was considerable cynicism in Arun’s voice as 
he recounted his earliest experiences. His narrative 
underscored how the benchers’ time would be spent 
without any professional purpose, which took a toll on 
their morale. !ese immigrants could seldom forecast 
the duration of their bench period, which added to 
their anxieties about being unemployed despite being 
associated with an employer. Arun continued: 
Initially, it was okay. I didn’t get a project immediately. 
!at’s what I am saying. After a month and a half, it was 
no more fun, it got serious.
During this time, Arun’s survival depended on rent-
free guesthouse accommodation, a ‘petty nominal 
allowance’ provided by his company, and the option 
of emergency loans from his employer for unexpected 
financial needs. He elaborated as follows:
Because they were not paying us anything, even 
though we were on H-1B. Well, it was actually illegal, 
but we didn’t care. So for this first month and a half, 
they paid us some kind of petty allowances…. And 
during this month and a half on bench, they paid us 
something very basic, a very petty nominal stipend. I 
don’t remember, maybe something like $100 or $120 
a month, something like that. If we had to spend on 
something and you needed money, you could take a 
loan … And they gave us our lodging free. !ey put us 
up in a nice guesthouse. I cannot complain about that 
and they didn’t charge us. As long as you are not on a 
project, you could stay there. From the moment you 
get a project you could stay there for a couple of weeks, 
until you find your own accommodation. 
!ese narratives suggest that some employers 
recognized new immigrants’ financial strain and 
attempted to ease part of their hardship by offering 
free or low-rent housing, emergency loans, or basic 
allowances to cover everyday expenses. In the long run, 
however, employers expected to recover these expenses 
from salary deductions. Rajen, an employee of a labour 
subcontractor, reported that his company provided 
monetary assistance in the form of an advance to cover 
basic expenses, which was later deducted from his 
paycheck once he started on a project. He explained: 
Once you get to the US then they pay you something. 
It was $1,200 for me at that time before I had a project. 
!ey gave that as an advance loan. Once you have a 
project and you start working they would deduct some 
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amount from the paycheck. But this depends on the 
company. Some companies will not give you any money, 
they will put you up in a guesthouse and will subtract 
from your paycheck directly.
!is reveals how it is the immigrants who ultimately 
shoulder the financial obligations associated with 
orchestrating this transnational labour chain. 
Furthermore, immigrants’ reference to this source 
of initial income in terms such as  ‘emergency 
loans,’ ‘advance,’ ‘small stipend,’ or ‘petty allowance’ 
underscores the extent of economic marginalization 
and downward status mobility this labour system 
imposes upon documented and skilled workers. Once 
placed on projects, these immigrants begin to earn 
salaries that reflect white-collar professional incomes. 
However, this research indicates that these immigrant 
IT workers overall earning is frequently compromised 
due to various reasons. First, every intermediary 
including the employer deducts a commission as 
revenue out of these contact workers’ billing wage paid 
by the client. !ese immigrants are more likely to be 
employed by labour vendors in the lower tiers of the 
subcontracting hierarchy. As a result, their wages are 
subjected to greater deductions given that the number 
of intermediaries between immigrants and clients are 
two or more. Second, these immigrants endure varying 
degrees of pay-cuts during their bench periods, which 
drastically reduces their annual income. As the number 
and duration of these benches increase, immigrants 
experience substantial dents in their earning. !ird, it 
is not uncommon for these workers’ salaries to fluctuate 
when they change clients given that each project might 
come with different billing terms and rates. 
Indranil’s experience, excerpted below, speaks 
to the extent of underpayment and exploitation these 
immigrants might encounter:  
And we were paid $10 a day at that time as daily 
allowance. And it was said that if you get a project then 
we would get you paid $1,800 per month. And you 
have to look out for your own accommodation because 
if you kept on staying in the guesthouse after you get 
your project, then they would deduct almost $400 as 
rent. 
Grossly underpaid or not paid at all, these 
immigrants absorb the impact of economic uncertainties 
structured within the subcontracting system due to 
the terms of project speculations set up by clients and 
consulting firms. !e emergence of labour vendor-
run guesthouses, the arbitrariness of their rent and 
tenancy policies, the various payment methods and 
arrangements through which immigrants tide through 
the initial phase of unemployment represent a range 
of minute transactions, interactions, and practices that 
enable the subcontracting system to function. !ey 
sustain the viability of flexible labour needs of clients 
and consulting firms while absolving them of any 
responsibilities.
During the course of my research, I was struck 
by the frequency with which interviewees commented 
that at various moments of difficulties in the US, 
they had been fortunate enough to have unexpectedly 
received indispensable help from colleagues, friends, 
or mere acquaintances. Interview narratives were 
interspersed with incidences that captured how a 
friend or colleague offered assistance to solve problems, 
which ranged from not being able to open a bank 
account, apply for a social security number, not having 
transportation or housing, needing an emergency loan, 
to more grave situations, like averting a crisis that may 
have led to a nervous breakdown. On the surface, the 
issue of being ‘helped out’ by friends during times of 
duress may not seem to be a topic worthy of academic 
contemplation. However, a closer look at these 
ostensibly individual problems and their resolution 
with help from acquaintances reveal how the costs of 
disembodying labour regimes, requiring for example 
individual flexibility and hyper-mobility, are absorbed 
and subsidized by immigrants and their networks. What 
is interesting is the systematic nature of this kind of 
informal cooperation among immigrants constituting 
flexible corporate labour. !e section above analyzed 
how a set of transactions, surrounding the organization 
of life’s necessities, is carried out between individual 
immigrants and their employers who are themselves 
immigrants running labour sub-contracting companies. 
What follows are excerpts from interview data which 
reveal the nature of social relationships that allow 
Indian IT workers to bear the costs of flexibility.
Several interviewees indicated that it was 
the support of family, friends, and even casual 
acquaintances in the US that allowed them to endure 
the unpredictability associated with being contract 
workers. Vinay was hired by a New Jersey-based 
subcontracting company and, upon his arrival, he 
discovered that it might take his employer anywhere 
between several weeks to a few months to place him at 
the client-site. !is also meant that he could be made 
to wait to be formally placed into the company’s payroll 
or to get his social security number. Vinay was grateful 
for brother’s support in the US at that critical moment 
when his professional life was filled with uncertainties: 
!ey were still looking for a client. A few others who 
had come around the same time as I did also did not 
get a job. Some had to wait for around six months! 
Fortunately for me, my brother was here. I don’t know 
what I would have done otherwise. So for the first 
month or so as I waited, I stayed with him. Once I got 
a client, I moved there. 
Vikram’s story offers one of the most striking 
illustrations of how friends and acquaintances are 
called upon to share the pressures these immigrants 
face as a consequence of minimal social support from 
employers or the consulting firms, clients, and the state. 
!e following excerpt captures Vikram’s second day in 
the US. Unlike many others, however, he was fortunate 
to have a client to report to upon arrival, meaning his 
employer had a project for him. 
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I had just landed from India and here I was, in Texas. I 
had to stay at a hotel before I could figure out housing. 
!e rate of the hotel was like $89 per day. And I had 
very little cash with me. And imagine, this is my second 
day in the US. I don’t have any credit cards, I don’t have 
anything. I just have some cash, which was somewhere 
around $300 to $400. So I took a cab, which took some 
$24 from me [laughs], so my cash reserve was already 
getting depleted. I digested the risk, the uncertainty, 
and the frustration and everything of the first day, to 
join the client. And I had to join the very next day, the 
project was starting. I was like furious. But, I joined the 
client with my big smile [laughs]. !e client was very 
good in fact. !e main guy’s name was Dave. A very 
good guy. I was so happy, you know, the first day the 
first American I meet turned out to be so good. So he 
came and met me at the office and he asked me general 
things: where I was coming from, and all that. So I told 
him the truth, that this is how I came, just two days 
back I was in India and in two days I was in the US and 
I am now at the client’s place! So he said, you know, why 
don’t you settle down first, and later after lunch we will 
tell you about the project and details and everything. 
He was so considerate; he said if I needed to make a call 
to my employer, I could use the desk and their phone. 
I called my employer in New York. !ey were willing 
to start my pay, but first I had to get a social security 
number before any payroll or finances or anything could 
be done. But that might take a few weeks! Meanwhile, I 
have no idea how to apply for a social security number 
or where I need to go for that. I don’t have a car, I don’t 
have anything! And life in Texas is totally different, 
they don’t have buses, they did not have any public 
transportation and god knows where the social security 
office was! And if you call a cab the minimum was like 
$20, which I could not afford. So again I went back to 
Dave [laughs] and said I have to go to this social security 
place. He was good to have taken me out to lunch. I 
told him about what I needed to take care of, like social 
security, driver’s license, and he told me where these 
offices were. He gave me directions and all, but that was 
all that I could expect from him. And of course after 
that he did not help me. I was stuck. Now I was praying 
to God. Now, from somewhere, out of the blue, from 
nowhere an old friend of mine appears, in Texas! On the 
pavement! [laughs very hard]. I said, Venky, how come 
you are here?! So this guy worked with me back in India 
in ISL in the late 1990s. He was equally surprised to see 
me. He had a car. And I said, okay, that settles it! He 
took me to his home in the evening and I stayed with 
him for a few days until I found a place of my own. I 
said, okay, I am checking out from my hotel. I went to 
his apartment. I was so fortunate to run into this old 
friend. I said to myself, you are saved!
!e above narrative reveals that immigrants have to rely 
on people’s help at a very private and individual level. 
Needless to say, assistance in such cases is negotiated 
arbitrarily and is contingent upon chance, luck, and 
the utter unpredictability of people’s disposition and 
inclination to help. !e kindness that Vikram found 
in Dave and the serendipity with which he ran into 
the safety net provided by his old friend Venky were 
randomly disbursed resources completely delinked from 
any institutional obligations or support systems that 
immigrants might depend upon. Consequently, dozens 
of other interviewees listed, in less dramatic terms than 
Vikram’s, similar experiences of having to reach out to 
friends, former colleagues, or old acquaintances from 
college for their various problems associated with the 
demands made on them as flexible and dispensable 
contract workers. 
During the early 2000s, Samir was working 
at an IT firm in Mumbai but was looking for an 
opportunity, like many in his generation, to come to 
the US. A US-based labour vendor recruited Samir and 
he arrived in the New York metropolitan area given 
that most of the consulting firms and their clients his 
employer dealt with were located around New York 
City. Upon arrival, Samir became part of the ‘labour-
ready’ immigrant workforce that consulting firms 
would draw from depending on project needs. Samir 
was placed on a project that lasted for a few weeks after 
which he was back on the bench. !is bench stretched 
over several weeks and Samir started to get anxious 
about his job and livelihood. By then, his employer had 
already indicated that he needed to be proactive and 
involved in looking for a project. Samir thus started 
to contact his friends, alumnae networks, and former 
colleagues about possible openings for contract workers 
at clients’ projects. Samir said:
I tried everything. All my friends, contacts, batch-mates 
from college. And it is very common, as we cannot rely 
just on the employer to find projects. We are constantly 
in touch with people we know for new projects, even 
before one project ends, because we have to find another 
one when the current project ends. 
In addition to helping with finding new projects, 
immigrants’ network of friends also offered benched 
workers economic and moral support. Speaking about 
a similar experience and his demoralized state while on 
the bench for several months, Ravi shared the following 
anecdote:
When I came, I was on the bench, my employer was 
looking for a project. !ey thought they had one for 
sure, but they lost it I think. I waited. Nothing came 
up. Meanwhile, they were not paying me a full salary, 
so I began to get really worried. I had left a good job 
in India and was hoping to start a new professional life 
here. No projects came up for a couple of months. !en 
it seemed I just lost everything. I couldn’t even tell my 
parents. When we talked on the phone and they asked 
me, how is your client, how is your project, I didn’t 
have the heart to tell them the truth. Plus there were 
financial commitments at home. I was getting desperate 
from worrying. I was in bad shape. So one of my friends 
called me one day and I just lost it. So he talked to 
his wife and they said, don’t worry, you come over here 
right away and live with us. Don’t think about anything, 
he said. !ey took care of me, helped me get through 
that situation. !at gave me the strength. !ey said I 
have to work it out and soon there will be a project, 
and I will be fine. I don’t know what I would have done 
without that one phone call. 
As discreetly as he could, Ravi disclosed the extent of 
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social isolation and lack of moral and material support 
that immigrants can be exposed to in general, and how 
project bidding and speculations for contracts exacerbate 
that experience for contract workers. Mutual support 
and a degree of communal resource sharing evolved as a 
form of social security, albeit in informal and transitory 
terms, for these immigrants. Many interviewees, for 
example, reported having experienced a precipitous fall 
in their incomes during bench periods when employers 
temporarily reduced their pay due to the absence of 
projects. When possible, immigrants pooled resources 
to economize on living expenses and got some degree 
of social support from one another to deal with their 
recurring bench periods. !ese social units, however, 
cannot last long as these immigrants need to relocate 
frequently, often from one state to another as clients 
and projects change. Given the predominance of 
men in this workforce, individual immigrant’s social 
networks also tended to be composed of other males. 
Female immigrants thus felt further disadvantaged as 
contract workers. A very small minority, women IT 
workers often found themselves to be the only female 
on a given project and typically unable to participate in 
some of the more intimate communal exchanges, such 
as sharing apartments or rooms with male co-workers 
(Banerjee 2006).6 
Conclusion
One might wonder, whether there are any positive 
attributes to these immigrants’ experiences. At the 
individual level like most immigrants, Indian IT 
professionals seek work abroad to earn and save 
money for buying homes, children’s higher education, 
remittances for family back home, and overall 
prosperity. Indeed, employment in the US does offer 
these immigrants the possibility of achieving these 
goals. In terms of their quality and standard of living 
in the US, one observes a wide variation. Only about 
one-third of the interviewees in this research were able 
to rent or own good quality housing and did enjoy a 
fairly comfortable middle-class life. However, what is 
startling here is that not all of these skilled immigrants, 
employed in one of the most celebrated professions in 
the global economy, were able to either live in one place 
consistently or even come close to being able to afford an 
upwardly mobile middle-class lifestyle that tends be to 
associate with employment in the IT field. Short-term 
contracts, frequent relocations, episodic unemployment, 
fluctuating incomes, financial instability, anxieties 
about maintaining employment and visa status result 
in considerable stress for these immigrants (Banerjee 
2006; 2008). It becomes imperative to contextualize 
even the positive outcomes experienced at the 
personal level, such as savings for remittances or home 
ownership, within the larger institutional context of 
the ways in which immigrants absorb the social costs 
of flexible accumulation. It is important to bear in 
mind that the achievement of immigrants’ financial 
goals takes place within marginalized employment and 
immigration status. Moreover, immigrants save out of 
already compromised salaries with the help of a frugal 
lifestyle requiring many sacrifices (Banerjee 2006). 
An institutional analysis of immigrants’ 
personal problems serves as a point of entry to broaden 
our scope of investigation and raise questions about 
how immigrants’ reliance on personal resources during 
moments of crisis for everyday sustenance subsidizes 
the cost of labour for clients and consulting firms 
that benefit from having access to immigrant workers 
in flexible and temporary terms. Companies’ ability 
to gain access to immigrant IT workers as a labour-
ready workforce and to insulate themselves from 
the responsibilities towards workers depends upon 
immigrants’ social relationships, institutions, and 
practices, such as the ones set in motion between 
immigrants and their labour vendor employers 
(another immigrant group), as well as those within the 
immigrants’ social circle. !is social milieu alleviates 
the rough edges of issues including some that are 
ostensibly less complicated, such as looking for projects, 
emergency housing needs, access to loans or cheques 
for rental apartment security deposits, negotiating bank 
account or driver’s license applications as immigrants 
wait for other formal paperwork to come through, as 
well as other issues that are patently more complex, 
such as emotional breakdowns or possible suicide 
attempts as a consequence of immigrants’ financial 
and other struggles. !is process of privatization and 
individualization of both corporate needs (access 
to workers via immigrant-run labour vendors) 
and workers’ embodied needs through immigrant 
networks allows clients and consulting companies to 
greatly offset the social, economic, and human costs 
of labour flexibility. Placed within the larger context 
of the neoliberal economy and the state, immigrants’ 
networks cannot just be seen as a collective whose 
role it is to assist newcomers’ acclimation, to secure 
employment in enclave economies, or to facilitate 
chain migration patterns. Instead, the social sphere of 
immigrants represents a mutable and highly complex 
domain that is fully integrated with and indispensable 
for the global economy.
Notes
1 Japanese companies are typically given credit for 
initializing this model.
2 !ese conclusions are based on extensive interview 
data. Due to limitations of space, interview excerpts 
are not being presented here. Extensive discussion and 
primary materials regarding these trends appear in 
Banerjee (2006) and (2008).  
3 Interviews in this research suggest that multiple 
variations in this format are possible. For example: a 
multi-national pharmaceutical firm may already have 
its own IT wing and yet decide to outsource a specific 
project with some degree of supervision or collaboration 
from its own IT department.
4 !e word ‘hired’ used in the narrative above does not 
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reflect full-time direct employment, but refers to the 
temporary placement of IT workers on contracts at 
client sites via layers of vendors and consulting firms.
5 A hostel or dormitory-type shared accommodation. 
6 See Banerjee (2006) for an analysis of female IT 
workers’ experiences.  
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Exile is a sort of long insomnia.
   – Victor Hugo
!e world today is confronted with the sustained 
existence of precarious lives, of temporary materialities 
that can be assembled and taken apart, of urban 
or global mobility without any permanent base, of 
unstable situations from which the past and future seem 
to be absent. Social, material, economic and political 
certainties are ‘unravelling’ one after another: we hear 
that the ‘city is falling apart,’ that the nation-state is 
obsolete, or that cultural differences are disappearing. 
!e ‘cores’ of institutions, structures and the great 
cosmological narratives also seem to be affected by this 
overturning of beliefs. However, we are also seeing the 
opposite situation in which, surreptitiously, in micro-
political forms, national states or communities are 
coming back into existence, are ‘remaking,’ ‘inventing’ 
or ‘fabricating’ themselves in situ.
 !e way the world is perceived is also changing, 
and intellectual as well as epistemological uncertainties 
quite logically accompany these developments in the 
increasing precariousness of the perceptible world. 
Resulting from stricter sociological interpretations of 
structural analyses in linguistics and anthropology, 
structural-functionalist representations themselves 
produced ‘interstices,’ ‘informal economies’ and 
‘margins’ as unconsidered residue. And criticism, even 
minority currents, was full of them back in the 1950s 
and 1960s.1 However, the historical realities relegated 
to the scrap heap of this unconsidered ‘residue’ have 
grown, and call for new paradigms and concepts which 
are thoroughly decentered.2 In this respect, several 
writings that examine things in a global context, point 
to the precariousness of social and biological lives, and to 
the increasing ‘liquidity’ of all social and material forms 
(see Butler 2004; Bauman 2004, 2007). Others raise 
questions – and question their respective disciplines, 
history and anthropology – about the blinding presence 
of the absolute present and the gradual disappearance 
of any sense of past or future in the way the present is 
experienced today (Hartog 2008; Augé 2008). As for 
Paul Virilio, he invites us to explore the consequences 
of dissociating historical time and the present moment, 
a loss of time perception that he calls ‘uchronia.’ !is 
presentist sensation is all the more vertiginous in that 
it is contemporaneous, so to speak, with the empire 
of speed and movement, with Virilio’s télescopages 
(‘collisions’), telecommunications and other ways of 
reducing space-time, in other words, with everything 
that constitutes the ‘sphere of acceleration of reality’ (the 
‘dromosphere’). Being aware of this double speeding, 
both ‘historical’ and ‘geographical,’ makes it possible to 
see what is coming:3 the big bang created by the equally 
explosive compression of time and space (Virilio 2005, 
2007). Quick destruction, as well as throwing out 
or clearing away things that were made for a specific 
one-time use (a camp, a checkpoint), require flexible, 
ready-to-go logistics and management. !e entire 
spectacle of contemporary biopolitics is based on these 
emergency-situation imperatives whose backdrop is the 
spectre of bombs exploding among crowds of civilians, 
stock-market crashes or panic-stricken throngs and the 
disasters that cause them.
 While I fully share these preoccupations and 
the questions they raise, I would like to focus on 
one aspect that specifically mobilizes the skills of the 
ethnologist: more than the analysis of the content, 
extent or depth of current social and cultural changes, it 
is the prospect of how long that now seems to determine 
the reality of these facts – which are a priori nothing 
more than simple facts: what I am seeing with my own 
eyes, what is happening here and now. Will it exist, 
persist, or even be reproduced? Will it acquire a little 
patina of age so that we can make a description of it, 
and come up with two or three logical sequences that 
might serve as possible social rules? What persists as 
a positive construction, not just as repetition, inside 
precarious spaces that might at first be seen as just a 
form of waiting? !is question is aimed in particular at 
those emerging forms whose primary feature is space, 
and which therefore impose their reality as an obvious 
The Camps of the Twenty-First 
Century: Corridors, Security Vestibules 
and Borders of Internal Exile 
Michel Agier
#is article discusses spaces on the outskirts of the ordinary social world, remodelled border areas, spaces that 
are used for transit, detention, or as ‘security vestibules’. #is article is interested in the deployment of di$erent 
types of camps in troubled areas of the world and in role of the ‘international community’ in the management 
of undesirable populations – refugees, the internally displaced, undocumented foreigners.
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fact, albeit on the outskirts of the ordinary social world 
and for no specified length of time: the remodelling of 
border areas by installing walls and more or less closed 
spaces that are used for transit, detention, or basically as 
‘security vestibules;’ the deployment of different types 
of camps in more or less sensitive or troubled areas of 
the world; the preponderant role of organizations from 
the ‘international community’ in the local management 
of undesirable populations (refugees, the internally 
displaced, undocumented foreigners) who are isolated 
from the rest (Agier 2008b).
!e political and technical function of these 
policies seems clear in light of current trends. It is a 
bio-political function that combines the management 
of populations with the management of spaces. !is 
involves controlling the movement of human beings 
as well as redefining North/South relations: extending 
police, economic and health screenings for selective 
immigration policies while making border areas ever 
more impermeable and more complex in order to 
better filter out and reject. What is less explicit is the 
historical significance of these trends involving the 
production and management of ‘flows:’ the significance 
of putting people into camps – of encampment – as 
part of not a political, but an administrative solution 
to controlling the movement of human beings, North/
South relations, etc. On the same wavelength as the 
very topical debates about the explosive convergence of 
accelerating time and liquefying space – including the 
question: ‘does that exist?’ to which they lead – Alain 
Brossat talks about the proliferation of ‘furtive exceptions’ 
with regard to the increasing use of camps in Europe 
as pre-deportation security vestibules for all sorts of 
undesirable foreigners (2008: 5-22). As we shall see, 
beyond the diversity and the ‘growth potential’4 of the 
different forms of encampment that exist today, there 
are two contradictions that shed light on the meaning 
of these situations. !e first is the contradiction of time: 
while these spaces are based on the fiction of a police 
or humanitarian emergency situation, they are in fact 
spreading, proliferating and becoming long-term. !e 
second contradiction concerns the status of the space: 
even though it is given a fictive extraterritorial status, 
the undesirables, even when they are relegated to the 
outskirts or the borders, always remain under control. 
!ey are ‘locked up outside,’ but are also isolated on the 
inside. !e exceptional emergency and extraterritorial 
circumstances to which they are subject become the 
ordinary fare of their existence.
Corridors, walls, security vestibules: camps 
as new borders
Let us start with an initial observation. All over Europe 
and the rest of the world, borders are becoming filled-
in spaces. To begin with, some of them – those that 
separate Mexico from the United States, the Spanish 
enclave Ceuta from Morocco, or the ‘barrier’ between 
Israel and the West Bank5 – are outfitted with complex 
systems that include ditches, trenches, barbed wire, 
electric wiring, electronic fences, concrete walls, around-
the-clock security agents and surveillance vehicles that 
patrol the area between the walls. 
 Secondly, the spaces around borders are also 
being outfitted as holding and confinement areas. 
Transit centres, holding zones, reception or detention 
centres – all of these spaces have the same function in 
today’s camp structures, which is basically that of a 
screening o%ce. !ey are directly overseen by national 
governments (Interior Ministries or other departments 
in charge of migration policies), police institutions, UN 
agencies and/or humanitarian aid organizations. In all 
of these places, people are registered on information 
cards or sheets or in files, subjected to medical exams – 
or ‘screenings,’ as they are called in humanitarian jargon 
– as well as to standardized biographical screenings. 
On the way in and on the way out, these selection and 
distribution processes assign them different categories 
of identification. In Europe, accommodation, reception 
and detention centres exist for asylum seekers, for 
foreigners arrested at the border or ‘illegal’ foreigners 
arrested inside the country, and for people held while 
awaiting a deportation decision or a response to their 
application for refugee status, which is only granted 
to a very small minority of asylum seekers nowadays. 
According to Claire Rodier and Emmanuel Blanchard, 
the ultimate purpose of these camps for foreigners on 
the outer edges of Europe is not so much to isolate or 
to confine, but to serve as ‘security vestibules.’ In other 
words, they serve to check or redirect the migratory 
flows, not to stop them completely, but to keep a tight 
control over them:
 
Comparing them to security vestibules ... gives us 
a relatively clear picture of the role of these camps. 
!ey are places that organize the transition between 
two countries; during this latency period, the desires, 
expectations and attitudes of those applying for entry 
will be remodelled. It is also a good time to socialize 
them to the police and administrative practices around 
which the lives of the migrants will be organized (Rodier 
and Blanchard 2003).
An ephemeral social world is formed at the same time 
as its temporary occupants – who may end up staying 
in spite of themselves – are becoming acquainted with 
it. According to a study made by the European Union 
in 2007, the duration of detention in closed centres ‘is 
sometimes not limited by law and in practice in some 
countries it can be extended by several years’ (European 
Parliament 2007: 25). Most (open) accommodation 
centres and (closed) detention centres in Europe have 
been set up in ‘recycled’ facilities: in former military 
barracks, in Austria and Poland, for example; in 
warehouses, such as at the Sangatte Centre from 1999 
to 2002 or, since 2001, at the Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle 
airport. More or less open or closed, these places are in 
general hard to gain access to either because they are 
under the control of private or public security services, 
or because they are in out-of-the-way or remote areas. 
Let us examine one of the countries in the European 
Parliamentary report.
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 In 2007, Poland had 17 ‘reception centres’ 
for asylum seekers and 13 detention centres for 
foreigners without residence permits. Its reception 
centres are officially reserved for asylum seekers, 90% 
of whom come from Chechnya or the North Caucasus 
(Dagestan, Ingushetia). !e detention centres house 
illegal foreign nationals (illegal entry or illegal presence 
after entering with a temporary visa). Asylum seekers 
may also be found in detention centres if they are 
considered to have infringed regulations. Detained 
foreigners come from various countries, but mainly 
from Vietnam, China, Armenia, and Georgia, as well 
as from Chechnya, Moldavia, Mongolia, Iraq, and Sri 
Lanka. Asylum seekers and undocumented migrants 
who are not authorized to be in the country and/or 
are awaiting regularization, ‘removal’ or admission are 
simply there because no one knows what to do with 
them or where to put them.
 !eir status and their future being relatively 
vague, it is this ‘out-of-the-way’ place where they 
end up that becomes the most obvious and stable 
basis for their identity. In a common reversal of cause 
and effect, their isolation seems to empirically create 
an attitude of xenophobia against them (‘if they’re 
isolated, it must be for a good reason’) that, in turn, 
tends to morally ‘criminalize’ them, thus making it 
easier to accept their confinement. !rough a reversal 
that is even more fundamental to the whole system, 
the concept of the border itself is redefined via the legal 
function of isolation. Chowra Makaremi, who has 
conducted studies for the ANAFÉ6 in holding zones 
for persons awaiting processing of their legal status 
(ZAPI, ‘Zones d’attente pour personnes en instance’) 
at the Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport, has found that 
it is the exceptional legal status of the ‘person awaiting 
processing’ that determines the legal quality of the space: 
a foreigner ‘who has not yet entered the territory’ must 
be kept in an appropriate area – extraterritorial – even 
if it means inventing a simulacrum for this special area. 
As an example, ‘ZAPI 2’ was located up on the first 
floor of the airport’s Ibis hotel for several years. It was 
decreed a non-national border area, while the ground 
floor and the second floor of the same hotel remained 
under national jurisdiction (Makaremi 2007).
 In order to implement this strategy of isolating 
undesirable foreigners for special treatment and 
categorization, it is thus necessary to establish border 
areas and even temporary extraterritorial residence areas. 
!ese areas are no longer attached – or no longer only 
attached – to the geographical boundaries of nation-
states. !e border is wherever an identified undesirable 
has to be isolated, ‘held’ and then ‘removed.’ Camps are 
thus defined first and foremost as ‘parking areas’ on the 
border or on any boundary. !e contradiction inherent 
in an area that is both inside (physically) and outside 
(legally and politically) leads to ‘a sort of obsession with 
borders which, while making them ever more invisible 
and non-localizable, also spreads them out everywhere, 
wherever there is any movement of persons who are 
not free to cross them; this creates infinite forms of 
confinement that end up coinciding with these persons’ 
(Sossi 2008: 132-151). 
!e ‘spreading out’ of borders until they 
become personalized is part of a larger process in 
which camps are also becoming smaller and easier to 
dismantle and move, even the ‘heavy’ camps that, as we 
shall see, are used to house large numbers of prima facie 
refugees in Africa.
 Most of the transit, holding or screening areas 
in Europe are run by the police or border patrols, or 
by regional or municipal administrations, but some are 
operated by private security agencies or NGOs, such 
as the Red Cross at Sangatte. !is formally links them 
to the transit zones administered by the UNHCR, or 
certain national or international NGOs in Africa that 
basically function as security vestibules for the camps 
themselves. While their aims may a priori seem different 
(isolate in order to ‘detain’ and ‘remove’ on the one 
hand; isolate for survival, healthcare and management 
purposes on the other7), similarities exist in terms of 
how these spaces are set up and managed.
 In Africa, the transit centres at the entrance to 
all UNHCR sites receive, register, do medical check-ups 
for, and channel all arriving refugees. !ey are provided 
with emergency aid for a period ranging from one week 
to approximately one month. Once everything has been 
checked, the new arrivals are given a place in one of the 
existing tents or shelters in the refugee camp. Transit 
facilities are also found near borders for refugees who 
are then transported out to the camps. Other centres 
called ‘way stations’ are set up along the routes from the 
border to the camps.
 !e refugees are housed in tents, warehouses, 
or huts made of planks or tarpaulin. !ey are supposed 
to receive one hot meal a day, but there are often 
problems, especially in the more remote transit zones. 
Later, once they are settled in the camps, they receive 
basic food supplies (rice, bulgur, etc.), which they cook 
themselves. A contrasting set-up, somewhere between 
an official camp and a self-organized refuge, consists of 
collective tents rudimentarily installed at ‘cross-border 
points’ between two borders (for example, between 
Liberia and Guinea during the Mano River war), 
which the humanitarian agents who periodically visit 
them call ‘grey zones.’
 !e situation on some UNHCR sites is halfway 
between a ‘transit center’ and a ‘refugee camp.’ !is 
was the case for the Ivorian refugees accommodated in 
the Nonah ‘transit camp’ in the Guinea Forest Region. 
Although the UNHCR considered this camp to be a 
transit center, by the end of 2003 the residents had been 
there for over a year, or, to be precise, since the second 
half of 2002, during the period of violent conflict 
in Côte d’Ivoire. !ey received food supplies from 
the World Food Programme and medical care from 
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), 
but they were required to stay inside the large collective 
tents that housed from 50 to 100 people. !ey were not 
allowed to build family cabins and did not benefit from 
any ‘social programs,’ etc. As the months went by, the 
refugees divided the tents up into separate apartments 
using blankets, plastic sheets, cloth from sacks, etc. And 
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they never stopped protesting once they found out that 
they would not be able to settle in the camp like ‘real’ 
refugees.
 As in the case of these protests, it is the 
intolerable and paradoxical situation of being kept in 
holding zones without being able to leave through – or 
even choose – one of the two exits (not even the one 
into the refugee camp!) that exacerbates the tension in 
these spaces and differentiates them from other types of 
camps, such as the self-installed camps or the UNHCR 
camps.8 In general, these tensions are explained by the 
length of time spent waiting and the incomprehensible 
screenings that are carried out. Of course, waiting is 
common to any type of camp where people in transit 
are held and often end up residing. But it is probably 
the most intolerable in these situations of transit and 
screening because no infrastructures are provided to 
‘kill time;’ it is almost impossible to leave, and the end 
result – along with the reasoning behind it – remains 
largely incomprehensible to the detainees.
 Social tension is also high in detention and 
accommodation centres for foreigners in Europe. Acts 
of revolt have brought attention to the existence of 
this category of ‘detainees’ and, at least in part, to their 
living conditions: riots and arson were used to protest 
detention conditions, for example, in Luxemburg in 
January 2006, in the United Kingdom in November 
2006, and in France between December 2007 and 
June 2008 (Special Report 2008: 80-85). In almost 
every European country, hunger strikes are a regular 
occurrence. In addition, the European Parliamentary 
report mentioned above speaks of ‘acts of despair:’ 
incidents of suicide and attempted suicide in open as 
well as closed centres in most of the countries visited, 
which are becoming more and more frequent.9 Finally, 
there are acts of violence committed against detainees 
by those who oversee them (physical violence, sexual 
abuse, beatings, verbal abuse), as well as internal acts 
of violence of the same type committed between the 
residents themselves.
 !ere are several factors that promote tension 
and violence in these transit areas. As a matter of interest, 
let us list them: excessive differences in status; the moral 
stain that exiles who have just come from violent or 
troubled situations seem to carry with them; the moral 
criminalization of their identity by people who see them 
quarantined in this way; the rejection felt by those who 
are explicitly treated as if they were superfluous; the 
contrast between the distress of the transitory residents 
and the absolute power that representatives from the 
managing institutions have over their lives (a power 
that, in the refugee-camp transit centres, might be 
expressed in terms of the amount of soap, blankets 
or food distributed); and finally, the low visibility of 
receiving and holding areas. All of these factors explain 
why acts of violence are so easily committed, remain 
unpunished, and maintain an atmosphere of ordinary 
exception that theoretically prohibits protest. When 
protest does break out, however, it does so with a fury 
that is just as exceptional and as excessive, before being 
swiftly and violently suppressed.
Locked up outside: refugee encampments
Of all of the camp types, the official refugee camp is 
the most standard and most controlled form. It is the 
opposite of the self-organized shelter (cross-border 
points, makeshift or jungle camps, ghettos, grey zones, 
squats, etc.), and different from the detention centres 
and the holding and transit zones described above. 
Occasionally visited by representatives of UN agencies 
or journalists, and often photographed for their 
dramatic aesthetics, refugee camps are not, however, 
all that visible in terms of their day-to-day operations 
because of their generally isolated location and their 
guarded access. Moreover, nothing important seems to 
happen there.
 !e sites established by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) vary in 
size. Some house less than 2,000 people in installations 
that are like villages, such as the camps for Mauritanians 
in Senegal. Others may accommodate up to 200,000 
residents, as was the case in the Goma region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo from 1994 to 1996.10 
Certain configurations, such as those in the Great Lakes 
region or the Dadaab area in North-Eastern Kenya, 
group together several camps that are erected side by 
side around a single humanitarian base. Such colossal, 
if precarious, human and material complexes may 
house tens or even hundreds of thousands of refugees.
 Refugee camps are hybrid realities that do 
not reproduce any pre-existing socio-spatial form. 
!ey represent new ways of experiencing place, if only 
through the eternal paradox they embody between an 
indefinite temporality and a space that is necessarily 
transformed by those who must appropriate it if 
they are going to live there. Originally conceived for 
emergency survival purposes or as temporary shelters 
for displaced and controlled populations, refugee 
camps evolve over time as a result of the different 
ways in which occupants use the resources offered by 
humanitarian aid, the camp area and the relationships 
that are formed. !e creation of camp-cities or large 
urban neighbourhoods, of which the Palestinian camps 
represent the most developed form in existence today, 
is the logical outcome of this evolution.
 In most cases, the camps are erected in vacant 
areas, an incursion that is more or less violent, and 
more or less removed from the local environment. 
Once they are settled in the large tents, the refugees 
use materials generally supplied by NGOs to build 
wooden or dirt cabins and huts with thatch or tarpaulin 
roofs. Individual or family houses with one or two 
rooms are put up around the tent, which is removed 
once all of the cabins have been built. In addition, 
dirt roads, water supply systems (wells, tanks, pipes 
and fountains), latrines, septic tanks as well as a few 
collective structures (clinics, schools, camp offices) are 
set up. !is is a gradual process that takes a few months 
or sometimes up to a year.
 During this phase of physical construction, 
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the social organization of the camp is also established. 
American corn or bulgur, oil and salt are distributed 
once a month by NGOs contracted by the UN World 
Food Programme. Out of the initial group of tent 
leaders, ‘section leaders’ arise, churches and video-shops 
are built of mud and covered with NGO or UNHCR 
tarps, and simple marketplaces and rudimentary 
football pitches are set up, etc. Even though no one 
knows how long the camp will last, they all work to 
create a living space that is precarious, but relatively 
livable.
 Control and management techniques are 
perfected. In the last few years, the UNHCR and the 
governments in host countries have been trying to set 
up smaller camps in order to maintain better control 
over residents. For example, the most recent camps in 
Africa (opened since 2000) accommodate from 5,000 
to 10,000 people. Even when there are groups of camps 
– as in Sierra Leone where, until 2005, eight camps were 
spread out over a distance of 60 kilometres between 
the towns of Bô and Kenema – each camp is managed 
separately. In general, the UNHCR subcontracts 
NGOs to ‘govern’ these camps, and the whole thing is 
overseen by a single UNHCR regional administration. 
!is type of arrangement is used in order to avoid 
potentially explosive or uncontrollable situations.
 Indeed, as the refugee camps develop physically 
and, in part, economically, they also become social 
and political entities. Often this development is only 
perceived a posteriori, when the camp has become a 
sort of city project that has been abandoned; a place 
of conflict over issues of camp management and 
refugee representation. In the end, the most common 
theme that pervades all refugee camps, once they 
have passed the initial emergency phase and settled 
into a process of relative continuity, is the question 
of their transformation: how they become places 
of identification, of human interaction and even of 
memory for the people who live there, the men and 
women who are hoping, eventually, to go ‘back home,’ 
but who have been living there for years or decades, 
who were born there, married there and who have 
buried their dead there.
!e fourth solution: the future of 
encampment
What is it that allows us to compare refugee camps – 
humanitarian spaces for keeping ‘vulnerable persons’ 
alive – to the different types of holding or transit centres, 
zones and camps that are being used as elements in an 
administrative and police strategy for managing the 
detention, selection and deportation of undesirable 
foreigners? !e contradictions of time – an emergency 
that lingers on – and of territoriality – in which ‘locked 
up outside’ equals ‘kept isolated inside’ – permit this 
comparison, and even more so, the connection between 
these forms as part of a vast modern-day apparatus for 
managing undesirables.11
 Segregating refugees in camps in fact prevents 
the UNHCR from applying the three solutions that 
officially guide its efforts to get these refugees out of 
their precarious situation: (1) local integration, (2) 
resettlement in a third country and (3) repatriation. 
!e UNHCR’s point of view is that repatriation is 
usually the ‘preferable’ solution, even when it goes 
against the desires of the refugees. !is sometimes leads 
to ‘collective repatriation,’ which is often experienced 
as ‘forced repatriation’ by the refugees. However, when 
this process is not possible for political, economic 
or organizational reasons, the UNHCR keeps the 
refugees in camps, putting them ‘on hold’ for a period 
of time that may drag on. In fact, isolation in camps 
is all the UNHCR-recognized refugees in Africa have 
ever known. Encampment is neither repatriation, nor 
integration, nor resettlement. According to Harrell-
Bond and Verdirame, encampment policies are actually 
the UNHCR’s fourth solution, an undeclared solution 
that is in fact systematically preferred to the other three 
(2005: 335).
 Should the predominance of encampment in 
the humanitarian apparatus around the world – and 
thus the very real connections between the treatment 
of ‘vulnerable populations’ and the treatment of 
‘undesirable populations,’ and between humanitarian 
operations and police operations – be seen as signs 
of the failure, the subversion or the perversion of 
humanitarian work (taken as a whole, the work of 
national and international NGOs, UN agencies, 
as well as, nowadays, by national governments and 
armies)? Or does it have to do, instead, with the gradual 
implementation and proliferation of an ordinary 
exception as the empirical basis for a special type of 
government, a humanitarian type of government? It is 
this second point of view that we defend. For, within 
its own domain, the humanitarian apparatus already 
is that ambiguous power. Its intervention seems to be 
justified by a supranational, universalist, and quasi-
divine ‘authorization,’ and it intervenes wherever the 
terrain is made favourable by unexpected, exceptional 
circumstances (see Pandolfi 2000: 97–105). !ese 
exceptional circumstances may be produced by an 
emergency, a disaster, a state of war, the massive 
arrival of a population in distress, as well as by the 
deportation of undesirable persons, the need for police 
forces to ‘track down’ illegals, and the confinement and 
detention of asylum seekers, etc. An entire network of 
‘spaces of exception’ is set up and consolidated over 
months, years or decades: endowed with their own 
form of government, they are gradually creating the 
‘grey zones’ of an extraterritoriality that is fabricated 
and maintained inside the global society of control and 
that, so far, remains within the domain of national 
governments or groups of nations.
If we were to follow it to its logical conclusion, 
this reflection on the diversity and proliferation of 
these new century camps for the counting, containing 
and managing of undesirables would lead us to the 
concept of internal exile, or ‘a sort of long insomnia’ of 
the holding zone.
First published in Native Land, Stop Eject, Fondation 
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Notes
1 Situational anthropology comes to mind (particularly, 
the situational analyses developed by Max Gluckman, 
Clyde Mitchell, Frederick Barth and, in France, by 
Georges Balandier and Gérard Althabe with regard to 
studies on cities, ethnicities and the colonial situation). 
We might also mention the different versions of 
situationism – philosophical, urbanistic and political. 
All of these approaches to investigation and to action 
emerged in the early 1950s and 1960s.
2 I have written about the necessity of decentering the 
anthropological gaze and refocusing it on the ‘margins’ 
or the precarious spaces in which new ways of living are 
being invented (Agier 2008a).
3 NdT: Ce qui arrive, the title of Paul Virilio’s 2002 
exhibition at the Foundation Cartier pour l’art 
contemporain, entitled in English Unknown Quantity, 
and of his book, published in English as Ground Zero.
4 ‘Growth,’ as in the ‘grow home’ concept: a basic, 
standardized unit which can be added to and 
individualized over time as the family grows.
5 Construction on the ‘barrier’ began in June 2002, and 
by May 2007 the Israeli government had completed 
408 km, or 56.5% of the total planned wall (see UN 
2007: 8). 
6 Association Nationale d’Assistance aux Frontières pour 
les Étrangers (National Border Assistance Association 
for Foreigners). Founded in 1989, it includes 22 
member organizations and works in border holding 
areas to ensure that the domestic and international 
rights of foreigners are respected.
7 ‘Care, cure and control’ is how a UNHCR official 
whom I met in Kenya summed up the objectives of 
their camps.
8 For more information see the description of the four 
main types of camps: (1) self-organized shelters; (2) 
border screening centres; (3) refugee camps; (4) internal 
displacement camps (see Agier 2008b).
9 For example, in Denmark, ‘according to the most 
recent report by the Danish Refugee Council, the 
percentage of suicide attempts has tripled since 2001, 
from 0.6% of the population residing in centres in 
2001 to 1.7% in 2006. !is observation is related 
to the duration of residence in the centres and the 
resulting deterioration in these persons’ psychological 
state’ (European Parliament 2007: 254).
10 See Godding (1997) for case studies on the political 
causes and effects of the creation of migrants, refugees 
and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region, and 
on categorization, encampment and forced repatriation 
policies (see Guichaoua 2004).
11 !e connection between and the contemporaneousness 
of these camps as part of a system that combines 
humanitarian, police and administrative operations 
for the purposes of controlling, isolating and rejecting 
individuals differentiates them from the camps that fed 
the ‘spectre of genocide’ and were part of ‘the horizon of 
death,’ as Alain Brossat notes (2008: 17-19). While the 
multifarious camps of today are being given ‘new life’ 
and becoming quite ‘common,’ we naturally hesitate to 
speak of ‘a return’ to camps.
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!is paper looks at the contexts in which asylum 
applicants in the UK are required to narrate their 
stories of persecution, and the constraints which 
may lead to those narratives being deemed to lack 
credibility. It calls into question the ‘common sense’ 
Home Office assumptions that in order to be credible 
accounts should be emotionally expressive; fully 
disclosed immediately on arrival; and wholly consistent 
over successive tellings. It discusses how lawyers seek to 
elicit comprehensive and coherent witness statements 
and concludes by examining the limited evidence on 
how judges – the ultimate arbiters of credibility – go 
about reaching their conclusions.
In British asylum appeals strict rules of evidence do not 
apply, because asylum applicants cannot generally be 
expected to produce corroboration of their ill-treatment 
to the standard required in other courts. One important 
consequence is that decisions as to the credibility of the 
applicant’s story become crucial. Immigration Judges 
must first decide ‘do I find this person and their story 
wholly or partly credible?’, and only then can they go 
on to determine whether, on the basis of what has been 
deemed credible, that person falls within the scope of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention.
 !e stories being judged in this way are initially 
presented to the court in at least two forms: as transcripts 
of the asylum interviews conducted by officials of the 
UK Border Agency, and as witness statements prepared 
with the help of the applicants’ lawyers. !ere may 
also be versions of the story provided in medico-legal 
reports or reports by ‘country experts’ such as myself. 
!ese multiple versions will be critically assessed, first in 
cross-examination and then by the Immigration Judge, 
for their consistency, plausibility and credibility.
 !is article – based on ethnographic research 
in British asylum hearings and at meetings between 
lawyers and clients; interviews with lawyers, caseworkers 
and judges; and archival research – looks at these 
contexts in which asylum applicants are required to 
narrate their stories of persecution, and at some of the 
constraints which may prevent those narratives from 
being effectively given or properly understood. !is 
article focuses on administrative and legal processes in 
the United Kingdom, but raises more general questions 
about the assessment of credibility by officials and 
judges.
!e legal process of claiming asylum in the 
UK
When someone applies for asylum in the UK, the 
initial decision whether or not to grant them refugee 
status is taken by the United Kingdom Border Agency 
(UKBA), a branch of the Home Office. Most applicants 
undergo an initial screening interview to establish their 
identity and collect basic personal information, but the 
decision on their claim is based largely on an asylum 
interview conducted by an UKBA caseworker.
Here it is important to distinguish between 
so-called ‘legacy cases’ which have been in the system 
for some years, and the New Asylum Model (NAM), 
one key feature of which is that, in theory, the entire 
process from asylum interview to possible appeal before 
the Tribunal is dealt far more speedily and by the same 
caseworker throughout. !ere is yet a third process, 
the ‘detained fast track’, under which applicants are 
detained on arrival and decisions may be taken within 
a very few days.
Witness Statements and Credibility 
Assessments in the British Asylum 
Courts 
Anthony Good
#is paper looks at the contexts in which asylum applicants in the UK are required to narrate their stories of 
persecution, and the constraints which may lead to those narratives being deemed to lack credibility. It calls into 
question the ‘common sense’ Home O%ce assumptions that in order to be credible accounts should be emotionally 
expressive; fully disclosed immediately on arrival; and wholly consistent over successive tellings. It discusses how 
lawyers seek to elicit comprehensive and coherent witness statements and concludes by examining the limited 
evidence on how judges – the ultimate arbiters of credibility – go about reaching their conclusions.
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Source: Table 2.8; Control of Immigration Statistics 2008, 
Home Office (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/
hosb1409.pdf; accessed 16/09/2009)
 UKBA refuses the great majority of asylum 
applications, as the Table indicates. In that case, a 
Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) is sent to the 
appellant, explaining the decision. Most refusals 
entail rights of appeal at public hearings, heard by 
Immigration Judges (henceforth IJs) from the Asylum 
& Immigration Tribunal (AIT). It is also possible for 
applicants to seek judicial review of Tribunal decisions 
by the High Court (or the Court of Session in Scotland), 
and each year a few cases reach the Court of Appeal 
or House of Lords. Since 2004, the pathways which 
appeals may follow through the courts have become 
quite complex (see diagram).
 At asylum appeals appellants are usually 
represented by barristers in England and solicitors 
in Scotland, while the Home Office representative is 
a Presenting Officer (HOPO), a civil servant who is 
generally not legally qualified. Hearings begin with 
the appellant’s examination-in-chief. !is is normally 
very short; their counsel merely ‘establishes’ the asylum 
interview transcript and witness statement, confirming 
that the contents are true and that the appellant wishes 
to submit them as evidence. Any necessary 
Figure adapted from !omas (2005: 468).
amplifications or corrections are briefly explored. !e 
appellant is then cross-examined by the HOPO. !is 
is the longest part of the hearing, because HOPOs ask 
detailed questions about events in the transcript and 
statement, often deliberately returning to the same 
issues several times in the hope of receiving inconsistent 
replies, which they can then use to cast doubt on the 
appellant’s credibility. !ere is then an opportunity for 
counsel to re-examine their client should they so wish. 
Very occasionally, other witnesses may be called, either 
to corroborate parts of the story or to give oral expert 
evidence. 
 Finally, the representatives address the court 
with their final submissions. HOPOs’ submissions 
generally involve attacks on the appellant’s credibility. 
!ey also cite ‘objective evidence’ about the situation 
in the appellant’s country of origin, which is said to 
support UKBA’s position. On the Home Office side, 
such evidence consists almost entirely of the country 
reports produced by its Country of Origin Information 
Service (COIS). Appellants’ representatives begin 
by answering the credibility points, then offer rival 
interpretations of the objective evidence. !ey too may 
cite COIS reports, but will usually also have submitted 
other documents such as news items, or reports by 
human rights bodies, doctors, or country experts. 
!e IJ must then produce a written determination 
announcing the decision, which must be justified on 
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the basis of a credibility finding, findings of fact on the 
appellant’s story, and an indication of the weight given 
to each piece of evidence.
!e importance of credibility
!ere have been several analyses of credibility in asylum 
contexts by lawyers, both academics and practitioners: 
Weston (1998), Jarvis (2000), and Sweeney (2009) for 
the UK; Coffey (2003) for Australia; Pfeiffer (1988), 
Ruppel (1991), Anker (1992), Kagan (2003), Pepper 
& Mateen (2006), and Anker et al (2008) for the 
USA; and Byrne (2005, 2007) and !omas (2006) 
on international contexts. Like most such writing, 
these studies almost always focus on written judicial 
decisions, especially in higher courts.1 !e approach 
taken here, however, is ethnographic rather than 
jurisprudential; that is, although it cannot avoid 
discussing legal statutes, administrative rules, and 
judicial determinations, it views credibility assessment 
above all as praxis and process.
 !e importance of credibility was set out by the 
UK’s Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (forerunner of 
the AIT), in a 2005 decision written by its President:
Findings of credibility are one of the primary functions 
of the Adjudicator, since they lead to the establishment 
of much of the factual matrix for the determination of 
the Appellant’s case. In some cases, but by no means 
all, the issue of credibility may be the fulcrum of the 
decision as to whether the Appellant’s claim succeeds or 
fails (SW v. SSHD).
 !e importance of credibility is similarly 
stressed by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board, which states that judges almost always have to 
‘decide if they believe the claimant’s evidence and how 
much weight to give to that evidence. In determining 
this, they must assess the credibility of the claimant, 
other witnesses and documentary evidence’ (IRB 1998: 
Foreword). So credibility assessment is the key initial step 
in the overall assessment process. What, then, is meant 
by credibility? According to the UNHCR Handbook, 
the basic requirement is that an asylum seeker’s account 
should be ‘coherent and plausible’ and ‘not run counter 
to generally known facts’ (UNHCR 1992: §204). For 
their part, the Asylum Policy Instructions (APIs) – the 
manual used by UKBA case workers – sets out detailed 
procedures avowedly designed to minimize the role 
of subjectivity and ‘unfounded assumptions’ in case-
workers’ decision-making. !ey suggest that case-
workers should first assess the internal and external 
credibility of the applicant’s story, and then decide 




 Internal credibility means that the applicant’s 
evidence is ‘internally coherent and consistent with 
past written and verbal statements, and consistent with 
claims made by witnesses and/or dependants and with 
any documentary evidence submitted in support of the 
claim’ (ibid.). In assessing this, case workers are told 
to take into account the level of detail provided by 
the applicant, and the degree of consistency in their 
account. Two explicit assumptions made here are as 
follows:2
It is reasonable to assume … that an applicant relating 
an experience that occurred to them will be more 
expressive and include [more] sensory details such as 
what they saw, heard, felt or thought about an event, 
than someone who has not had this experience …
It is reasonable to assume that an applicant who has 
experienced an event will be able to recount the central 
elements in a broadly consistent manner. An applicant’s 
inability to remain consistent throughout his written 
and oral accounts of past and current events may lead 
the decision maker not to believe the applicant’s claim 
(ibid.).
 External credibility refers to whether the 
applicant’s account is ‘consistent with generally known 
facts and country of origin information’. If a case-
worker discovers ‘objective country information that 
clearly contradicts the material claimed fact(s), this is 
likely to result in a negative credibility finding’ (ibid.).
 If the available country of origin information 
does not directly corroborate an applicant’s story, but 
does not contradict it either, that applicant may be given 
the bene't of the doubt in accordance with Paragraph 
339L of the Immigration Rules. !is can, however, 
only be granted in cases where ‘the general credibility 
of the applicant’ has been established’ (ibid.),3 and in 
practice UKBA doubts the credibility of at least part of 
almost every applicant’s story. Indeed, in the opinion of 
many asylum lawyers, UKBA’s presumption is that all 
applications are ‘bogus’.
 Even this brief account illustrates that ideas of 
‘objectivity’ are central to the legal analysis of credibility. 
It is important to note, however, that ‘objectivity’, like 
‘fact’ and ‘truth’, is here defined according to legal 
convention. For scientists ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
mean external and internal to the observer, respectively, 
whereas in legal usage ‘objective’ refers to the subjectivity 
of a Reasonable Man (Kandel 1992: 3). Likewise, 
‘truth’ and ‘fact’ are defined pragmatically rather than 
meta-physically by lawyers: a ‘fact’ is a matter which has 
been proved to the required standard, whereas ‘truth’ is 
a statement made by a credible witness.
Principles of credibility assessment
Because corroborative evidence is so often lacking, 
credibility assessments based on the internal coherence 
of the account, and its external consistency with 
‘objective evidence’ are used throughout the decision-
making process to filter out supposedly ‘bogus’ claimants 
(Weston 1998: 88). !e danger, however, is that such 
decisions may display prejudice or misunderstanding 
when the person whose credibility is being assessed 
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comes from a cultural background very different from 
that of the assessor (Bingham 1985: 14; Ruppel 1991: 
5).
 In its general survey of the issues involved 
in assessing whether evidence is indeed ‘credible or 
trustworthy’, the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada (IRB 1998: ¶1.2) states that testimony must 
be evaluated in the light of 
conditions and laws in the claimant’s country of origin, 
as well as the experiences of similarly situated persons 
in that country. !e Federal Court has cautioned, 
however, that ‘[t]here can be no consistency on findings 
of credibility.’ Credibility cannot be prejudged, and 
is an issue to be determined ... in each case based on 
the circumstances of the individual claimant and the 
evidence.
!e guidelines note that credibility findings must 
be properly founded on the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom (1998: ¶1.6). !ey should 
consider the evidence altogether, not bit by bit; even if 
particular pieces of evidence are found to lack credibility 
– in which case ‘clear reasons must be given’ – the claim 
must still be assessed on the basis of whatever evidence 
has been found credible (1998: ¶2.1).
If there were equivalent guidance for British 
decision makers it would be unlikely to differ greatly.4 
!e crucial questions, however, are whether, how, or to 
what extent such principles are put into practice by the 
Home Office and judiciary. Because credibility findings 
‘go to the heart of the identity’ of asylum applicants, 
one
senior IJ has written, ‘to get it wrong is to add insult 
to injury ... to inflict yet further damage upon a 
human being who has already undergone experiences 
incomprehensible to most of us’ (Jarvis 2000: 6).
Telling their stories
For most asylum applicants the principal evidence 
of the persecution they have experienced is provided 
by their personal stories of suffering. On numerous 
occasions during the course of their asylum appeal, 
they are required to tell those stories. In a purely 
structural sense these occasions are all alike: fairly 
rigidly structured dialogues involving, paradoxically, 
three participants – questioner, asylum applicant, and 
interpreter. But although structurally similar, these 
contexts are of course fundamentally different in terms 
of the purposes and motives of the questioners, and the 
interviewing strategies followed.
 !e first is generally the screening interview, 
held soon after arrival in order to establish the applicant’s 
identity, nationality, and mode of travel. !is does not 
explore the detailed substance of their claim, but they 
are asked in general terms why they have come to the 
UK; they may well be tired and frightened, but if they 
make any slight errors – over dates, perhaps – these will 
be held against them later.
 !eir substantive asylum interview with a 
UKBA caseworker, a few weeks or months later, goes 
into their claim in far more detail, though the mode 
of questioning often restricts their ability to fully 
explain their claim as they themselves see it. It is not 
the case, of course, that applicants know better than 
caseworkers what information is relevant; in general, 
their knowledge of refugee law is slight. Even so, if 
given the opportunity to explain things fully in their 
own terms, they would almost certainly provide 
further details which would clarify the significance of 
particular events. However, as is true to some degree 
of every stage in the asylum process, their ability to 
do so is constrained by a number of factors (Rycroft 
2005), including time pressures on the interviewer, the 
need to work through an interpreter, and underlying 
both of these, the limitations intrinsic to the artificially 
rigid question-and answer format employed in legal 
processes (Atkinson and Drew 1979).
 In parallel with this process the appellant 
will be preparing a witness statement with the help of 
their legal representative.5 Here the above constraints, 
though still present, are less intense, because the 
questions are more open ended and the questioner 
equally probing but more sympathetic. Ideally, taking 
a statement involves several sittings, because the 
experience is emotive and tiring; details have to be 
checked; and the final product has to be read back in 
their own language. !is procedure may be truncated 
by the increasingly niggardly provisions of legal aid, 
however, and nowadays may even be forestalled by the 
speed of the process; under NAM, and especially under 
the Detained Fast Track, there may be barely time to 
produce even a rudimentary witness statement.
 Many applicants also narrate their stories to 
doctors who are preparing medico-legal reports; this 
creates yet another risk of minor discrepancies seeming 
to arise. !eir representative may sometimes take a 
supplementary witness statement after the refusal letter 
has been received, in which the applicant rebuts any 
points based on errors or misunderstandings. Finally, 
there is the appeal hearing itself, when appellants are 
subjected to detailed cross-examination.
 Many legal representatives see taking the 
statement as a useful ‘dress rehearsal’ for the asylum 
interview, but that does not necessarily mean that 
they will actually submit the statement to the Home 
Office prior to that interview; they may see that as a 
hostage to fortune, giving UKBA case-workers extra 
opportunities to search for discrepancies. However 
much their opinions and strategies differed on such 
tactical matters, however, all the legal practitioners 
interviewed stressed the key importance of the witness 
statement in building a case:
Solicitor A: Absolutely one hundred per cent crucial, in 
the British system. You might have seen in court, it so 
much centres on credibility, and therefore, you know, 
asylum seekers often won’t be documented so it really 
is down to them giving an account of their experiences. 
Unfortunately, when you take a case where there hasn’t 
been a good statement, you’re already on the back foot.
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Several legal representatives explicitly contrasted their 
own techniques for eliciting information with those of 
UKBA case-workers in asylum interviews:
AG: How do you actually start to elicit the story, and 
discover what the issues are?
Solicitor B: Well, I normally go back much further than 
the Home Office would, because it certainly was always 
a Home Office tradition that the first question they ask 
is, ‘So what made you come here?’ So you end up with 
the last question first, and it’s very, very confusing for 
clients, because then they think they’re not required to 
go back any further in an interview. But my technique 
is exactly the opposite, which is to delve right back into 
ancient history and say, okay, did you or your family 
suffer any persecution in the 1980s? And that opens it 
up, you know, that sort of question.
 !e processes whereby asylum lawyers 
structure their clients’ statements to maximize their 
impact as evidence have received little attention up to 
now,6 but in most cases it seems reasonable to expect 
that such accounts will need to be converted from what 
Conley and O’Barr (1990) call ‘relational mode’ into 
‘rule-oriented mode’.
 !eir research, in small claims courts in the US 
where claimants generally present their own cases, shows 
that the ways in which lay persons present evidence in 
court lie along a continuum. At one extreme, litigants 
who display a relational orientation tend to define rights 
and responsibilities in terms of ‘a broad notion of social 
interdependence rather than … the application of rules’ 
(1990: 61). For example, if the case involves a dispute 
with a neighbour, they will focus less on the particular 
event which led to them being in court and more on 
their generalized moral outrage that someone who has 
lived beside them for years should violate the social 
norms of good-neighbourliness. !is is unlikely to be a 
successful strategy, because it conforms to a logic very 
different from that of the law. Consequently the courts 
‘often fail to understand their cases, regardless of their 
legal merits’ (1990: 61).
 At the other extreme, those litigants who 
adopt a rule-oriented approach ‘evaluate their problems 
in terms of neutral principles whose application 
transcends differences in personal and social status’ 
(1990: ix). Because such a perspective resembles that of 
legal professionals themselves, there is a better chance 
that people who present their problems in this way 
will be fully understood. Consequently, in two cases of 
equal merit, it is the rule-oriented litigant who is more 
likely to be successful.
 Because they are usually unfamiliar with legal 
proceedings of any kind, let alone the particularities 
of law in the country where they are claiming asylum, 
it is very likely that asylum applicants will display 
a relational orientation in their responses during 
interviews and cross-examination. Not only that, in 
the great majority of cases they are unaware of the 
provisions of the Refugee Convention, and hence of the 
basis upon which their asylum claim will be decided:
Solicitor B: But on the other hand, they still don’t know 
what is relevant and what isn’t, and this is one of the 
major, major problems with, for instance, on-arrival 
asylum interviews or people who get a NAM interview 
within three or four days, when there’s barely time to 
even see a solicitor.
When asylum applicants’ cases are put on their behalf 
by their lawyers, their submissions will inevitably be 
converted into rule-oriented format. Perhaps because 
of this, many applicants are baffled by the whole 
process of taking the statement, and their lawyers must 
repeatedly remind them what it is for. !is exchange 
came after six hours of interviewing spread over two 
sessions:
Interpreter: He doesn’t understand the whole purpose of 
having a statement.
Solicitor C: We have to explain to the Home Office why 
you don’t want to go back to Somalia, so they need to 
understand what problems you had before and why you 
believe there would be problems on return. And the 
thing is, you didn’t come as soon as the civil war started, 
so they will want to know what prompted you to leave. 
So this statement explains your difficulties. ... !ey are 
going to think, is this man from Somalia, first of all; 
then, does he really belong to a minority clan; then, 
would he be at risk on return? So with all the details we 
have taken, they will understand what your life was like. 
And also why you didn’t leave before, because so many 
persons have left.
It seems quite common for representatives to address 
this incomprehension using cinematic analogies:
Solicitor D: It’s like this, in simple terms. If it’s an 
uneducated client, I tell my client, ‘this is like creating 
a good movie’. You can have a real, genuine story, but 
you have to produce it, and direct it, and present it in 
a different way, so all those skills have to be employed 
without which, even the best story on the planet can’t 
attract people to watch that particular movie. So that’s 
why it’s very important to present it in a very simple, 
chronologically-ordered, understandable way.
With these provisos, the asylum interview, the witness 
statement, and the appeal hearing itself, all provide 
opportunities for asylum applicants to tell their stories of 
persecution. For some applicants, though, the incidents 
most helpful to their claims have to be coaxed out of 
them by sympathetic, trusted questioners. Moreover, 
these stories often come out differently on different 
occasions, giving rise to the ‘discrepancies’ which Home 
Office staff are always seeking to identify.
Hiding their stories
No doubt many applicants do want to tell their stories 
to a wide audience – as a therapeutic catharsis; to ‘bear 
witness’ to atrocities inflicted on their community; or to 
obtain official recognition of their persecution. Whether 
it is reasonable to expect applicants to reveal intimate 
personal details, straight after arrival, to strangers in a 
strange country, is doubtful; but one ‘common sense’ 
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UKBA assumption is that genuine applicants will 
mention all serious incidents of persecution at the 
earliest possible opportunity. When they later reveal 
the truth to their doctor or lawyer, UKBA always 
attacks their credibility. !e following refusal letter to a 
Sri Lankan Tamil woman is typical:
when the immigration officer asked you whether you 
had any other reasons or events that caused you to 
seek asylum, you did not add anything further. Even 
bearing in mind, your apprehension as expressed in 
your additional statement, he considered that your 
failure to mention anything about the alleged rape … 
undermined your credibility in raising it later.
 Yet that interview was conducted by a male 
Immigration Officer in the presence of a male, Tamil 
lawyer. !is was bound to inhibit disclosure. Shame 
before men generally, and a fear that information 
may leak out to local members of their community, 
greatly inhibit the willingness of many Tamil women to 
disclose sexual assault. Many have not even told their 
own family what happened.
 IJs usually pay more attention than UKBA 
case workers to the cultural reasons why women may 
not divulge sexual assaults on such occasions, but they 
to do not always accept this as a sufficient explanation. 
In the tribunal appeal of ‘S’, a Turkish Kurd women, 
the Tribunal concluded:
her excuse ... that she was ashamed and embarrassed to 
reveal that matter to male Immigration Officers ... does 
not stand up when it is considered that she had been in 
constant touch with her solicitors, some of whom must 
have been female, when she could have brought such 
matters to light, but had failed to do so.
 It is well-known that many rape victims in 
western societies, too, fail to report rape attacks – the 
so-called ‘silent reaction to rape syndrome’ (Burgess 
and Holmstrom 1974). Because of the extra pressures 
they face, one might expect this to be at least as true for 
refugees, even at the cost of weakening their legal cases. 
It takes skill, empathy, and time to build up the degree 
of trust needed for disclosure to take place:
AG: So how do you make them comfortable enough, in 
order to disclose the information?
Solicitor B: Well, I think when they realize how well-
disposed I am and that I am actually interested in the 
amount of detail that I am, you know, they regard 
that as a major compliment. It’s just like any human 
relationship ... somebody’s really, really interested in 
you, that’s a very touching thing, you know, and ... 
when they realize that that is actually going to benefit 
them, then they sort of open up like a flower, and start 
disclosing information voluntarily.
 Such reticence is displayed by men too. Doctors 
from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims 
of Torture reported that male asylum applicants from 
Sri Lanka who suffer sexual abuse during detention are 
even more likely to remain silent until a relationship of 
trust has been established than are female rape victims 
(Peel et al 2000; Peel 2002) and this led solicitors to 
uncover many more cases that would have been missed 
previously:
Solicitor B: I was doing Tamil cases for years and I just 
… I might have asked it in a female case, but in the 
male cases I just assumed, you know, that nobody male 
would get raped. And then that Medical Foundation 
booklet came out, and I was very, very skeptical. So then 
I thought, well I’d better start asking, and gradually 
learned the delicate art of eliciting that ... and was 
absolutely astonished to find what percentage of them 
had been raped. And of course none of them had told me 
before, because I’d never asked it; and it’s an extremely 
sensitive matter which they weren’t going to volunteer, 
unless they were put on the spot about it.
!is can be stressful for the lawyer too. In the following 
passage the solicitor relives his embarrassment as he 
explains how he goes about broaching the topic:
Solicitor B: !e first thing is not to sort of plunge straight 
in ... get them really talking first, and probably talking 
about torture ... and then get the relative or friend out 
of the room, quite unceremoniously, you know... So 
even if it’s an implication, you know, that I’m going to 
ask that, at least it gives the person some privacy. And 
then you’ve got to say, ‘!e … this … you know, has, 
has this happened to you, have you suffered any, erm, 
rape or sexual abuse. I mean, I know it’s a very, very 
awkward and sensitive matter, but it’s actually extremely 
important for your claim that you tell the truth about 
this, and if it’s any consolation to you, erm, you know, 
actually the great majority of my male Tamil clients 
have been raped. So if you have been, you know, it’s – if 
that makes you feel any better about it – and, and that’s 
the case’.
 What is more, it often turns out that in initially 
suppressing this shameful element of their experience, 
the asylum applicant has been forced to omit or 
downplay other incidents too, which might otherwise 
have given their account greater credibility and thereby 
helped their case:
Solicitor B: If that is later disclosed, and perhaps 
supported by psychiatric evidence, then that’s a 
legitimate reason for reopening a case and ... you know, 
that can actually sort of throw a whole new perspective 
on everything, because it may reveal why other things 
have not been disclosed. I mean quite often there may 
be torture that’s not been revealed, and then it turns 
out that the reason for that was, because it was all 
intermeshed with the rape, and the person didn’t feel 
that they could start talking about the torture, in case 
that led on to questions about the rape, so, you know, 
whole chunks have been left out.
 Clearly, therefore, it would be quite wrong 
to base a negative credibility finding on initial silence 
alone; explanations for late disclosure should be taken 
very seriously. !at does not of course mean that every 
applicant who finally claims to have been raped is telling 
the truth. IJs must decide on overall credibility, and in 
the Turkish case cited above there was no medical or 
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psychiatric report supporting S’s claim to have been 
raped; such a report would have greatly strengthened 
her case.
Remembering traumatic experiences
Another ‘common sense’ supposition in the Asylum 
Policy Instructions, quoted earlier, is that traumatic 
experiences will be remembered with clarity and 
vividness. !is goes hand in hand with a general 
assumption that variations and inconsistencies between 
different tellings of an event, even months or years apart, 
are damaging to credibility – hence the significance 
attached by the UKBA, and sometimes the courts, to 
apparent inconsistencies in applicants’ stories. On both 
counts, however, anthropological and medical evidence 
point in the opposite direction.
 Elaine Scarry (1985: 4) notes that the physical 
pain of torture ‘does not simply resist language but 
actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate 
reversion to ... the sounds and cries a human being 
makes before language is learned’ (1985: 4), while 
Stuart Turner points out that torture also has the ‘ability 
to shatter relationships [and] destroy trust’ (1995: 58). 
Not surprisingly, torture victims may find it almost 
unbearably hard to discuss such experiences. Many 
cannot achieve this degree of ‘agency in the face of 
disempowerment’ (Hastrup 2003: 314, citing Arendt 
1958 and Jackson 2002), but even if they manage 
to do so with the aid of a sympathetic interlocutor, 
their accounts are often drab, ‘listless’ (Daniel 1996: 
143) recitations from which ‘all the emotional edges 
have been eliminated’ (Scarry 1985: 32). !e judge, 
expecting something with far more emotional bite, 
may find this unconvincing.
 It is also clear that stories come out differently 
on different occasions, even under the best of 
circumstances, and recent medical research involving 
Kosovan and Bosnian refugees illustrated that such 
differences are even more pronounced when trauma is 
involved (Herlihy, Scragg and Turner 2002; cf. Cohen 
2001, Herlihy 2005). I attended a seminar in which 
Turner summarized these findings to an audience of 
IJs.
Several openly admitted that they generally 
based their credibility judgments on the consistency of 
accounts with previous versions, but Turner confirmed 
that discrepancies in recounting past experiences 
are high under any circumstances, but higher for 
traumatic events. His research therefore indicates that 
such discrepancies have no necessary connection with 
overall credibility. Of course, some discrepancies and 
confusions may indeed indicate untruthfulness, but 
that decision has to be based on overall credibility, not 
purely on the discrepancies themselves.
 Scholars working on oral histories and life 
stories would not be at all surprised by such findings.7 
!e sociolinguist Linde, for example, argues that life 
stories are judged more on the basis of coherence rather 
than factuality, coherence being both ‘a social demand 
and an internal, psychological demand’ (1993: 220). 
!e causal chain in such narratives must be perceived 
by the listener as ‘adequate’ (Linde 1993: 221).
Ultimately, the ‘most pervasive and invisible 
coherence system is common sense – the set of beliefs 
and relations between beliefs that speakers may assume 
are known and shared by all competent members of 
the culture’ (Linde 1993: 222). In the case of asylum 
narratives, however, the cultural and experiential 
differences between teller and listener may be too great 
for common sense assumptions to be shared to anything 
like this degree. !at is why witness statements are so 
crucial. !ey allow legal representatives to structure 
their clients’ accounts according to the expectations of 
European legal cultures. Causal adequacy can thereby 
be assured prior to the hearing, although it may of 
course begin to unravel once cross-examination starts.
 !e full meaning of a narrative emerges only 
during its performance, and relates in part to ‘the 
interaction with ... the audience and its expectations’ 
(Finnegan 1992: 93). As Conley and O’Barr (1990: 
171) put it, a story 
does not exist fully developed on its own, but only 
emerges through a collaboration between the teller and 
a particular audience ... a research interviewer asking 
questions, a judge presiding in an informal court, a 
lawyer talking with a client.
 !is process is, however, greatly inhibited 
by the procedural rules applying in law courts, most 
notably the highly artificial (in relation to everyday 
speech contexts) question-and-answer format of cross-
examination. !is is intended to circumvent ‘practical 
problems posed by ordinary discourse’ (Atkinson 
and Drew 1979: 8), but one effect is to diminish 
‘the rhetorical force of the account’, making it less 
involving for the speaker, less dramatic and interesting 
for the listener, and – potentially – less credible for 
the Judge (Conley and O’Barr 1990: 40). !e need to 
use interpreters has further dampening effects on the 
performative force of appellants’ own utterances.
Cultural (mis)translation
For asylum claims to be fairly evaluated, applicants’ 
narratives must be placed within their cultural, socio-
economic, and historical contexts (UNCHR 1992: 
¶42). Country of origin information and expert evidence 
help explain such contexts, and appeal hearings, too, 
offer opportunities for culturally-specific differences 
in behaviour, terminology, or understanding to be 
explored, especially when UKBA has cast doubts on its 
credibility. Yet in practice further misunderstandings 
often arise at the hearing itself, raising additional 
questions about credibility. !ese often result from the 
process of interpretation.
 !is is not necessarily a question of faulty 
interpretation, however; all interpreters, however 
skillful, face the problem that utterances in the 
asylum applicant’s language, with particular ranges 
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of meaning, cannot be mapped precisely onto the 
language of the court. !e constraints imposed by 
legal processes further limit the interpreter’s ability to 
facilitate communication (Morris 1995: 26). !e legal 
expectation is that court interpreters will give verbatim 
translations of whatever is said by each speaker (Berk-
Seligson 2002: 65). 8 Judges tend to assume that 
verbatim translations are also accurate ones, but in 
fact strictly verbatim translations produce ‘distorted 
communication’ (Colin and Morris 1996: 17).
 Some misunderstandings in court involve 
simple factual matters which can easily be resolved if 
the court has the necessary information, but if not, 
HOPOs will seize on any apparent inconsistencies in 
order to call credibility into question. To illustrate how 
easily a damaging confusion may arise, consider the 
most common inconsistencies in asylum stories – those 
concerning dates. Any discrepancies among dates given 
at interview, in their statement, to the doctor, in cross-
examination, and so on, are certain to be seized upon 
by the HOPO as damaging to the credibility of the 
account as a whole. !e plausibility of such arguments 
varies according to the nature and importance of the 
event, but problems may arise from cultural differences 
too (cf. Kalin 1986). For example, courts rarely take into 
account – and few lawyers are well-enough informed to 
ask them to do so – the fact that many countries do not 
follow the Gregorian calendar. Discrepancies over dates 
may therefore arise from inaccurate mental conversions 
of dates into a calendar with which appellants are 
unfamiliar.9
 Cultural and calendrical difficulties both seem 
at play in the following exchange from the appeal 
hearing of a Nepali man, which illustrates that problems 
may arise even with something so obvious as one’s date 
of birth:10
Adjudicator: [W]hat is your birth date in the Nepali 
calendar?
Appellant (in English throughout): Nepalese calendar? I 
cannot remember
Nepalese calendar because I got used to using English 
calendar now. According to
English calendar my date of birth is 26/9/74.
Adjudicator: What is your date of birth in Nepalese?
Appellant: !ere is no such thing as birthday in Nepalese 
so I need to convert it
into Nepalese calendar.
Adjudicator: Are you telling me you don’t know what 
your Nepalese birthday is?
Appellant: I cannot remember just now.
Adjudicator: !at’s fine if that’s what your answer is!
Appellant: I have got used to English calendar just now.
 Variations in kin relationship terminology can 
also create problems. Not surprisingly, I most often 
became aware of such misunderstandings in Tamil 
cases where I could follow the dialogue to some extent. 
Problems often arose, for example, from the fact that 
everyday Tamil has no word for brother, but separate 
and quite different, words for elder brother (annan) 
and younger brother (tampi). !e problems this poses 
for interpretation are obvious, and it was sometimes 
unclear in court whether, for example, appellants were 
discussing all their brothers or only their seniors or 
juniors. Similar ambiguities regarding different parts of 
the body may be crucial when comparing appellant’s 
evidence of how they were tortured with the placing of 
scars on their bodies, as reported by medical examiners. 
For example, Tamils use the same word (kal) for foot 
and leg. !ere are numerous composite terms (ankle is 
kanukkal, knee is mulankal, and so on) but in everyday 
speech people often use kal with all these meanings. 
It is impossible to know, after the event, whether a 
particular appellant (or, for that matter, the interpreter 
on that occasion) had or had not used one of the precise 
composite terms; it is, however, easy to see the scope 
for apparent ‘discrepancies’ when this information is 
re-elicited on subsequent occasions, with different 
interpreters.
 !ese examples all concern fairly straight 
forward kinds of cultural difference, which could have 
been fully explained had the requisite information been 
available. If explanations are not forthcoming, however, 
the damage done to an asylum applicant’s credibility 
may be considerable. Moreover, mis-understandings 
over subtler and less tangible cultural matters – such as 
norms and values – may be far harder to redress.
Judicial assessments of credibility
Credibility decisions in asylum appeals are matters 
only for the IJ, though the difficulties involved are 
recognized. As Lord Abernethy said in the Court of 
Session:
Credibility is an issue to be handled with great care 
and with sensitivity to cultural differences and the 
very difficult position in which applicants for asylum 
escaping from persecution often find themselves. But 
our system of immigration control presupposes that the 
credibility of an applicant’s account has to be judged.
Credibility is a question of fact which has been entrusted 
by Parliament to the adjudicator … Of course, an 
adjudicator must give his reasons for his assessment. A 
bare assertion that an applicant’s account is implausible 
is not enough. But an adjudicator is entitled to draw an 
inference of implausibility if it is based on the evidence 
he has heard and in coming to his conclusion he is 
entitled to draw on his common sense and his ability, as 
a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is 
not plausible (Esen v. SSHD; citations omitted).
 !e first appeal is especially crucial where 
credibility is concerned, because unless an IJ’s 
assessment is clearly wrong, later tribunals will not 
overturn the initial findings on credibility – and with 
good reason, because IJs at first appeals do, after all, 
hear appellants giving oral evidence and undergoing 
cross-examination. !e Inner House of the Court of 
Session stated in HA that:
!is court may not interfere with the immigration 
judge’s decision on a matter of credibility simply because 
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on the evidence it would, if it had been the fact-finder, 
have come to a different conclusion.
 But on what basis do these first instance judges 
reach their decisions on credibility? It has been argued 
that members of the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board members tend to perform credibility 
assessments by applying their own ‘assumptions of 
a universal Canadian cultural ‘logic’’ (Rousseau et al 
2002: 62). It must however be questionable whether, or 
to what extent, it is justified to assume the existence of a 
single frame of reference in refugee hearings, shared by 
decision-maker and applicant (see also Clifford 1988: 
329).
 !is Canadian research revealed not only 
the effect of psychological trauma on the quality of 
applicants’ testimony, as might be expected on the 
basis of the research by Herlihy et al (2002), but also 
the extent to which repeated exposure to narratives of 
torture and rape produced ‘massive’ avoidance reactions 
among decision makers themselves. According to the 
researchers, Board members displayed a high incidence 
of ‘emotional distress’, explicit prejudice, and cynicism 
(Rousseau et al 2002: 64). !e report concludes 
that such behaviour shows ‘a very strong emotional 
reaction, a lack of empathy, and an association of the 
victim with the aggressor, all symptoms of an inability 
to cope with the emotional stress created by the 
hearing’ (2002: 59-60). It is common for professionals 
in stressful occupations to distance themselves from 
the traumas to which they are repeatedly exposed, 
through denial, avoidance, or emotive reactions such 
as anger, lack of empathy, or cynical humour (see, for 
example, Katz 1981), but this seems a particularly 
serious matter when so much depends upon judicial 
evaluations of credibility. !e Canadian research team 
included a Professor of Psychiatry, a discipline in which 
I claim no expertise whatever; from my lay perspective, 
though, I have to say that I have never observed any 
such symptoms among British Judges, although some 
are notoriously hostile and seem to allow few if any 
appeals.
 !e most systematic research into how British 
IJs reach credibility decisions was carried out by Catriona 
Jarvis, herself now a Senior IJ. Adjudicators (as they were 
then termed) were asked to rank twenty-seven factors 
pertaining to credibility in order of importance; some 
were factors common to all judicial assessments, such 
as consistency or a failure to answer questions, while 
others were more specific to asylum appeals, such as 
delayed disclosure of rape or torture (Jarvis 2000: 10). 
Replies suggested that many credibility decisions rested 
on ‘gut feelings’, the application of common sense, 
or recourse to personal experience, but also indicated 
considerable variation in stated practice (Jarvis 2000: 
16).
 Some general conclusions can be drawn, 
however. For example, IJs acknowledge that appellants 
have less chance of winning if they do not attend, or 
attend without giving oral evidence.11 Although it is 
an error of law to make a negative credibility finding 
on these grounds, the fact that it happens is not 
surprising when one considers that there is usually no 
evidence (barring standard objective sources) except the 
appellant’s own. Some IJs draw adverse conclusions on 
credibility when applicants choose to use interpreters 
even though they speak adequate English, although this 
too is an error of law. Adverse credibility findings are 
also more likely when a claim is lodged only after that 
of a family member has been dismissed, though as Jarvis 
notes this may disadvantage wives who – adhering to 
cultural norms of dependence – initially allowed their 
claim to be subsumed under their husband’s (2000: 
21).12
 Numerous studies show that demeanour is an 
unreliable guide to credibility in any area of law (Jarvis 
2000: 40, and sources therein). !is is especially likely 
in asylum courts, given appellants’ diverse cultural 
backgrounds and varying expectations regarding 
interpersonal behaviour,13 yet by their own admission 
demeanour figures importantly in the assessments of 
many IJs (Jarvis 2000: 23, 40). Like other legal decision 
makers, IJs also admit that they are more inclined 
to believe appellants who are physically attractive, 
unless they seem to trade on their attractiveness in a 
manipulative way (2000: 40–1).
 In my own interviews, IJs stressed that for 
them too the witness statement is crucial both before 
the hearing, in helping them get to grips with the huge 
bundles of evidence received, at best, the night before; 
and when writing their determinations, in initiating 
the reasoning process underlying their decision on 
credibility:
IJA: When you come to write up your decision, you 
have to set out, what does the appellant say happened to 
him? [!e witness statement is] the document I go to, 
to start my summary of his case. And then I move on to 
the objective material, what that says about the country 
concerned. And then I’m going to decide, whether to 
believe the person or not. And then I’m going to decide 
whether or not they’re a refugee. How do I do that? In 
terms of whether I believe them, I always bear in my 
mind the low standard of proof ... but, that ‘reasonable 
degree of likelihood’ can be shattered if you have some 
huge implausibility or discrepancy. I take a lot of what 
people say at face value. I don’t go looking for minor 
discrepancies and then say, ‘oh, I don’t believe a word 
he’s said’, if the general case has the ring of truth. But I 
would also look at the objective material.
AG: Do you equate plausibility with credibility? What’s 
the relationship between them? Are they different 
things?
IJA: Oh gosh! !ey are, yes, because someone can be 
credible, even though something isn’t plausible.
AG: And when you are deciding whether you believe 
them or not, is that primarily on the basis of the witness 
statement, or is it primarily on the basis of the cross-
examination?
IJA: It’s the two together. If on the surface the witness 
statement is a ‘plausible account’, if there’s a reasonable 
degree of likelihood that that would have happened, 
then actually the examination is quite important 
because I’ll be starting from the point of view that I 
have a plausible story here; let’s see whether they come 
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up to proof … Or there may be one part of the story 
that you just think, well, depending on the answer to 
this question is whether I’m going to believe them or 
not. And maybe the whole thing unravels ...
 
 Like Jarvis’s work, such data reflect IJs’ self-
assessment of their practices, not those practices 
themselves. On them there is even less information, 
although we do know that more than twice as many 
women as men (15% as against 6.5%) are judged 
credible by British IJs (Harvey 1998: 191; Jarvis 2000: 
8). !ere are no detailed statistics on the social identities 
and decision-making proclivities of particular IJs, of the 
kind so dramatically produced for the United States, 
where Ramji-Nogales et al found startling differences 
in asylum grant rates between different judges:
how about a situation in which one judge is 1820% 
more likely to grant an application for important relief 
than another judge in the same courthouse? Or where 
one U.S. Court of Appeals is 1148% more likely to rule 
in favour of a petitioner than another U.S. Court of 
Appeals considering similar cases? Welcome to the world 
of asylum law (2007-08: 301; footnotes omitted).
 !e explanations for such discrepancies are 
not given in the statistical data themselves but must 
be hypothesized by the analysts. For example, they 
attribute the fact that success rates are three times 
higher when appellants are legally represented, to the 
importance of knowledge about asylum case law, court 
procedures, and sources of objective evidence (2007-08: 
376); in part, clearly, this seems to reflect the positive 
impact of presenting cases in rule-oriented fashion (see 
above). !e data also show that judges are significantly 
more likely to grant refugee status to appellants who 
brought their spouses or small children with them to 
the US, than if they were single or had left their families 
behind. !is, they suggest, could well be due partly 
to underlying assumptions about credible behaviour: 
would someone with genuine cause for fear be willing 
to ‘abandon’ their family? Not surprisingly, judges’ own 
backgrounds may significantly affect outcomes. It is 
perhaps unsurprising to find that asylum grant rates 
are lower than average for judges with prior careers in 
the Department of Homeland Security, but higher for 
those who were formerly immigration lawyers, NGO 
workers, or law professors (2007–08: 377). Gender is 
also a major factor – that is, the gender of the judge 
rather than of the appellant. Grant rates for female 
judges are 44% higher than for men (ibid.).14
 As one IJ bluntly put it in responding to 
Jarvis’s study, British asylum appeals are ‘a lottery’ 
in which the decision depends above all on which IJ 
happens to hear the appeal (2000: 19). !is view is 
echoed and devastatingly documented for the United 
States by Ramji-Nogales et al, whose ‘central finding’ is 
as follows:
Whether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the 
United States or is deported to a country in which he 
claims to fear persecution is very seriously influenced 
by a spin of the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk’s 
random assignment of an applicant’s case to one asylum 
officer rather than another, or one immigration judge 
rather than another (2007-08: 378).
 While there are no doubt many contributory 
causes, it seems highly likely that differing approaches 
to credibility assessment help account for these gross 
disparities.
 Finally however, and to set this discussion 
into perspective, it is important to note that although 
they are crucial starting points in almost every appeal, 
credibility assessments are not in themselves decisive 
because decisions should ultimately be based upon the 
existence of future risk. !e ultimate question is: does the 
applicant have a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’? !at 
is evaluated mainly on the basis of ‘objective evidence’ 
about the background in their home country, so in 
practice the outcomes of most appeals depend equally 
strongly on IJs deciding which version of the objective 
evidence they prefer as regards risk on return. Indeed, 
as the veteran IJ Mr Care pointed out, such background 
evidence ‘is crucial to most findings of plausibility and 
frequently credibility as well’ (Kanagasundram); that is, 
both the initial decision on ‘external credibility’ and the 
subsequent decision regarding ‘risk on return’ are based 
in part upon an evaluation of the objective evidence 
regarding the situation in the appellant’s home country. 
Finally, strange though it may sound, asylum applicants 
whose accounts are not deemed at all credible may still 
succeed in their claims if it is accepted that they will, 
nonetheless, face a real risk of persecution if returned; 
thus, ‘an applicant’s story may not be credible in the 
light of the objective circumstances but still the case 
is established’ (Nimets).15 As the determination in SW 
v. SSHD went on to say, immediately after the passage 
quoted earlier: 
an assessment of credibility is not the ultimate focus of 
an Adjudicator’s determination. In an asylum or human 
rights case, that focus is the potential breach of either 
Convention which will usually involve an assessment of 
the nature and risk to an Appellant of his removal. An 
Appellant who is partly or even wholly disbelieved may 
still be at a real risk e.g. for his ethnicity. He may have 
lied to bolster a true case.
Notes
1 !e work of Jarvis (2000), now a Senior Immigration 
Judge, is an exception.
2 Various mitigating circumstances are recognized: 
‘mental or emotional trauma, inarticulateness, fear, 
mistrust of authorities, feelings of shame, painful 
memories particularly those of a sexual nature’ (ibid.).
3 Under para 339L, the benefit of the doubt should be 
given when all of the following conditions are met:
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
his asylum claim ...
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
submitted, and a
satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of relevant 
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material has been given
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
plausible, and do not run counter to available specific 
and general information relevant to the person’s case
????????????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????????
possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good 
reason for not having done so
?? ???? ???????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????
established
4 One potential source of such advice is the Appeal 
Court decision in Karanakaran; however, its starting 
premise – that an adjudicator, as IJs were then called, 
was a mere ‘administrative decision-maker’ whose role 
was not equivalent to that of ‘a judge in civil litigation’—
was highly unpalatable to adjudicators themselves, so it 
has been cited and followed less than might otherwise 
have been expected (Care 2004).
5 A witness statement is ‘a written statement signed by a 
person which contains the evidence which that person 
would be allowed to give orally’ (Ministry of Justice 
2009: sec. 32.4 [1]).
6 McKinley (1997) describes such a restructuring for 
a Zimbabwean asylum applicant in the USA, fleeing 
from an abusive forced marriage.
7 For a more detailed discussion see Good (2007: 
193-94).
8 Mikkelson (no date) describes this as ‘a pervasive 
myth within the judiciary’. !e issues in this section 
are discussed more fully in Good (2007: 153-69).
9 Many lawyers and Judges are aware that Iranians do 
not use the Gregorian calendar, and that this may cause 
problems, but this awareness does not seem to extend 
to appellants from other cultural backgrounds.
10 !is appellant constantly caused problems by 
bypassing the interpreter and bursting out with answers 
in English to poorly-understood questions which had 
not yet been translated, despite repeated warnings from 
the adjudicator of the dangers of so doing.
11 Many judges see oral evidence as key to establishing 
credibility, and cannot see how ‘justice could be achieved 
by … making significant findings of credibility solely on 
the basis of written submissions’ (Judge Bertha Wilson, 
in Federation of Canadian Sikh Societies). Others, like 
Sedley LJ (Yousaf & Jamil), think that ‘it tends to be 
documentary material which demonstrates that the 
unconvincing witness has been telling the truth or the 
convincing one been deluded or lying’.
12 By contrast, most UKBA reasons for disbelieving 
applicants, such as a lack of identity documents or 
failure to claim asylum in transit, cut little ice with 
most IJs, the one exception being when no claim is 
made until after deportation notices are issued (Jarvis 
2000: 17).
13. ‘[J]udging demeanour across cultural divides is 
fraught with danger’ (‘B’ [DRC])
14. My discussion here focuses on judges because they 
make the crucial rulings on credibility. However, 
Ramji-Nogales et al found large disparities in decision 
making among Department of Homeland Security 
officials (equivalent to UKBS’s caseowners) too; many 
officers are ‘outliers’ whose grant rates differ by 50% or 
more from the norm in their own regional office, and 
who therefore ‘appear to have grant rates that reflect 
personal outlooks rather than an office consensus’ 
(2007-08: 372).
15. Imagine, for example, an Iranian whose story is 
wholly disbelieved, but whose drug-related conviction 
overseas is deemed likely to bring him to the adverse 
attention of the authorities if returned.
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Introduction
In this paper I will discuss Ireland’s recent role as a 
destination for asylum seekers (applicants for refugee 
status or other subsidiary protection) and situate 
Ireland within the context of European moves towards 
a so-called ‘harmonized system’ of asylum policy 
following the Hague Programme, adopted by the 
European Council in November of 2004. I will discuss 
the definition of a ‘refugee’ arising from the Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 
– which has been retained unchanged – as well as the 
role of NGOs, with special focus on (mental) health 
service providers for survivors of torture and violence. 
!e approach taken in this paper follows 
Liisa Malkki’s (1995) critical understanding of the 
international refugee regime and Michel Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality, which has been influential 
in understanding the refugee regime. I examine the 
practices aimed at standardizing the criteria that 
underpin concepts like ‘well founded fear’ and the 
‘genuine-ness’ of asylum seekers (see Nyers 2006) 
through a ‘moral economy of care’ (Watters 2007). 
!ese constructs – together with the emergence of 
‘trauma’ as nosological category and its inclusion into 
the classification of diseases, in particular the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (American 
Psychiatric Association 1980) (Young 1995; Fassin 
and d’Halluin 2007) – led to the reconfiguration and 
appearance of a new knowable object, the ‘traumatized 
refugee’. !e implications for access to asylum resulting 
from this category shall be a substantial element of the 
discussion in this article.
!e term ‘asylum’ derives from the Greek 
ásylon and asylos, which means ‘secure’ and refers to a 
refuge, a sanctuary, an inviolable place of protection. 
‘Access’, on the other hand, stands for ‘a way or means 
of approach’, an entrance, a channel or doorway. Today, 
in the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1992, 1995), 
it is the state that acts in the role of protector through 
international law and through the principle of non-
refoulement, according to which ‘[n]o Contracting State 
shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion’.1 In order to understand 
the doorways of contemporary shelters and since not 
all ‘asylum seekers’ are granted ‘refugee status’, I will 
therefore turn to Foucault who discussed the state as a 
particular form of governmentality, that is 
[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analysis and reflections, calculations, and tactics that 
allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, 
and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument. (2007: 108)
Ireland and the EU
#e European Union Policy towards a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) states, that ‘[s]ince the beginning 
of [the] 1990s, the &ow of persons seeking international 
protection in the EU has been such that the Member 
States have decided to find common solutions to this 
challenge’ (emphasis added). !is can be seen as one of 
the contemporary backgrounds against which migration 
studies scholars such as Peter Nyers argue that ‘Refugees 
and their movements regularly emerge as a “problem” 
to world order. To those whose principal concern is the 
maintenance and security of this order, any situation 
that is constructed as a problem – or worse yet, a crisis 
or an emergency … [that] warrants immediate action’ 
(2006: 1).  A communitarized European approach 
to asylum has been outlined through the Amsterdam 
Treaty (EC 1999) and the Hague Programme (2004)2 
which envisaged the ‘construction of Europe’ as a 
#rough a case study on asylum procedures in Ireland, this paper discusses the intersection of medical and psychological 
knowledge production on ‘trauma’ with an increasingly restrictive management of migration in the EU. I will examine 
practices aimed at standardizing the criteria that underpin concepts like ‘well founded fear’ and the ‘truthfulness’ of 
‘genuine’ asylum applicants and argue that in recent years the ‘traumatized refugee’ has emerged as a new knowable object. 
#e theoretical perspective of this paper draws on a critical understanding of the international refugee regime (Malkki 
1995) and on studies of governmentality (Foucault 2007) which address the intersections of knowledge, power and the 
control of populations.
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space of ‘freedom, justice and security’ with the goal of 
securing free movement within the EU. !is legitimized 
shifting the control towards the external borders of 
the EU. While the onus is on the individual asylum 
seeker to show evidence of his/her well-founded fear of 
persecution, asylum has thus emerged in recent years as 
particular aspect of European migration management. 
States are not only increasingly hostile to asylum seekers 
(see UNHCR 2006) but also disavow any geo-political 
connections to international conflicts and internal 
political pressures that give rise to refugee flows.
Ireland ratified the Geneva Convention 
(1951) in 1956 and the Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1967) in 1968, but only in 1996 – after 
asylum applications rose from 49 in 1988 to 600 in 
1996 – were they transposed into domestic legislation 
with the Refugee Act, 1996. !is was subsequently 
amended by the Immigration Act, 1999, the Illegal 
Immigrants (Tra%cking) Act, 2000, and Immigration 
Act, 2003. From 1996 to the actual implementation 
of the Refugee Act in November 2000 the number of 
asylum applications rose sharply, and it has been argued 
that the two amendments restricted the initial refugee 
act.
As the numbers of asylum seekers arriving in Ireland 
increased, the political will to safeguard the right of 
asylum diminished. In the tension between a rights-
based refugee regime and a control-based immigration 
policy, the desire for security and control won out 
(Byrne 2000: 149). Ireland, which had previously 
been a destination for programme refugees (resettled 
following governmental agreements),3 introduced an 
annual quota for resettlement refugees in 1998, for 
priority groups such as victims of torture, persons with 
medical needs, women at risk and the elderly. 
!e refugee as knowable object
According to the UNHCR’s 2007 Global Trends report 
(2008a) the majority of refugees today are hosted by 
their neighbouring countries, since over 80% remain 
within their region of origin or are ‘internally displaced’ 
within their own country. Europe participates in the 
international ‘burden sharing’ by hosting 14% of the 
world’s refugees.4 !e UNHCR as key UN body, 
but also international law and international studies, 
NGO publications, developmental studies and literary 
studies have shaped through their documentation and 
classifications the ways in which refugees are nowadays 
depicted, conceptualized and ‘known’ within a 
humanitarian and a-political framework. Malkki 
argues that the ‘international refugee regime’ ‘produces 
the social, political and legal constructions that we now 
recognize as refugeeness’ (1995: 505–6). 
On the European level, through the 
development of the CEAS, the European Commission 
has established legal instruments5 and provided through 
the European Refugee Fund (ERF) financial support to 
member states. !e ERF has also been funding extended 
inter-European research projects, thus contributing 
to the knowledge production and construction of 
‘refugeeness’. Herein, I will refer in particular to one 
project: Traumatized Refugees in the EU – Analysis of 
Institutional Developments, Identi'cation of Protection 
Systems, Best Practices and Recommendations (European 
Refugee Fund 2006).6 
NGOs and mental health services for asylum 
seekers in the EU
One of the EU Directives in relation to ‘shared 
minimum standards of health, welfare and reception 
of asylum seekers’, calls upon Member States to 
guarantee treatment possibilities for persons who have 
been subjected to torture, rape or other acts of violence 
(Ireland, however, did not opt in to the relevant Council 
Directive 2003/9/EC). In practice, however, ‘there 
is no harmonized picture and no harmonized policy 
regarding torture victims seeking asylum’ in the EU 
(Sydhoff 2006). In most countries, to follow Watters 
(2007: 198), this deficiency is made up for by NGOs 
or the Red Cross. 
Such organizations were mainly involved in 
the EU project on ‘Traumatized Refugees in the EU’ 
(European Refugee Fund 2006), which concentrated 
on the legal frameworks governing the treatment and 
care of traumatized refugees, the impact of asylum 
determination procedures on them and the way in which 
statutory and voluntary agencies provide care and social 
assistance to trauma sufferers in the refugee population. 
A conflicting issue which emerged and which was also 
highlighted by Elise Bittenbinder, founding member of 
the European Network of Rehabilitation Centres for 
Survivors of Torture, is the relationship between NGOs 
and governments in regard to medical or psychological 
reports. !ese documents, requested by solicitors in 
order to be included as documentation in the asylum 
application of their clients, are written by health 
professionals who assess the physical and psychological 
state of the applicant and then report their assessment 
as to whether the body and the psyche are ‘consistent’ 
with the story the person tells. Such assessments can 
be seen as part of, to again quote Watters (2007: 395), 
a ‘moral economy of care’, by reflecting the wider 
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illegitimate, deserving or undeserving – the legitimate 
being the ‘genuine’, ‘authentic’ refugee deserving 
protection. !e Hague Protocol suggests that the legal 
instruments on asylum established for the CEAS 
lay the foundations for a Common European Asylum 
System, on which could be built further structures to 
safeguard the EU as a single asylum space and ensure 
that our citizens could have confidence in a system 
that gave protection to those who required it and dealt 
fairly and e%ciently with those without protection 
requirements. (http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
asylum/fsj_asylum_intro_en.htm [emphasis added]).
!e diagnosis of health is therefore undertaken 
in a politically charged environment. In order to 
understand the meaning medico-legal certificates may 
hold in contemporary asylum practice, the relationship 
between the category of ‘refugee’ and that of ‘trauma’, as 
well as their respective meanings, have to be discussed 
and the consequences of this relationship for access to 
asylum investigated. 
!e traumatized refugee, fearful subjectivity 
and objective control
Since it is beyond the limits of this article to discuss the 
genealogy of the categories of ‘refugee’ and of ‘trauma’ 
in Western discourse, I will begin by introducing 
the main arguments developed by Liisa Malkki in 
regard to the former and by Allan Young in regard to 
the latter category. By adopting their constructivist 
understanding of socially-produced and historically-
situated categories – which therefore are no less real in 
social and personal lived experience – I will argue that 
the contemporary conceptualization of the ‘traumatized 
refugee’ constitutes another ‘historical moment of 
reconfiguration’ (Malkki 1995: 497) and appearance 
of ‘new object’, which contributes to the construction 
and production of a particular form of subjectivity. 
My focus, then, is especially on the role that medical 
knowledge and institutions play in the administration 
of asylum applications through their privileged access 
to this new object. 
With the Geneva Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, 1951, and the creation of the UNHCR 
in 1950, the modern post-war refugee emerges as 
‘knowable, nameable figure and object of social scientific 
knowledge’ (Malkki 1995: 498). ‘Refugee’ is a legal 
classification that encloses a huge variety of different 
experiences and was ‘normatively’ established after 
World War II, even though both movements of people 
and war have much longer histories. Its representation 
shifted from military problem to international social 
and humanitarian problem, ultimately through the 
1967 Protocol of the Geneva Convention (ibid.: 
510), which widened the classification that previously 
included only pre-1951 displacement within Europe 
to international phenomena of displacement with 
specific characteristics. Similarly, the term ‘trauma’ 
should not be a-historically naturalized: ‘trauma’ has 
had a long migration from its meaning up to the end 
of the nineteenth century, when it referred exclusively 
to physical injuries, to its present admission into the 
‘universal’ territory of psychiatric entities, through its 
introduction as ‘post-traumatic-stress-disorder’ (PTSD) 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 1980).7 
Nyers (2006) asks: is the 1951 definition of 
the ‘refugee’ still appropriate? !ere, a ‘refugee’ is a 
person, who 
owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality but being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing such fear, is unwilling to return to it 
[emphasis added]. 
!is established the ‘authentic refugee’ as fearful human 
subjectivity, represented as a speechless, placeless, 
invisible victim, belonging, as universal identity, to the 
moral community of humanity because of abandoning 
the ‘protection’ of his/her country – in contrast to 
the ‘citizen’, who belongs through his/her particular 
identity to a political community of co-nationals. !e 
UNHCR also drafted a Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status in which one 
reads: 
To the element of fear - a state of mind and a subjective 
condition - is added the qualification ‘well founded’. 
!is implies that it is not only the frame of mind of a 
person concerned that determines his refugee status, 
but that this frame of mind must be supported by an 
objective situation ([emphasis added] UNHCR 1979: 
Art. 38).
While psychologically an individual might react 
differently to ‘objective’ situations, following the 
indications by the Handbook, it is institutional authority 
that defines whether the applicant’s fear of persecution 
is reasonable. As Malkki points out:
!e truth of ‘suffering strangers’ as a categorical subject 
is not doubted, it is even sacralized. In contrast, the 
particularity of a single person’s ‘stories’ and ‘claims’ is 
suspect … has to be examined by experts for her story 
to be accepted as factually true (2007: 337).
!e Truth [hidden in the body and the psyche] tends 
to require the intervention of expertise to be rendered 
visible and legible and actionable, whether in therapy, 
courtroom or immigration office (2007: 339).
Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Halluin (2007) in their 
study on Asylum Politics and NGOs in France noted 
that in contemporary France – as in other countries 
across Europe – two historical processes converged: 
on the side of the ‘refugee category’ the decline in the 
legitimacy of asylum and the request for evidence to 
establish the reality of persecution, on the other side 
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the emergence of ‘trauma’ as nosological category. 
!e result is the emergence of new protocols of 
bureaucratic and juridical regulation in which the test 
to which asylum seekers have to submit to establish 
that they are ‘true’ victims of repression must 
correspond to the category of trauma formalized 
as PTSD, a recognized category in psychiatry. (Das 
2007: 331) 
It is here that the figure of the ‘traumatized refugee’ 
emerges. 
Although the symptoms of PTSD do not differ 
from those of other anxiety and depression syndromes, 
the unity of this disorder is ‘achieved’ (Young 1995) 
through the establishment of a particular temporal-
causal relationship, whereby its hidden typical feature 
– the etiological (traumatic) event – accounts for the 
subsequent development of symptoms. In clinical 
practice, according to Young, the symptoms become 
the tokens for the event; in the context of medical 
assessments for legal documentation this means that 
the diagnosis of PTSD becomes proof of the event 
and explains ‘inconsistencies’, as well as establishing 
a clinical condition eventually deserving subsidiary 
protection.
!e practical consequences of such defined 
subjectivity emerging from this convergence will be 
investigated though a concrete example. 
Case study: Ireland and mental health 
service for asylum seekers
In Ireland refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to 
access to local General Health Practitioners (GPs) in 
common with Irish citizens, but initially GPs did not 
receive any extra training (Faughnan et al. 2002). A 
special service for survivors of violence and torture exists 
since 2001, following discussions in parliament (Dáil 
Éireann)8 and two studies on public health and asylum 
seekers (Begley 1998; Begley et al. 1999). !e author 
was founding member (1999) of the humanitarian 
NGO called SPIRASI, which among other activities 
houses the Centre for the Care of Survivors of Torture 
(CCST).9 !e Centre is a member of the International 
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) 
and besides counselling, provides various forms of 
therapy, psycho-social outreach support, and medico-
legal reports.10 Over the last two years SPIRASI has 
been working together with the Office of the Refugee 
Applications Commissioner (ORAC), the Refugee 
Appeals Tribunal (RAT), and the Refugee Legal 
Services in the development of a Framework Document 
for the Production, Interpretation and Use of Medico-legal 
Reports in Determining Refugee Status, based on the 
Istanbul Protocol.11
Refugee protection falls at the intersection 
of international human rights and domestic law, and 
it has been argued that there is a lack of evidentiary 
principles established by international refugee law in 
regard to the credibility assessment of oral testimony 
and documentary evidence in the asylum procedure 
(Byrne 2007). !ere are two noteworthy Irish-
authored reports (Almirall and Lawton 2000; Mullally 
2001), written in collaboration with the Irish Refugee 
Council (IRC) (although prior to the establishment 
of the CCST and the elaboration of the Framework 
Document), that note that domestic law – the Refugee 
Act, 1996 – does not make any provision for standards 
of proof or credibility, and that assessors ‘are applying 
a “well-founded fear” test’ with an ‘unreasonably high’ 
standard of proof (Mullally 2001: 87). Contemporary 
responses of the Irish NGO sector to the proposed 
Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill also express 
concern, since the bill does not introduce the missing 
guidelines for the assessment or the publication of 
decisions. !e determinations quoted in the study of 
Mullally can be seen as examples that show the mistrust 
for the applicants’ testimony. It leads, as we shall see 
below, to the replacement of the word of the asylum 
applicant with that of an expert through ‘objective 
supportive’ material. She quotes two judgments:
!is applicant has failed to establish evidence of 
persecution that is well-founded and is therefore 
manifestly unfounded under paragraphs 14 (a) and 
(c) of the procedures. 
On the basis of the above analysis, in particular the 
absence of any independently-sourced supporting 
material, I regard the applicant’s stated fear of 
persecution as not being well-founded in all respects 
([emphasis in the original] 2001: 87).
In Ireland, as with other Member States, a high 
percentage of applications for asylum are rejected 
on the basis of credibility due to inconsistencies and 
ostensibly lack of evidence. It is within this ‘culture of 
disbelief ’ – as Mullally argued in the case of Ireland 
(2001: 90) – and rising suspicion towards the world 
of the asylum seeker that the deployment of medico-
legal reports has to be contextualized: they constitute 
a particular form of evidence and ‘proof ’ and provide 
the case with ‘objective evidence’. !e ‘true’ asylum 
seeker is produced as a particularly defined subjectivity 
and needs to conform to the criteria established for its 
identification and the mechanisms of identification 
– criteria which are not value free and indeed reflect 
particular cultural and historical epistemologies. 
[T]he importance of the true confession does not 
reside in its being a correct and certain report of 
process. It resides rather in the special consequences 
which can be drawn from a confession whose truth 
is guaranteed by the special criteria of truthfulness 
([emphasis added] Wittgenstein 1997: 222e). 
It is from the angle taken by Wittgenstein that the 
following quotations from a study titled Asylum in 
Ireland: A Report on the Fairness and Sustainability of 
Asylum Determinations at First Instance (Almirall and 
Lawton 2000) should be read. It reports a case where 
the applicant was judged to have failed to establish 
evidence of persecution that is ‘well-founded’, because 
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a) he had “no marks or scars to show following his 
alleged beatings” ([emphasis added] 2000: 82).
Also:
b) If the shooting took place as alleged then the 
applicant would clearly have been traumatized, 
requiring medical attention. In this situation medical 
confirmation evidence should be readily available 
([emphasis added] ibid.).
c) If he was wanted so badly and in custody for 
almost a week, it is hard to believe that he was not 
identified at this stage but instead allowed out on 
community work. He was only arrested that one 
time and he stated that the police beat him but he 
didn’t visit a medical centre afterwards (2000: 61).
d) ‘!e applicant’s “persecution and torture” 
experience relates to one incident only, as described 
in his questionnaire and at interview. In this respect 
he had advanced no objective sources of information 
to support his case. He has no permanent injuries 
nor was he ever hospitalized as an outcome of his 
alleged torture (ibid.).
!ese judgments show that it is (a) the body and (b) the 
mind of the applicant that are questioned to testify and 
give evidence through physical or psychological scars 
and also that the assessment is framed by presumptions 
in regard to the reality of the applicant’s home country 
(c and d). Scars are supposed to bear witness and be true 
confession to the persecution and fear of the individual, 
and scientific-based knowledge criteria and disciplinary 
apparatuses are employed for the establishment of their 
truthfulness. !e above-quoted rejections postulate 
a causal relationship between traumatic event ? 
fear ? traumatized subject, and establish the ‘fearful 
subjectivity’ (Nyers 2006) of the genuinely true asylum 
seeker as a ‘traumatized’ subjectivity under medical 
attention. I do not mean to underestimate the effect 
of violence on the health of survivors, but intend to 
point out the following: similarly to Malkki’s critique 
related to the a-political and a-historical approach of 
the ‘international refugee regime’, so too, by locating 
the evidence of persecution and fear not in the mental 
memory expressed through the narration of the 
applicant, but in his/her bodily memory (Young 1996) 
– accessed by medical professionals – the experience is 
stripped of its historical, social and political context, 
as well as causes. !is is reflected in the contemporary 
understanding of ‘trauma’, held in the epistemological 
traditions of medicine and psychodynamic psychiatry 
respectively, as neurophysiologic or intra-psychic 
processes, which are both linked to a particular concept 
of the individual unitary self (Kirmayer 2007, Young 
1995).
!e quoted study examined 100 cases, in eight 
of which the lack of medical evidence was named – not as 
ground for rejection – but as significant fact to decrease 
credibility when ‘allegedly’ injuries were sustained. 
!ey also stated that, in their sample, five examined 
cases had supplied medical evidence; while in four 
there was an explicit reference to it, in one of the four 
the supplied medical evidence was challenged by the 
judge. Notably, all cases – including those three where 
the medical evidence was ‘simply acknowledged’, as the 
report states – got refused in the first instance. Mullally 
indeed reports a case where the medical report attesting 
to scars on the applicant’s body held evidentiary weight 
in the positive determination outcome (2001: 205). 
!ese findings conform with the few studies 
undertaken on this topic in other countries, such as 
Canada (Rousseau 2002, Kirmayer 2007) or the U.K. 
(Good 2004), which state that there is no clear picture 
with regard to the evidentiary weight of expert reports 
(medical certificates or country expert reports) although 
the request and production of medical certificates is 
rising in numbers. !eir use in the administrative and 
legal decision-making process is not formally indicated 
(Rousseau 2002) and there are also conflicting versions 
of what constitutes ‘objective evidence’ and different 
expectations towards the style and content of medical-
legal reports (Good 2004). Marked inconsistencies in 
approach even among the tribunal chairs were noted. 
An issue of sharp critique by the courts related to the 
situation when a physician would voice an opinion 
about the ‘credibility’ of an asylum seeker: for the 
courts it is only their responsibility to decide on the 
overall credibility of an applicant. However, physicians 
would argue that a judgment on credibility also emerges 
during their medical assessment aimed at establishing 
the ‘consistency’ between physical/mental scars and 
the story of a person. !e divide of medical expertise 
on the one hand, and juridical authority on the other, 
emerged thus as a conflicting issue (ibid.). In the Irish 
context, the Framework Document for the Production, 
Interpretation and Use of Medico-legal Reports in 
Determining Refugee Status constitutes a unique 
although not legally binding agreement and it remains 
to investigate how the standardized terminology of the 
degree of ‘consistency’ carries different meanings in the 
medical assessment and juridical judgment. 
Concluding remarks
!e effort made to establish norms that would 
guarantee refugee status due to ‘fear of persecution’ 
through ‘expert witnesses’ and standardized assessments 
politicizes the non-governmental service providers. It 
might put into conflict the role of the medical staff 
between rehabilitation and documentation or alter the 
doctor-client relationship, as research in other countries 
has suggested (Haagensen 2007; Mandel and Worm 
2007). But, above all, it does not actually challenge the 
‘national order of things’, the a-historical and a-political 
‘refugee-representation’ and some basic assumptions 
in reference to ‘fear’ and the ‘moral economy of care’. 
!e present model might include individuals who 
experienced torture (although certainly not all forms of 
torture do leave identifiable traces), but this criterion 
excludes, a priori, private violence experiences and does 
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not recognize the phenomenology of fear itself. One 
is dealing not only with the individual experience of 
a torture victim/survivor, but with its effect of fear, 
mistrust or insecurity spread through the broader 
community (see Green 1994, Daniel and Knudsen 
1995, Sluka 2000). States are not ‘naturally protective’ 
as presumed by the Convention, but also agents of 
violence, directly or indirectly. 
Focusing on physical violence/persecution and 
political-civic rights leaves behind a broader concern 
for socio-economic human rights and structural 
violence and becomes problematic when considering 
the UNHCR statement that ‘displacement in the 21st 
Century’ requests a ‘new paradigm’, because ‘people 
do not just flee persecution and war but also injustice, 
exclusion, environmental pressures, competition 
for scarce resources and all the miserable human 
consequences of dysfunctional states’ (http://www.
unhcr.org/events/4860b4272.html). It is important 
to investigate the consequences that contemporary 
moves in EU ‘harmonization’ of asylum procedure 
have in regard to this. In this perspective the African 
(1968) and Latin American (1984) modifications of 
the Convention definition seem more realistic and 
their criteria for guaranteeing refugee status include 
man-made disaster, generalized violence, foreign 
aggression, internal conflicts, and massive violations 
of human rights (Nyers 2006: 143). !is is reflected 
also in the way the concept ‘trauma’ is understood 
differently, which has been pointed out at the 
concluding conference of the project on ‘Traumatized 
Refugees in the EU’12: while the interpretation of 
‘trauma’ as psychiatric category or psychodynamic 
process locate it within the individual, many African 
or Latin American scholars tend to highlight the 
social and political context. ‘Traumatization’ – and its 
cure – are then not individual but a broader process 
of society. State sovereignty over a territory and the 
understanding of individuals as subjects of rights and 
as objects of discipline are central for understanding the 
refugee system. However, in his 1977–78 lectures on 
Security, Territory, Population Foucault individuated the 
‘problem of circulation’ (2007: 64) and ideology of the 
freedom of circulation – both of people and things – as 
essential historical moment in the genealogy of what he 
refers to as governmentality: a form of power – of bio-
power – which emerged in the eighteenth century and 
operates through regulation, management and control 
of individuals and populations. !e apparatuses of 
security (concerned with the security of population) 
have not substituted an individual application of law 
and discipline, but use them in order to regulate and 
control reality (not to prohibit or prescribe it) (2007: 
47). !e production of medico-legal reports – although 
their actual weight in the evidentiary assessment is 
unclear – can be understood as a particular practice of 
knowledge production employed in the administration 
of ‘individualized’ population. !e problem is still 
posed as that of ‘allowing circulations to take place, 
of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad 
…’ (2007: 65): of establishing and producing the 
legitimate and illegitimate, the authentic and the 
fake. Hospitality being framed between humanitarian 
ideology and pragmatic politics, the inclusion/exclusion 
of populations is controlled through the application 
of specific knowledge and truth criteria in the name 
of protection and security, less for the refugee, than for 
fortress Europe. 
Notes
1 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 
of the Convention against Torture (CAT) state that 
‘No state shall expel, return, or extradite a person to 
another state where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.’
2 !e Amsterdam Treaty resulted in the amendment of 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU Title I, Art. 
2) as well as in the inclusion of a new title into the 
Treaty of the European Communities (TEC) which 
addresses the development of a communitarized first 
pillar policy related to ‘visas, asylum, immigration and 
other policies related to free movement of persons’. 
Ireland, not signatory of the Schengen Agreement, has 
reserved its right to ‘opt-in’ on particular policies.
3 !e following were brought as resettlement refugees 
to Ireland:  350 persons from Hungary (1956), 120 
from Chile (1973), 803 from Vietnam (1979–2000), 
26 from Iran (1985), 1,341 from Bosnia (1992–2000), 
1063 from Kosovo (1999–2000) – and recently 
refugees from Burma (2007) and Sudan (2008). At 
the institutional level, only in 1992 was the Refugee 
Agency established under the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, responsible for the admission, reception, and 
resettlement of convention refugees (by working with 
the State as well as with local communities); this was 
replaced in 2001 by the Reception and Integration 
Agency (RIA) under the Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform.
4 !e most popular destinations for the 548,000 new 
asylum applications registered in 2007 worldwide 
are the United States (9.3%), South Africa (8.3%) 
and Sweden (6.6%), the former two also holding the 
highest number of pending cases (UNHCR 2008a). 
Of the 338,000 applications made in ‘industrialized 
countries’, the member states of the European Union 
received 222,900 (66%), the year 2007 showing for the 
first time a rise in numbers, after a five-year period of 
decline (UNHCR 2008b).
5 !e Reception Conditions Directive, the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, the Qualification Directive and 
the Dublin Regulation.
6 Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
participated in this project. See also Watters et al. 
(2002–03) Good Practices in Mental Health and Social 
Care for Asylum Seekers and Refugees.
7 !e DSM is published by the American Psychiatric 
Association and provides diagnostic criteria for mental 
disorders. !e current edition in use is the reviewed 
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DSM IV (DSM-IV-TR 2000).
8 see Dáil Éireann – Volume 476 (25 March, 1997); 
Dáil Éireann – Volume 473 (22 January 1997); Dáil 
Éireann – Volume 486 (29 January 1998).
9 ‘SPIRASI is a humanitarian, intercultural, non-
governmental organization that works with asylum 
seekers, refugees and other disadvantaged migrant 
groups, with special concern for survivors of torture’ 
(www.spirasi.ie). In 1999 SPIRASI started as a ‘Centre 
for the Education and the Integration of Migrants’ 
(CÉIM), providing language, computer training and 
promoting public awareness. Since 2002 it has a team 
that provides health information to reception centres 
and has undertaken also various artistic projects with 
the clients.
10 In 2006 the CCST had 377 new registrations and 
provided 113 medico-legal reports (Begley, 2007: 3–4). 
!e new registrations are about 10% of the annual 
asylum applicants; in 2006 ORAC received 4,314 
asylum applications and finalized 4,784 cases; among 
those 397 were granted refugee status.
11 !e Istanbul Protocol is a ‘Manual on the Effective 
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’ and was drafted in 1999 by 75 experts in 
law, health and human rights from 40 organizations. 
It was adopted by the UN in 2000, but is not 
internationally legally binding. It states that interviews 
can be made for judicial or medical purposes as well 
as for documentation; however, ‘the broad purpose of 
investigation is to establish the facts related to alleged 
incidents of torture’. !e main applications of the 
Protocol are the identification of perpetrators, bringing 
them to justice; support of political asylum applications; 
establishment of conditions for obtainment of false 
confessions by the state; regional practices of torture; 
medical evaluation used to identify therapeutic 
needs of survivors and as testimony in human right 
investigations. !e Protocol has been promoted by the 
IRCT: www.irct.org. (14/01/2008) and its application 
in the asylum procedure has been recently discussed 
(R. Bruin et al. 2006).
12. Trauma, according to Elise Bittenbinder in the opening 
presentation in Florence 2006, implies difficulties in its 
definition. It can be interpreted as medical concept like 
the nosological category PTSD in psychiatry, but also as 
psychodynamic process or as a socio-political process. 
While the difference between the first two definitions 
– and I refer to Young’s writings – lie in the fact that 
for the former ‘a symptom is meaningful because it is 
juxtaposed with other symptoms in stable formations 
(syndromes). In psychodynamic discourse, on the 
other hand, symptoms are polymorphic expressions 
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 ‘Diversity’ in the Balkans, and the ‘Balkan 
Paradox’
Over the past two decades the ‘Balkans’ have not only 
been the site of horrific conflicts, which resulted in the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, but also the site of 
various interpretations and attempts to theorize those 
same conflicts through the analysis of local ethnic, 
religious and linguistic ‘diversity’. Following some 
recent elaborations on the ambivalence of the Balkan 
stereotype (e.g. Muršič 2007), I would like to deal 
here with what I would call the ‘Balkan paradox’ – a 
notion referring to the simultaneous existence of two 
patterns or imaginaries regarding the issue of diversity 
in the Balkans (within academia, the media, politics 
and everyday discourses). !e first imaginary builds 
on the vision of the so-called ‘ancient hatreds,’ well 
known from the media reports on the Yugoslav wars 
of 1990s. !e second and opposing imaginary pictures 
the Balkans as a place of harmonious coexistence, inter-
ethnic tolerance and ‘shifting,’ ‘fluid,’ ‘hybrid,’ etc. 
identities (e.g. Duijzings 2000, Jezernik 2004). 
 !e first part of the paradox is a result of a 
historically developed way of imagining the Balkans. 
According to the seminal work of the historian Maria 
Todorova, ‘Balkanism’ – which according to her is the 
pattern of thought through which the ‘West’ imagined 
this region – is a genuine category and not just a variation 
of Orientalism, as elaborated by Edward Said. !e 
Balkans, she argues, unlike the ‘Orient,’ were and are 
being imagined as a concrete historical and geographical 
region, characterized as poor, backward, medieval, 
brutal, heroic, beset by conspiracies, masculine, as a 
crossroads and a bridge, as ‘semi’ (that is semi-civilized, 
semi-colonial, semi-developed), etc. First and foremost, 
and this is Todorova’s core argument, unlike the Orient 
which represents the ‘complete other,’ the Balkans, 
due to its transitional, ‘semi’ or liminal character, are 
rather the ‘incomplete self ’ of the West and of Europe 
(Todorova 2009: 18). As the Slovenian anthropologist 
Božidar Jezernik puts it: 
Western travellers crisscrossed the Balkans in every 
direction; a lot of them actually did not see it for 
itself. !e land and its people merely served as a kind 
of mirror in which they saw themselves and noticed, 
first and foremost, how advanced and civilized they 
were. In this respect, we can argue that there can be 
no Europe without the Balkans. (2007: 14)
!e Balkanist discourse has lent itself to a new term 
in academic and everyday language: ‘Balkanization’. 
Originally coined after the WWI to describe the 
fragmentation following the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire2 and redeployed to speak of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, ‘Balkanization’ refers to, according 
to Todorova, ‘not only … the parcelization of large and 
viable political units, but also had become a synonym 
for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, 
‘Diversity’ in the Balkans: Balkanism, 
Anthropological Approaches to the 
State, and the Political Realities of the 
Contemporary Balkans1
Jelena Tošić
#is article presents some initial thoughts on the controversial issue of ‘diversity’ in the Balkans from an anthropological 
perspective. It begins by discussing the opposing ways of seeing and explaining ‘diversity’ in the Balkans, a pattern I 
term the ‘Balkan Paradox’, and herein I focus on anthropological contributions in this context. Further, I will make 
use of contemporary work on the anthropology of the state, Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality, and Benedict 
Anderson’s thoughts on the census and maps as instruments of power. Finally, I will conclude the article by applying these 
considerations to the case of contemporary Bosnia.
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the barbarian’ (Todorova 1994: 453). 
 ‘Balkanization’, then, acts as something of a 
keyword (to borrow from Raymond Williams) around 
which a semantic cluster of other terms and ideas have 
formed, and also as the nexus in a web of ideas that are 
more or less interconnected: ‘Balkanization’ denotes the 
welling up of ‘ancient hatreds’ or the metaphor of the 
‘gunpowder barrel’ (Serb. bure baruta, germ. Pulverfass) 
referring both to the war and the succession states 
of former Yugoslavia. In short, the conflict potential 
which caused the violence of the 1990s is imagined 
as an essential and potentially explosive ingredient 
of the Balkans, which makes further conflicts, that is 
‘explosions,’ possible at any time. 
 But this is only one, although I would say 
dominant, side of constructing the Balkans. !e other 
element of the ‘Balkan paradox’ involves imagining the 
Balkans as a place of self-managing ‘diversity,’ of ‘fluid,’ 
‘hybrid’ and ‘shifting’ identities. !is imaginary is also 
a part of the socialist legacy and may be found in the 
ideology of Yugoslavism, when the state, that is, the 
socialist regime, promoted itself as the space of diversity, 
or, in the preferred language of the time, as a space of 
‘brotherhood and unity’ regardless of ethnicity. 
 !e bottom line of imagining the Balkans as 
a space of diversity and tolerance is the argument that 
the violent conflicts in the Balkans (not only the most 
recent ones) are actually not merely the proof of ‘ancient 
hatreds’; rather, so the argument goes:  they represent the 
culmination of Europeanization/Westernization, that is, 
they result from the imposition of the western nation-
state model onto a genuinely diverse, multicultural or/
and ‘hybrid’ region. !is conclusion is a core element 
of the well-known nationalist and essentialist argument 
that through the imposed processes of ‘Europeanization,’ 
‘Westernization’ and ‘Globalization’ the Balkans are 
loosing their authentic ‘identities’. But beyond this, 
variations of this argument can be found in quite a few 
academic texts. For example Todorova herself – while 
always pointing out the crucial importance of the 
Ottoman legacy of tolerating difference through the 
Millet-system – concludes a discussion of the Yugoslav 
wars of the 1990s thus: 
From this point of view the Balkans were becoming 
European by shedding the last residue of an imperial 
legacy, widely considered an anomaly at that time, 
and by assuming and emulating the homogeneous 
European nation state as the normative form of 
social organization. It may well be that what we are 
witnessing today, wrongly attributed to some Balkans 
essence, is the ultimate Europeanization of the 
Balkans’. (2009: 13)
In a similar way, and after having impressively described 
the cultural history of the Balkans during and after the 
Ottoman rule, the Slovenian anthropologist Božidar 
Jezernik concludes:  
We have seen how vigorously the people of ‘the 
mountainous peninsula’ struggled to progress and how 
splendid were the results of their efforts to Europeanize. 
But in the process the quality that present-day Europe 
proudly claims as its foremost virtue was eliminated: 
tolerance of diversity. Travellers on our Balkan tour 
may in addition notice a curious fact: while the Balkans 
is now making every effort to be part of Europe as it 
once was, Europe now defines itself on the basis of its 
difference from the East, the Balkans included, and 
claims to be what the Balkans used to be for centuries. 
(2007: 20)
 
Anthropological Approaches to ‘Diversity’ 
in the Balkans 
Following Jezernik, one may ask: how have 
anthropologists broadly engaged with the Balkans and 
with the specific issues I have identified as the ‘Balkan 
paradox’? It will come as no surprise that anthropologists 
generally tend to ‘deconstruct’ or de-essentialize the way 
the Balkans have been constructed. !ere have been a 
number of recent anthropological contributions along 
these lines, such as, for example, Pamela Ballinger’s 
(2004) work on constructing ‘authentic hybrids’ in 
Istria, Robert Hayden’s (2007) controversial work on 
Bosnia, which recently triggered a debate in Current 
Anthropology, and Jane Cowan’s (2000) work on 
identity and difference in Macedonia. Here, however, 
I draw specific attention to Ger Duijzings’ work on 
multi-ethnicity in Kosovo (Duijzings 2000). 
 !rough his analysis and choice of case 
studies, Duijzings turns against the dominant Balkanist 
theses of ‘ancient hatreds’. He opposes the image of 
static collective identities composed of intrinsically 
antagonistic groups by stressing the complexity, 
ambiguity, and fluidity of identities in Kosovo, which 
formed the basis for common patterns of peaceful 
coexistence in this region. Duijzings does this by 
focusing not just on the two largest (ethnic) groups in 
Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs, but also on ethnic and 
religious groups that have what could be called a ‘hybrid’ 
identity, such as Roma, Goranci, Crypto Catholics or 
Bektashi. In order to investigate these identities in 
Kosovo (as well as in Albania and Macedonia), one 
example he uses are the so-called Goranci. Goranci are 
Muslims who speak a Slavic dialect (Duijzings 2000) 
of which some used to refer to themselves as Turks. It is 
precisely such groups as the Goranci who unsettled the 
Serbian and Albanian nationalist discourse and were 
forced to declare as either Serbs or Albanians. !at 
is to say, the nation-state did not tolerate ambiguous 
identities. 
 Much can be learned about the ways in which 
nation-states manage identity by returning to Benedict 
Anderson’s well-known argument that nation-state and 
imperial modes of government in fact share a certain 
grammar. Discussing the rise and fall of colonial 
governmentality in South East Asia, Anderson noted 
how the management of the colonial world necessarily 
involved imposing unambiguous, clearly ‘territorialized’ 
and ‘historicized’ identities through such instruments 
as the census, the map and the museum. !ese are 
understood by Anderson as specific institutions of 
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power that were crucial to the formation of national 
consciousness and, later, nation-state rule (Anderson 
1991: 163-185). I will return to these arguments when 
discussing the case of contemporary Bosnia.    
 Considering ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’ in Kosovo 
and the Balkans in general Duijzings argues: 
People often changed their ethnic identity or converted 
to another religion without completely abandoning and 
forgetting the legacy of previous identities. Because of 
these historical experiences of conversion and ‘mimicry’ 
(the outward adoption of an identity for the sake of 
survival), and the consciousness of mixed and composite 
origins, there is often a high awareness of Balkan 
inhabitants that most identities should not be taken for 
granted: they are often regarded as ‘guises’ or ‘constructs’ 
that may be accepted or rejected (2000: 15).
 
In stark contrast, Hayden’s controversial work on 
contemporary Bosnia is based on the claim that 
anthropologists (and other academics) as well as officials 
did quite the contrary: they constructed the image 
of Bosnia marked by a tradition of tolerance toward 
diversity. !e crucial point of Hayden’s argument is that 
Bosnia’s citizens reject this image. Hayden concludes 
his text on war-torn and post-war Bosnia as follows: 
In Bosnia, I argue, well-meaning outsiders have tried to 
impose their own view of community on peoples who 
reject it. Indeed, the whole enterprise of the international 
community in post-war Bosnia may be seen as an 
attempt to create a single society in a setting in which a 
large portion of the natives successfully fought a war to 
prevent just that result.’ (2007: 108)
   
!e Anthropology of the State and the  
Management of Diversity 
An important access route for anthropologists 
interested in diversity in the Balkans is that of the 
‘state’. In their introduction to #e Anthropology 
of the State Sharma and Gupta (2006) explore the 
ways anthropology can approach the complex (and 
necessarily interdisciplinary) phenomenon of the state 
in the context of globalization. Rather than seeing the 
state as an ‘a priori conceptual and empirical object,’ 
anthropology is interested in how the state ‘comes into 
being’ in the first place; and, moreover, how it manages 
to ‘successfully represent itself as coherent and singular’ 
(2006: 10) and as the supreme manager of institutions 
and identities. 
 For Sharma and Gupta, anthropological 
discussions of the state must take cognizance of 
processes and forces that transcend the (nation) state 
and include broader issues of how individuals and 
populations are governed and govern themselves.  !ey 
therefore turn to the work of Michel Foucault and 
especially to his work on governmentality (Foucault 
2007). Borrowing from Foucault they argue that the 
state must be seen as ‘… but one node (although at 
times a ‘coordinating’ node) in a horizontal network 
of institutions and individuals through which power is 
exercised, and not the vertically highest institution in 
which power inheres’ (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 25). 
In the course of framing the anthropological approach 
which incorporates both the state and the broader space 
of governmentality as elaborated by Foucault, Sharma 
and Gupta speak about the ‘cultural constitution of 
the state’ which evolves through two spheres: everyday 
practices of state agencies, and representation. In terms 
of everyday practices, the state constitutes itself through 
bureaucratic authority, which itself is constituted 
through mundane and repetitive administrative 
processes where citizens ‘encounter’ ‘the state’ on a 
daily basis—in registry offices, at work, in ministries, 
etc. Apart from constructing and enacting authority 
through everyday practices in this way, the state also 
defines the identity and hence the rights of its citizens. 
In terms of representation, the ‘anthropological lens’ 
can be directed towards symbolic or ritual processes, 
such as the flag, the hymn, commemorations, 
public holidays, etc. !rough everyday practices and 
representations, the state also defines, following Veena 
Das and Deborah Pole (2004), its ‘margins’, which on 
the other hand are constitutive of the state that is, its 
politics of belonging. 
 Against the background of these thoughts 
on anthropology of the state, I will briefly deal with 
the realities of managing diversity in contemporary 
Balkans. My question in this context are: in a region in 
which recent violent conflicts aimed to reduce or even 
eliminate diversity, how do states construct diversity and 
belonging? How and where do people encounter those 
definitions? And how do those definitions influence 
their (everyday) lives, their understanding of identity 
and belonging? In order to deal with these questions I 
will focus in an explorative way on the case of Bosnia.3 
 As is widely known, the former Yugoslav 
republic of Bosnia was a site of violent conflicts from 
1992 to 1995 and thereafter, through the Dayton 
agreement, Bosnia was founded as a tri-national state, 
a state of three so-called ‘constituent people’: the 
Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniaks. Before the war, 
Bosnia was a multi-ethnic Yugoslav republic and it 
was possible to have a ‘Bosnian’ identity, regardless of 
religion. Religion, which in this case corresponds with 
ethnicity, was and is the crucial (some would say the 
only) difference between the aforementioned groups, 
who spoke the same language/dialect, shared territory 
and lived with a high percentage of intermarriages, 
etc. 
 How is Bosnia composed today, after the war, 
and how is it being (hegemonically) represented, and by 
whom? Keeping in mind Benedict Anderson’s work on 
colonial nation-building through specific instruments 
of government such as the census, map and museum, 
it is important to examine the maps of Bosnia (see 
below) which are displayed on the internet site of the 
Office of the High Represenatative.4 !e maps may be 
viewed as an illustration of the unity, respectively the 
interplay, of representing and governing diversity in the 
Bosnian case. On the first map we see Bosnia before the 
war in 1991, which quite clearly visualizes the popular 
metaphor of the ‘Bosnian mosaic’. It is this metaphor/
imaginary of a ‘mosaic’ that has recently been taken up 
and critically examined by anthropologists working in 
the region (see Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2007). 
!e mosaic is a metaphor of diversity par excellence, 
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which constructs the Balkans as a space of tolerance 
and diversity but in so doing obscures the complex 
and multilayered character of diversity in Bosnia. !e 
phantom objectivity of the cartography of ethno-
nationals leaves unexplored other aspects of difference 
such as patterns of urbanization and rurality, gender, 






and Duijzings 2007: 2). At the risk of eliding the 
multifaceted complexities of recent history, it is possible 
to argue that thinking about Bosnia is overshadowed 
by processes which marked Bosnia through and after 
the war wherein various estimates suggest that between 
90,000 and 200,000 persons lost their lives or remain 
missing – a ‘territorialization of ethnicity,’ as the 
political scientist Florian Bieber has it (2006: 3).  
 !us, when we examine the second map, 
which shows Bosnia today, the contrast speaks for itself: 
the ‘mosaic’ is gone. Its complexity and ‘colourfulness’ 
is replaced with an image marked by four clear un-
graded colours and sharp-cut territorial boundaries. 
It describes Bosnia today as composed of two entities: 
Republika Srpska, where most of the Serbs live, and 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly 
inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats living in separated 
cantons.5 !us, through the process of ‘territorialization 
of ethnicity,’ post-Dayton Bosnia seems to represent 
quite the opposite process to deterritorialization (Gupta 
and Ferguson 1992: 9) or the progressive detachment 
of territory and identity that appears to be one of the 
most pronounced features of the present moment of 
globalization. 
 Beyond the maps-as-images, the crucial 
aspect of this territorialization of ethnicity is that we 
are in fact studying maps-as-instruments by which 
diversity is managed. !e process is one of controlling 
diversity by and ‘arranging’ it territorially, ‘fixing’ 
diversity and rendering it as a concrete lived experience 
by transposing the imaginary into the institutional 
processes and governance structures of Bosnia. As 
Florian Bieber explains, significant power was given to 
ethnically homogenous regions (such as municipalities, 
cantons or entities), but at the same time ‘light’ power-
sharing arrangements were established to promote 
minimalist joint institutions (2006: 4). Without going 
into the details of this complex case of multi-ethnic 
and multilevel governance, I will just mention that it 
has seven levels, fourteen constitutions and more than 
one hundred ministries. 
 !ese governance structures were installed by 
the ‘democratic West,’ which leads us automatically 
to the well-known liberal critical conclusion and, in a 
way, the second paradox I mention in this article. In 
order to stop the conflict and prevent future conflicts 
in Bosnia the International Community created a state 
based on the very same principles that marked the war 
– the ‘ethno- territorial’ principle.
 How might we approach this complex and 
contradictory case of managing diversity from an 
anthropological perspective? Let us recall the levels of 
inquiry proposed by contemporary anthropological 
approaches to the state: the call for attention to everyday 
practices, representations and margins. At least one 
aspect of the always-emergent, and state-constituting, 
‘everyday practices’ of Bosnian governance is the 
requirement to ‘declare’ one’s identity. !is has very ‘real’ 
consequences in Bosnia. Unless one can declare oneself 
to belong to one of the three constitutive peoples, one 
cannot for example realize all of the rights guaranteed 
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in democratic states. In this context, it is important to 
keep in mind that the ‘constitution’ defines Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as the state of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, 
‘Others’ (with capital ‘O’) and ‘citizens’. !e category 
‘Bosnian,’ for example, where someone could identify 
as a citizen of a multi-ethnic state, a historical region 
or express his or her Yugo-nostalgia, simply does not 
exist.
 One right which is confined to constituent 
peoples only is candidacy in political institutions such 
as the office of President. In the famous ‘Finci case’, 
before the European Court for Human Rights, Jacob 
Finci, the Chair of the Bosnian Jewish Community, 
brought a case against Bosnia because he was not 
allowed to run as a candidate for President due to the 
fact that his declared Jewish identity does not conform 
to the governmental imaginary of the three constituent 
peoples.6
 Apart from this case, which could have 
far reaching consequences for the state of Bosnia 
and its constitution, another example ‘drawn from 
everyday life’ is the issue of public holidays. While it 
does not immediately suggest itself, the practice of 
regulating holidays can justifiably be seen as an aspect 
of governmentality because it involves a process of 
managing the ‘conduct of people’s conduct,’ what 
may be considered to be ‘public’ or ‘private’, ‘work’ or 
‘leisure’, even to the level of regulating space and time 
(Foucault 2007: 245). As Nataša Bošković concludes 
in her discussion of socio-economic and cultural rights 
in Bosnia, discrimination begins at the point where 
someone has to declare their religious identity – taking 
for granted that they have one in first place – in order to 
have the right to a holiday and the consequent two-days 
of absence from work (Bošković 2009: 11). A crucial 
inconsistency in this context is that religious holidays 
in one part of a tri-national state (the Federation) 
are not designated as public holidays at all. So what 
statement does ‘the state’ make to its citizens? It is not 
simply a statement on a divided society, where one 
has to belong to certain categories in order to be able 
to realize one’s rights; rather, it turns on the ethnic/
religious principle and yet the institutionalization of 
this principle is inconsistent. If all religious holidays 
would be public holidays for all citizens regardless of 
religious affiliation, recognition of diversity would be 
at least partly given. Nataša Bošković concludes in this 
regard:
!e absence of a formal recognition of religious holidays 
as public implies a series of problems that ultimately 
lead to the breach of economic, social and cultural 
rights. !e way in which religious holidays are regulated 
by the law produces inequalities and discrimination.’ 
(Bošković 2009: 13)
It is especially significant that in Bosnia the ‘democratic 
West’ built a ‘state’ in which, to follow Veena Das and 
Deborah Pole (2004), rights are constrained at the 
‘margins’ and there we encounter not just ‘Other’ 
collective identities but also the citizen. Little wonder 
that the local slang in Sarajevo makes use of the inherent 
ambiguity, a recognition of oppression and a refusal 
of governance through reification of ethnic/religious 
group as the material of language: namely what one can 
be in Bosnia today is best described as being a ‘shitizen’. 
Although one will automatically laugh upon hearing 
this expression it actually has a very serious content: 
it expresses the self-irony of a people who survived the 
war, chose a non-collective identity in a democratic state 
designed by the West and are ironically marginalized 
for being ‘just’ citizens.  
Conclusion 
From the Bosnian constitution to the practices 
surrounding public holidays, much may be gained from 
exploring governmentality beyond a restrictive frame 
of ‘the state’. Of central concern in this article is the 
ways through which diversity is institutionalized as the 
basic principle of the state, but, at the same time, one 
may also witness the selective recognition of difference 
and thus manage diversity through the exclusion of 
‘Others’, both ethnic or religious groups and those 
citizens who do not want to declare themselves within 
a collective identity. !is is not simply a ‘tension 
between ethnic belonging and being a citizen’, rather 
this kind of paradoxical diversity management has a 
direct impact on all aspects of life: employment, leisure, 
political activity, the historical image of diversity which 
is being transmitted to future generations in schools, 
dealing with war crimes committed in the recent past 
and hence reconciliation, etc.  In a way this bears a 
suspicious resemblance to Tito’s diversity policies of 
tabooing and sanctioning ethnicity and nationalism 
in favour of a new Yugoslav identity and at the same 
actually glorifying, ritualizing and institutionalizing 
diversity. One may only think of the ‘torch relay’ where 
a torch symbolizing the unity of Yugoslav peoples 
was carried through every republic until it finally was 
handed over to Tito. However since the present and 
the future of Bosnia (and the Balkans) is marked by 
the transnational process of ‘European Integration’ 
– another model of unity in diversity – it remains 
to explore the ‘ritual,’ ideological, governmental and 
everyday aspects of diversity in the Balkans on this 
different scale.
Notes
1 !is paper is based on a talk given at the Erasmus 
Intensive Programme “Movement 2: World Culture 
and Nation States” within the joint master CREOLE 
(Vienna, 12-23.7 2009). I would like to thank !omas 
Fillitz and Anna Streissler for inviting me to present 
a talk and in particular I would like to thank Mark 
Maguire for his comments and suggestions.
2 Balkanization, 2009. In Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Retrieved November 20, 2009, from Encyclopedia 
Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/50323/Balkanization 
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3 My exploratory discussion of the Bosnian case in this 
paper owes a lot to my friend and colleague Nataša 
Bošković who is dealing with the issue of managing 
cultural diversity in Bosnia from a political science and 
human rights perspective.
4 !e Office of the High Representative (who 
simultaneously is the EU Special Representative) is an 
ad hoc international Institution created through the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) which is responsible 
for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of 
the accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.
asp?content_id=38519).  
5 !ere is also the special case of the so-called Brčko 
district, which is multiethnic and has an autonomous 
local government.
6 Finci brought the case against Bosnia together with 
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Aihwa Ong, 2006. Neoliberalism as 
Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and 
Sovereignty. Durham, London: Duke 
University Press. 292pp. 
!is volume is a continuation of Aihwa Ong’s long-
term preoccupation with the shifting cartographies of 
power, contingency and resistance that accompany the 
era of globalization. With neoliberalism as its terms 
of reference and point of entry, this book presents a 
welcome and timely addition to the contemporary 
discussions of neoliberalism. As a contested term, 
neoliberalism entails different readings by different 
people. Some see neoliberalism as a more aggressive 
form of capitalist imperialism spearheaded by the 
United States; others view it as an umbrella term for 
market-based policies.  Nevertheless, neoliberalism 
is popularly understood as an economic doctrine that 
celebrates the primacy of the market and denounces 
government interventions. Running counter to this 
predominant view, Ong sets out to offer an alternative 
perspective by conceptualizing neoliberalism as a highly 
pliable ‘technology of government’ (p. 3) that can be 
utilized in different ways by different regimes to meet 
specifically calculated goals of optimization. 
 Drawing greatly on the governmentality school 
led by Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose, Ong seeks to 
capture how ‘relationships between governing and the 
governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and 
territoriality’ are reconfigured (p. 3). In contrast to the 
predominant focus on the North American experience 
of neoliberalism, Ong directs her empirical attention to 
the East and South-East Asian region, an area which has 
long been neglected in scholarship on neoliberalism. 
 As a collection of ten essays most of which have 
been published over the past decade, this book covers 
a spectrum of issues ranging from pro-capitalist Islam 
and women’s rights in Malaysia to the mobilization of 
Chinese ethnicity on the Internet, and from China’s 
creation of special market and administrative zones to 
the plight of Filipina and Indonesian domestic workers 
in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, and Singapore’s 
project of becoming a hub of scientific expertise and 
the indentured high-tech servitude in Silicon Valley.
 Ong’s conceptual endeavour is thought-
provoking because she theorizes neoliberalism together 
with the concept of ‘exception’ chiefly informed both 
by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben and formulates 
two analytic domains: ‘neoliberalism as exceptions’ 
and ‘exceptions to neoliberalism,’ where sovereign 
power and regimes of citizenship are articulated and 
disarticulated. According to Ong, ‘neoliberalism as 
exception’ is applied in ‘sites of transformation’ (p. 3) 
where the market figures as the main principle dictating 
the management and administration of resources, 
spaces and populations. A telling example of this is 
presented in Chapter Four titled ‘Zoning Technologies 
in East Asia’ where Ong discusses how state strategies 
are informed by neoliberal logic to actively produce 
conditions of possibility to facilitate cross-border 
networks and enhance global competitiveness (p. 
99). !e state deployment of zoning technologies, 
Ong argues, creates, accommodates and negotiates 
a spectrum of varied governing regimes within the 
broader context of normalized rule. According to 
Ong, the political outcome of zoning strategies is ‘an 
archipelago of enclaves, the sum of which is a form of 
variegated sovereignty’ (p. 103) whereby differentiated 
forms of social entitlements and economic regulation 
are applied to different segments of the population. In 
the case of China, Ong goes further to contend that the 
creation of special economic and administrative zones 
works as a detour on the road to political integration 
of disarticulated political entities such as Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. 
 In addition to ‘neoliberalism as exception,’ 
Ong notes that ‘exceptions to neoliberalism’ are 
also invoked, especially politically, as a mechanism 
to ‘exclude populations and places from neoliberal 
calculations and choices’ (p. 4) and thus deny an 
equal distribution of the fruits of neoliberalism. !is 
is described in the chapter called ‘A Biocartography: 
Maids, Neoslavery, and NGOs’ where Ong tells the 
unfortunate stories of Filipina and Indonesian female 
domestic workers in affluent neighbouring countries 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong. !e 
lives of these migrant workers bear witness to how 
neoliberalism can be malleably instrumentalized as 
a double-edged sword of individual freedom and 
mobility articulated and disarticulated by and within 
varied regimes of governing.
 !e yoking of neoliberalism and exception is 
innovative and more significantly, it unsettles the rigid 
state-population-territory framework commonly seen 
in studies of sovereignty and citizenship. By focusing 
on the interplay of exceptions in some developmental 
states in East and Southeast Asia where ‘neoliberalism 
itself is not the general characteristic of technologies 
of governing’ (p. 3), Ong persuasively maps out an 
anthropological problem-space constituted by specific 
alignments of market rationality, sovereignty and 
citizenship that shape contemporary ‘regimes of living’ 
(Collier and Lakoff in Ong and Collier 2005: 22–39). 
More importantly, Ong’s linking of neoliberalism with 
the concept of ‘exception’ presents a convincing critique 
of Agamben’s rigid bifurcation of the population 
into two halves: zones of citizens enjoying political 
rights, and zones of ‘bare life’ deprived of citizenship 
protections. Drawing on her empirical studies, Ong 
proposes that ‘the space for problematizing the human 
Book Reviews
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is a milieu constituted by a nexus of multiple ethical 
regimes’ (p. 197).
 !is said, there are several reasons to be critical 
of Ong’s text. First, the idea of ‘exception’ implies the 
existence of a normative order which precedes it and, 
indeed, constitutes it by disguising the exception 
within the norm. Ong mentions this point only in 
passing in the introductory chapter (p. 3) but fails to 
clearly address what the normative order is in each 
specific milieu of her investigation. Furthermore, 
despite the novelty of linking neoliberalism with the 
notion of ‘exception,’ the fruitfulness of this approach 
is questioned when acknowledging that modern 
capitalism is essentially a volatile system characterized 
by unevenness, a tension described by Karl Polanyi’s as 
‘double movement’ (Polanyi 1944 cited in Ong 2006: 
10). Ong intends to employ the logic of exception to 
articulate a political space or ‘latitudinal space’ (see 
Chapter Five) where a mix of disciplinary, regulatory 
and pastoral technologies interacts to instill self-
discipline and promote self-enterprising ethos (p. 
79). With this, Ong makes a strong argument against 
the common assumption of capitalist systems as 
transitioning from ‘disciplinary to regulatory modes of 
control’ (p. 121). And yet, there are significant parallels 
between Fordist and post-Fordist eras as illustrated, for 
example, in Ong’s description of the ‘return of the post-
Fordist sweatshops to North America’ (p. 121). !us, 
the ‘exceptions’ that Ong portrays are not so much 
‘exceptional’ as ‘normal.’ Second, despite Ong’s claim 
that this book sets out to conduct an ‘ethnographic 
inquiry into contemporary mutations in citizenship 
and sovereignty’ (p. 10), Ong’s analysis is not so much 
ethnographic as descriptive, which not only attenuates 
the weight of her analysis but also runs the risk of 
giving more discursive power to the advantaged such 
as the states, technocrats and NGOs. !ird, there is a 
lack of an account of methodology in this book. !e 
emerging problem-space that Ong has tried to sketch 
throughout the book appears incredibly complex and 
diverse, so it will be of great interest and help for other 
anthropologists as well as anthropological students to 
learn about her methods of analysis.
 !ese comments aside, Ong’s book is a 
stimulating text that challenges common wisdom of 
neoliberalism and provides sophisticated ideas and 
observations of contemporary ‘regimes of living.’ More 
significantly, this volume offers important directions 
for future anthropological research in the studies 
of governance, citizenship, transnationalism and 
migration.
Darcy Pan
Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm 
University
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Bryan Fanning, 2009. New Guests of 
the Irish Nation. Irish Academic Press, 
pp. 228. 
In a time when Irish citizens are once again asked to vote 
for the Lisbon Treaty Referendum, and posters soften 
voters anxieties with mellow slogans like ‘We Belong’, 
Bryan Fanning’s New Guests of the Irish Nation is useful 
and is quite possibly necessary reading as it informs 
debate, sheds light on some historical grey areas and may 
even provide answers to the many questions that are put 
to the Irish people in a time of economic and political 
turmoil. !e book is a compilation of essays written 
between 2001 and 2008 concerning Irish Travellers 
and asylum seekers, citizenship and rights, integration 
and discrimination, exploitation of migrant workers, 
state and power. !e book is structured so it can be 
read in short chapters or as a whole; and, in essence, it 
confronts political correctness and lifts the veil on the 
rules of belonging to the Irish polis. In this regard, the 
straightforwardness of Fanning is refreshing. 
 !e first few chapters of the book set a 
comprehensive and focused historical framework where 
the links between the production of knowledge and 
the exercise of power become apparent and to a certain 
extent give shape to how all the other chapters are to be 
framed. Giving particular emphasis to mechanisms of 
exclusion, addressing especially cases of discrimination 
towards Travellers, Bryan Fanning shines  a powerful 
light on the role of the mass media in conveying political 
messages and constructing spaces where social cohesion 
or discrimination can flourish. Equally relevant here 
are the personal accounts of spatial exclusion, and the 
fears of a threat to the social order arising the dominant 
community. !e personal comments and accounts of 
exclusion and discrimination related in some chapters, 
especially chapter three ‘!e Remaindered People’ 
where the issue of spatial conflict in rural, urban and 
sub-urban areas is given a special place through the 
voices of Travellers and local communities, and chapter 
eight ‘!e Citizenship Referendum’ where discourses 
of political and public culture are articulated, add a 
sense of tangibility to the issues addressed and make 
informative reading for a wider audience.
 In the subsequent chapters Fanning answers 
some questions regarding cultural recognition and 
raises other compelling and philosophical ones, 
theoretically framed in an interdisciplinary manner, 
citing anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, 
policy makers and the media,  that aim to conceptualize 
racism and nationalism in the current Irish context 
together with the politics of nation-building. In a 
slightly moralizing approach, the author calls for 
cultural recognition and integration, and stresses the 
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role of the state and political discourse while at the 
same time he also calls for solidarity and human bonds 
to develop in a climate of social cohesion. 
 Fanning explores issues of governance, 
funding, law and accountability which play important 
roles in the formulation of social and integration 
policies in a modern society. Perhaps more importantly 
is the author’s call for articulate ideas and leadership for 
political parties in line with public responsibilities. !e 
idea that integration cannot be bought and that rights 
and integration go hand-in-hand, is one that breathes 
throughout the last chapters. !e author calls for 
integration policies to be directed at society as whole 
and not just immigrants and, how ‘the primary goal of 
any viable integration project should be to close gaps 
between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ for the sake of 
future social cohesion’ (p.3). On this specific point, of 
forms of solidarity and the ‘possibility of praxis’, I must 
agree with Gavan Titley, in his review of this same book 
for Translocations, where the issue of ‘Self-integration’ 
is more compellingly raised as a ‘critical gap to the 
practice of solidarity’.
 Perhaps due to the fact that the book brings 
together a series of essays, I cannot help feeling that 
at times it feels a little unfocused and repetitive; 
however, ultimately it succeeds in making an enormous 
contribution to the understanding of Irish society 
and, to making sense of immigration policies and the 
responses to asylum seekers and immigrants. It is my 
opinion however that whist Fanning portrays cases of 
invisibility and marginalization for Travellers, asylum 
seekers and non-EU immigrants, he is silent to the 
cultural recognition and integration of EU citizens 
and the problems and issues they too can encounter 
when moving to a new country. New Guest of the Irish 
Nation is a comprehensive contextualization of how 
institutional barriers and mechanisms of exclusion 
come to form a shell of discrimination and disjointed 
political policies, whilst state funding agencies struggle 
on, juggling and balancing funding, ideas and ideals.
 Seventy eight years after the publication of 
Frank O’Connor’s short-story ‘Guests of the Nation,’ 
which inspires the title of this book, the problems 
and worries that cast a shadow over Irish nationalism 
and human relationships in 1931 still seem to obtain. 
Notions of ‘who we are’ and ‘where we belong’ define 
the criteria for inclusion or exclusion. !e people that 
the Irish nation and state welcomed 10 years ago are 
now deemed unwanted, the partnership that lasted for 
a ‘decade when the business case for mass immigration 
found ready acceptance’ (p.1) no longer sits so snugly. 
In the last few chapters, Fanning explores issues of rights 
in a globalized world and how ‘rights and recognition 
have become wedded to citizenship but that more 
and more people are outside citizenship in the place 
where they live’ (p90). Moreover, the author makes an 
argument for the challenges that social cohesion faces 
when confronted with ethnic nepotism. !e concept 
of ethnic nepotism is central in the development of the 
author’s analysis of the outcome of the 2004 Referendum 
on Citizenship and the inadequate responses to 
immigration issues. Equally important, as also pointed 
out in Titley’s review, is the little consideration given to 
‘racial state’ thinking in the book. Whether to agree or 
disagree in naming the Republic of Ireland a racial State, 
a close and critical examination of further work, would 
have, in my opinion, made for a stronger argument.
 In the Ireland of today, a book like New Guests 
of the Irish Nation is not only a thought-provoking 
read based on academic bodies of work, policy 
reports and the media, it also adds invaluable and 
insightful contributions to understanding the specific 
mechanisms of exclusion in contemporary Ireland 
and the institutional barriers that set the responses to 
marginalized groups.  
DIANA GOUVEIA
Department of Anthropology, National University of 
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Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, 
2009. !e Empire of Trauma: An In-
quiry into the Condition of Victim-
hood. Princeton University Press, pp. 
305. [Orig. 2007. L’empire du trau-
matisme. Enquête sur la condition de 
victime. Paris: Flammarion]
#e Empire of Trauma critically examines the ambivalent 
uses of trauma as a social category that marks the politics 
of victimology and calls into question morality, as well 
as the political and judicial implications attached to the 
concept. !roughout the book, this theme provides 
the framework within which to unpick collective and 
individual experiences, the role of witnesses, judges 
and aid workers. 
 !e foreword to the English translation sets out 
the book’s goals and content: to move beyond medical 
discourses on how to face trauma and, rather, seek a 
re-politicization and historicization of the concept as 
it has evolved during the last century. It thereby opens 
up a discussion on how violence might be explored 
in that particular way. !roughout the book, Fassin 
and Rechtman, by drawing on various case examples 
from their (field)work, discuss the social, political, 
and cultural respectablityrespectability of traumatized 
‘victims’ and draw attention to them not as passive 
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casualties embodying suffering but rather as active 
agents shaped by and in turn shaping power relations 
within our contemporary globalized society. 
 Fassin and Rechtman suggest that ‘trauma is a 
new name to address the relationship between time and 
memory, mourning and obligations, misfortune and 
the misfortunate,’ which enables the anthropologist 
to connect past and present, the powerful and the 
subaltern, the global and the local. By so doing, they 
look at trauma not so much in terms of its psychological 
implications but rather as embedded in a moral 
economy. In this sense, the authors stake out a critical 
position on the actual conditions and flows of capital, 
people, and values that together produce current social 
realities. 
 !e book is organized into four parts and is 
composed ofcomprising two foci: a historical overview 
of trauma is followed by a discussion of three case 
studies that draw on their own empirical data. !e first 
part of #e Empire of Trauma provides the reader with a 
rich, chronologically structured and ilyaccessible guide 
to the evolution and conceptual construction of the 
term ‘trauma,’ wherein the authors provide an overview 
of concepts ranging from hysteria, trauma-neurosis, 
sinistrosis and survivor syndrome to trauma and 
PTSD, at each stage discussing the evolution, usage, 
social reception, and political implications of each one 
within its cultural and historical setting. Yet, due to 
the straightforward and neutral manner in which the 
information is presented, new insights will be few and 
far between for those well acquainted with the topic. 
However, the interested reader will enjoy the historical 
embeddedness and socio-political contextualizing of 
the developments presented.  
 Style and content change in the second part 
of the book: perhaps the most worthwhile elements of 
the text are to be found when the authors train their 
analyses on their own empirical data. !e Politics of 
Reparation, !e Politics of Testimony and !e Politics 
of Truth are the provide the structural headers for the 
second section, wherein the authors discuss the fields 
of psychiatric victimology, humanitarian psychiatry, 
and the psychotraumatology of exile, thereby allowing 
for reflections on trauma format the scale of thefrom 
national, international and transnational, as well as 
from political and socio-cultural perspectives. 
 In the first case study on the explosion at the 
AZF factory in Toulouse in 2001 the authors address 
topics of societal recognition, moral communities, and 
reparation. !ey elaborate on psychiatric victimology 
and the use of the terms ‘trauma’ and ‘suffering’ for 
the building of solidarity and the call for action and 
compensation. In their discussion (also in chapter 
four) of the imputability of PTSD as a formally 
recognized illness, along with its economic, social, and 
political effects, this part of the book also contributes 
to current anthropological debates on the economic 
instrumentalization of trauma. While Fassin and 
Rechtman do not directly address possible exaggerated 
uses of ‘trauma’, their writing is broadly suspicious of 
its instrumentalization, adding, thereby, to the body of 
scholarship that seeks to critically evaluate this trend. 
 !e Politics of Testimony explores 
humanitarian interventions in Palestine, Armenia and 
other places of turmoil. Fassin and Rechtman draw the 
reader’s attention to the various roles aid workers and 
humanitarian volunteers incorporate, and they critically 
examine western policies of neutrality and ethical 
standards. !ey expand their arguments by looking 
at psychological care giving for victims, perpetrators, 
and bystanders, whereby ethical boundaries get blurred 
and empathy, personal interests, and anthropological 
categories such as Othering become central. Ultimately, 
so the authors’ argument goes, humanitarian aid 
workers bear witness to events mediated by ‘trauma’. 
 Truth and representation, trauma and its 
bodily evidence, and juridical, ethical and medical 
intersections are discussed in the chapter on asylum, 
titled !e Politics of Truth. According to Fassin and 
Rechtman, discourses of power and representation are 
at the center of the increasing demand placed on those 
claiming refugee status to provide evidence of their 
trauma through ‘expert certificates’, as legal decisions 
on asylum become evermore weighted in favor of the 
provision of medical proof, often including bodily 
evidence of torture. !e delicate issues of asylum 
policies, human rights and representations of the 
refugee ask challenging questions of western hegemony 
and draw attention to political as well as socio-
economic power relations in such settings. As asylum 
claims are often cast into doubt, the authors show how 
the reemerging phenomenon of suspicion, directed 
at victims’ narrations, shifts the power to judge the 
authenticity of claims to western enlightened medical 
experts.
 All the case studies examined by Fassin and 
Rechtman greatly profit from the wide range of empirical 
data collected separately by the two anthropologists 
throughout their professional careers. Didier Fassin, 
who has long worked as a senior medical professional 
in France and in various French humanitarian 
organizations (e.g. Vice President of Médecins sans 
Frontières), was recently appointed as the first James 
D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social 
Science in (WherePrinceton). He has been connecting 
anthropology, medicine, and psychology throughout 
his professional career, becoming thereby a political 
and moral anthropologist with unique interdisciplinary 
training and experience. Richard Rechtman, in turn, 
is a well known French anthropologist, psychiatrist, 
and editor-in-chief of the French magazine l’Évolution 
Psychiatrique. He has been working as a researcher in 
the Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur les Enjeux 
Sociaux and Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales 
as well as with the Cambodian Diaspora in France. 
 !e authors’ personal background as French 
professionals and their experiences within French 
humanitarian organizations clearly positions the book 
within a francophone setting, adding interesting 
insights on French history and policies, and should be 
read from that perspective; nonetheless, the book isn’t 
limited to the French context but allows for general 
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usage of its theoretical suggestions. 
 It is worth noting that the final section of the 
book includes a sophisticated bibliography with a full 
index of the subjects and names mentioned in the 
book, making it very easy to go back to certain points 
of interest and to use the book as a reference text. 
Furthermore, the work is filled with rich commented 
footnotes that provide the reader with more than 
just the usual side-notes to the main text and help 
illuminate further readings and sources that allow for 
the deepening of the reader’s specific interests.
 While the book’s stated objective is to write from 
an anthropological viewpoint, at times there seem to be 
insufficient connections made with the contemporary 
scholarly literature on, for example, collective trauma 
and its consequences for societies. Moments of dialogue 
with other anthropologists working in the area of state 
violence and political anthropology – such as Marcelo 
Suárez-Orozco, Linda Green, or Antonius Robben 
(who provides a different viewpoint on social trauma 
and questions of moral universes entailed for victims 
and perpetrators of state violence) – are infrequent. 
!is could provide a moment of disappointment to the 
reader looking for comparison or wider discussions on 
current debates.
 All in all, #e Empire of Trauma, engages 
with anthropological topics such as representation, 
narration, and the concept of Othering on a very high 
level. It provides deep insights into the moral economy 
of contemporary societies (especially when it comes to 
the topics of migration and asylum), as well as political 
and juridical processes at stake in our contemporary 
globalized society. Finally, it manages to connect these 
urgent questions with a constant focus on power 
relations and morality. 
 With #e Empire of Trauma, Fassin and 
Rechtman provide a new and highly valuable 
perspective on the topic of trauma that contextualizes 
and critical examines trauma in its own socio-cultural, 
political, and economized settings. !is excellent book 
makes a profound contribution to the anthropological 
scholarship and will soon become a standard text to 
this important area of research.
KATJA SEIDEL
Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria
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Mika Aaltola, 2009. Western Specta-
cle of Governance and the Emergence 
of Humanitarian World Politics. 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 212.
Anthropologists anxious for new thinking on problems 
of global governance today may find interest, and 
perhaps puzzlement, in this volume. Visiting many of 
the topics that grab today’s headlines – the so-called 
‘global war on terror,’ the movements and management 
of people across international borders, military 
humanitarianism, the powers of political emergencies 
– Aaltola invents a fresh, and idiosyncratic, interpretive 
language for discussing international affairs. If the 
substantive themes are ones social scientists everywhere 
are addressing, the figures in Aaltola’s analysis are 
surprising visitors on a stage crowded by contemporary 
clichés. You won’t find Agamben’s bios (the way of 
life proper to an individual or group in a polity) and 
zoë (‘bare life’) under the proscenium of this spectacle 
(and you won’t find Agamben or Foucault in the 
bibliography, let alone Max Weber or Karl Marx). !e 
resulting readings are, then, fresh – if also sometimes 
fanciful.
 Chapters ostensibly touch on specific topoi 
where emergent and shifting global hierarchies can be 
sensed. While one chapter contrasts border politics in 
an expanding EU, a politics of balanced diversity, to the 
surveillance of US borders, a surveillance signifying the 
cementing of a secure American identity that demands 
defending, another chapter finds the fate of empires 
evoked in the smells of airport lounges.  (A substandard 
departure lounge apparently signifies imperial decline, 
making this reader wonder what in the world Aaltola 
would make of Dublin Airport.)  !e hub-and-
spoke world of international air travel comprises for 
Aaltola an ‘aviopolis’ and he sees the airline network 
as an organic skein of relations exhibiting at a global 
level many of the anxieties shown at national border 
crossings – and of course, today many of those 
crossings are at airports.  Building on the language 
of bodies and subtexts of immune function, Aaltola 
moves from the airport concourse to the medical 
clinic in a chapter on ‘pandemic spectacle’: reflexes 
of both fear and preparedness characterize response 
to SARS, mad cow disease, HIV/AIDS, and other 
epidemics.  Like an international tourist tarrying for a 
while in the shopping area of Heathrow’s Terminal 5, 
Aaltola freely samples events and images in compiling 
his story.  He cites televisual broadcasts, paintings by 
Raphael, classical histories, rumors about George W. 
Bush, famous speeches about Finnish fortitude ... and 
the official statistics of the International Air Travel 
Association. Scanning along, Aaltola never ceases to 
risk surprising interpretations and juxtapositions. In 
a chapter ostensibly about border policy, several pages 
segue into intricate discussion of the image of a man 
falling from the burning World Trade Center.
 All of this interpretative gusto is framed by an 
early engagement with !ucydides and the Hippocratic 
medico-political theories that influenced his 
historiography. Intending to yield a ‘neoclassical’ theory 
of political history, Aaltola finds in !ucydides ways 
for understanding the entanglements of global macro-
politics with local micro-politics, as when a conflict 
in South Ossetia in 2008 melds into larger narratives 
of imperial (either Russian or US) ‘submergence’ 
(regression, decline). Justifications for contemporary 
wars and conflicts (like the 2008 Georgian/Russian 
conflict) frequently invoke a humanitarian rationale 
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and evoke sympathy for the suffering citizen or casualty. 
Aaltola therefore sees in global politics the swirling 
‘vortices’ (his word) of affect – especially compassion. 
!e book frequently refers to sentiments or ‘political 
emotions’, and sees these sentiments incited and sited 
in the figures that obsess political discourse today: the 
immigrant, the terrorist, the bureaucrat. Moreover, 
Aaltola suggests that contemporary war is a symptom 
of diseased political bodies. Community harmony or 
balance (Greek: enkratia) is threatened by unbalanced 
and dangerous sentiment (self-interest, greed, anger, 
temptation) called here, again after !ucydides and 
Hippocrates, akrasia.  Akrasia may harden, may doxify 
so to speak, into a pathological stasis.  Communities 
plagued by this condition, in Aaltola’s neoclassical 
reading, act out – and act outward. Lack of internal 
harmony, balance, and prudence produces a state or 
political body which scowls and claws at others, in 
diversionary wars for example.
 What kind of political theory moves from the 
father of political history to CNN Headline news?  I 
was gladdened by Aaltola’s ability to skip past the 
contemporary analytics of sovereignty currently filling-
up thousands of pages in journals and books devoted to 
critical theory and its cousins, including anthropology 
as cultural critique. But the very ease with which Aaltola 
diagnoses political-emotional disorder at the root of 
contemporary conflagrations causes concern. Writing 
of the mass media imagery of a would-be migrant lost 
at sea, Aaltola tells us that “the body in pain is not that 
of the man himself (the migrant); it is actually felt to 
be that of Europe or of its individual member states.” 
Here as elsewhere, Aaltola tells us what is ‘actually 
felt’, but by whom – and how does he know anyway? 
!is book is comprised principally of readings of mass 
media images mixed with reference to his neoclassical 
model of degenerating political bodies that imploded 
(he refers to ‘black holes’ of international affairs) and 
that suck others into the resulting ‘vortex.’  Spectacle 
indeed.  Aaltola’s interpretive style is all image, affect, 
and zeitgeist (whose voice he assumes).  !e problem 
is that global politics seems to be for Aaltola only 
image and sensory response. While dissecting the 
visual rhetoric that obscures the victims of collateral 
damage in the war in Iraq, Aaltola never refers to the 
political economy of energy supplies. In discussing the 
hierarchical map of global air travel hubs, Aaltola does 
not refer to the actual business of air travel, nor to the 
technological facts (such as the relative ranges of an 
MD-11 versus a 777) that condition where hubs can 
be situated. And in criticizing what people putatively 
‘feel’ when witnessing the suffering of a migrant lost at 
sea, Aaltola himself rushes right past the experience of 
the figure at the center of his anecdote: a nameless and 
voiceless man.  
 Aaltola nevertheless puts on an imaginative 
and captivating show.  Ethnographers, thrilled by the 
pyrotechnics on display, will be eager to rush to the 
stage door to talk to the actors and stage-hands who 




Directors Nicky Gogan and Paul 
Rowley, 2008. Seaview. Dublin: Still 
Films. 
!e film Seaview is an essay in ‘killing time’, that is, 
time that is deadening, but that must also be deadened. 
A portrait of the remaindered lives of asylum-seekers 
‘warehoused’ in a holiday camp, deadening time is 
visually realized in the sustained attention to mundane 
institutional space and discarded objects. It is also 
witnessed, continuously, in the narratives of inhabitants, 
from those that ‘talk alone, in the walking way’ to the 
reflective obsolescence of parents, forced to watch 
children watching parents do nothing. Being watched 
doing nothing is pregnant with future cost, and this 
is the additional toll of deadening dead time. Seeking 
asylum, in one resident’s words, is ‘waiting for the zero 
point’, but this waiting is haunted; what if deadened 
time is not the antechamber to a new life? Hope, as 
Ghassan Hage writes in Against Paranoid Nationalism 
is ‘… the future that one can detect in the unfolding of 
the present’ (2003: 10). On direct provision, however, 
it can’t be assumed that the present unfolds. 
 Filmmakers Nicky Gogan and Paul Rowley 
spent three years, on and off, in the ‘re-purposed’ Mosney 
Holiday Centre, getting to know, among others, the 
Congolese, Kurdish, Nigerian, Somali and Sri Lankan 
asylum-seekers enduring a post-Butlins experience. 
!eir initial aim, according to one press release, was 
to do background research for a fictional exploration 
of the Irish government’s plans in 2000-2001 to intern 
asylum-seekers in &otels. ‘Our true intent is all for 
your delight’; who needs fiction when Mosney offers 
you the same pathological spatial fixation as a flotel, 
with a free upgrade to more allusive levels of leisured 
incarceration? What results from embracing this 
dark Celtic Tiger riff on the all-inclusive resort is an 
unsettling, lyrical documentary that develops a distinct 
aesthetic counterpoint to the violence of waiting – ‘we 
lack words to express how we feel.’
In Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the 
Celtic Tiger (2009), Fintan O’Toole notes how corporate 
representations of social space in Ireland in the 2000s 
were invariably set under blue, cloudless skies. !is odd, 
pathetic fallacy from a pathetic, fallacious era captures 
a political tendency to airbrush out evidence – and 
particularly, troubling human evidence – that the ‘best 
of times’ did not effect a magical dissolution of relations 
of power and inequality. Instead, as both Michael 
Cronin and Peadar Kirby argue in their respective 
contributions to the edited volume Transforming 
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Ireland (2009), the Irish ‘economic miracle’, and its 
dominant cultural forms, were profoundly shaped by 
new forms of socio-political regulation, control and 
concealment. Like the clouds prevented from sullying 
the graphic promise of new lifestyles experiences, 
‘asylum-seekers’ vanished from the social imaginaries 
of boom-time Ireland. As the decade progressed, 
public debate in Ireland shifted from the concerted 
emphasis on the threat of asylum-seeking – generated 
in the late 1990s – to a wider discussion of migration, 
and a differentiation of distinct national (and racial) 
populations and occupational groups according to 
newer criteria of economic contribution, cultural 
compatibility, and legitimacy of presence. 
 State-sponsored frameworks of 
interculturalism, diversity and integration promised 
blue skies of mutual enrichment and celebration, but 
only for those ‘here legally’ – a refrain that reveals not 
only implacable assumptions about asylum-seeking, 
but that excluded asylum-seekers from the new 
governmentality of culture (at every ‘consultation on 
best practice’ organized by the Office of the Minister 
for Integration between 2006–8, the brainstorming 
on ‘going forward’ was interrupted by questions 
about the treatment of asylum-seekers. !e response 
was always solemn, and always the same – we can’t 
discuss them here, that’s a matter for Justice). Over to 
Mosney, where asylum-seekers wait for the status that, 
among other things, allows them to become threats 
to integratedness, but where in the meantime they are 
systematically immiserated and immobilized in a society 
of unprecedented wealth and valorized mobility. It is 
to Seaview’s credit that it can resist the excess of these 
dichotomies better than this review. 
 !e film is well aware of the transposed pop 
cultural eeriness of resorts out of season, but it opens 
with a softer evocation of Irish nostalgia, a stylized sigh 
for a past era of mass leisure (that in fact only ended 
in 2000, the final holiday season, and first year as a 
‘location for resettlement’). Long-serving staff guide 
the camera through the back stage, reminiscing about 
the epic industrial production of fried breakfasts, but 
this narrative tails off after an abrupt cut to the current 
residents’ first appearance, on CCTV. !is device 
is no less effective for being somewhat clichéd, as it 
instigates key themes of isolation and disjuncture – 
emphasized through the recurrent filming of daily life 
through curtains, blinds and veils, and by long tracking 
shots that retreat from empty, faded spaces and move 
sporadically through stockpiles of pillows, duvets and 
mattresses. It is also a structuring narrative theme that 
evokes the fragmented isolation of residents; the film 
dwells on Mosney as a space of internal seclusions, as 
well as on its more obvious status as a space of social 
segregation. Children and teenagers aside, residents are 
almost exclusively represented, interviewed or voiced 
alone, or in national clusters, rarely interacting. !is 
provides a cumulative set of vignettes of geopolitical 
chaos, with sharply focused treatments of the Congo’s 
neglected wars, the alienated victims of the Afghanistan 
war for inalienable rights, and the resigned, imaginative 
geography of Kurdistan. 
 When common social moments are 
represented, they are scenes of music and dance that 
hover between realist document of cultural life and a 
silent mocking of multicultural clichés, ‘celebrating 
their vibrancy’. Even when the Community Games 
make their annual appearance, there is the insistent 
visual suggestion that these are the parallel community 
games, conducted oblivious to the residents who use 
the annual event as a way of marking time. And all the 
while, rhythmical montage emphasizes the enormity of 
inner space, its regimented barracks and its redolent 
material degradation. !e ambivalence of enclosure, 
and the daily interaction between residents and Mosney 
staff, and also between residents and government 
agencies, are perhaps underplayed in this totalizing 
drive. !ere are obvious limits to representing such 
interaction, but the insistence on isolation neglects the 
other key dimension of the governmentality expressed 
through spatial segregation; the micro-administration 
of their lives. 
 For all that, the spectral presence of 
administration is superbly rendered through reflections 
on the instability of monotony. Every day is the same, 
until it isn’t – ‘I came home from school and he was 
gone’. It is perhaps only through this multivalent 
production of isolation that the film can recount 
individual stories in ways that avoid the conventional, 
depoliticizing properties of individual portraits. 
Fragments of experience are told to camera, or voiced 
over installation-style images of accumulated domestic 
and institutional materials. !ere are no complete 
stories, racked over narrative arcs of triumph in 
adversity, but rather the patient exposition of enforced 
wastage, infantilization, depression and anxiety. !e 
careful editorial approach weaves testimonies seared by 
distinctive voices and the poetry of sparse subtitling, 
and no where more so than in the sequence that could 
be called ‘inside the sea’; inside the chlorine-tinted 
water of Mosney’s water park, and inside a story – for 
that is where the narrator still lives – of rational(ized) 
murder on the Suez canal. 
 Mosney’s residents do not, in the end, ‘lack the 
words to express how they feel’. I live, says one, dryly, 
between ‘Ahmadinejad and Justice’ – another, equally 
wry, that ‘I came out (being born) and found myself 
in Nigeria’. Should they want to be less figurative, a 
spelling test shows the camp-school children being 
asked to spell ‘penalize’ (the connotation of a well-
known joke about spelling ‘racial discrimination’ can 
hardly be unintended). !e brilliance of Seaview is that 
it shapes it probing and disconcerting approach around 
these insights. 
Gavan Titley
Centre for Media Studies
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
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